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ABSTRACT
A DESEGREGATION STUDY OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
IN NORTH CAROLINA
by
Ransome Ellis Holcombe
The purpose of this study was to Investigate and describe the 
desegregation of public schools In a selected southern state between 
the years 1954 and 1974.
In developing the research project that described the elimination 
of legal blraciallsm In North Carolina's schools, public sentiment 
emerged as a major factor in the desegregation story. Some of the 
key influences on public sentiment which helped to determine the 
success of the desegregation initiative were presented in this study.
North Carolina's public schools were unusual when compared to other 
states with dual systems because, despite the fact that the state had 
one of the largest black populations in the nation, the desegregation 
drama proceeded peacefully and successfully, albeit slowly. Throughout 
the twenty-year period that was required to completely eliminate the 
dual school structure that existed at the time of the Brown decision, 
an abiding commitment to preserve a stable public school system was 
demonstrated by the people of North Carolina.
In the implementation of the Brown ruling, the federal government 
gave the state ten years to begin and ten more to reach compliance.
This judicious application of "all deliberate speed" allowed North 
Carolinians an opportunity to adjust to major societal change as 
progressive sentiment gradually overcame conservative resistance.
The strong stand on law and order by North Carolina's leaders at 
critical stages of the desegregation process helped to account for the 
relatively peaceful demise of legal blraciallsm in the public schools. 
While most of the people were pro-segregationist and repeatedly elected 
leaders who advocated the continuance of segregated schools, they 
ultimately chose to obey the law. State officials, despite their 
pro-segregationist rhetoric, in almost every case stood firm on law 
and order issues.
What was thought of in the 1950s as a regional problem took on 
national dimensions, and, by the 20th anniversary year of the Brown 
decision. North Carolina had some of the best desegregation statistics
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in the nation. The year 1974 was also the 10th anniversary of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the law that actually brought about the 
elimination of dual schools in the state. Under Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act, the powerful Influence of federal aid brought 
North Carolina schools into compliance more rapidly than federal 
officials could have expected when viewed in terms of the amount of 
existent biracialism ten years after Brown. In the Brown decision o 
1954, the concept of legal blraciallsm was voided; by 1974, legal 
blraciallsm was a dead issue in North Carolina, and the system of 
dual schools was completely dismantled in the state.
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka represented a constitutional 
and national challenge to statutory and regional standards that had for 
generations united the South. While the Supreme Court decision on 
May 17, 19i4, was limited to "separate but equal" public school 
facilities in southern and border states, the ruling eventually 
affected educational institutions throughout the United States.
The nation's public schools are ultimately contextual and operate 
within the limitations established by the larger societal framework.
As the country's primary enculturatlon mechanism, the public schools 
are by nature reactive and of necessity evolutionary. They operate 
within the constraints of time and place. Since time is constant and 
accrual while place is relative and circumstantial, change is both 
intrinsic and inevitable. History is the record of human interaction 
in time and place; administration is a function of that Interaction in 
context. The task of school administrators is to manage human resources 
adroitly enough to effect institutional goals that are dictated by 
societal demands in a climate of change. Change is the constant, the 
prime factor in the administrative function; evasion or avoidance may 
Impede the phenomenon, but ultimately change must be managed.
Succinctly, history is the evidence of change and the management thereof
In the course of events that regulates human endeavor, there 
occasionally emerge conflicts or circumstances that profoundly affect
Che attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of the populace. Events of this 
magnitude that disrupt the societal equilibrium and threaten the 
philosophical foundations of institutions are rare in the history of 
America. Traditionally In an open society, problems are emergent and 
evolutionary while solutions are gradual and accommodating. In 
problems involving constitutional rights, citizens have a prescriptive 
imperative to seek redress of their grievances. To suppress an issue 
involving the circumventing of constitutional liberties and guarantees 
for a large segment of the population requires a tremendous amount of 
effort in terms of intrigue and conspiracy. Thus, the time and energy 
devoted to establishing and maintaining racial segregation in the 
public schools of the South guaranteed an emotional tinderbox ready to 
be touched off by the Brown decision. Traditions, customs, mores, and _ 
institutions were at risk. Dual schools devised to insure racial 
segregation was the issue, the crucible was the Constitution, and the 
heat was generated by the Brown decision.
The Problem
Statement of the Problem
The problem of this study was to investigate and describe the 
desegregation of public schools in a selected southern state between 
the years 19i4 and 1974.
Purpose of the Study
School administrators study theory to better manage change. Their 
professional careers are dependent largely on their abilities to 
effectively recognize, assess, regulate, and direct change. Change
management Is the rock on which school administrators' professional 
reputations are founded or upon which their careers founder. The 
opportunity to study change in order to effectively cope with the 
phenomenon is constant, and the professional task of dealing with the 
concept is unavoidable. Since profound change ip rare in American 
institutions, the occurrence of such change begs for the attention 
of all who are judged by their ability to manage transitional impera­
tives. The Brown decision may be the best example in the history of 
education in the United States of profound change and as such provides 
a classic study for the training of educational administrators. It Is 
one thing to develop a sensitivity to the winds of change but quite 
another to be caught in the eye of a hurricane. When the storm broke 
in May of 1954 with the announcement of the Brown decision, many public 
school administrators in the South found themselves in the center of 
controversy. Much is to be learned from the multifarious situations in 
which individuals and communities found themselves as they grappled 
with change.
Desegregation, like so many other educational problems, was 
complicated by myriad factors beyond the control of southern school 
administrators. With the Brown decision, educators found themselves in 
the bright lights of the arena facing a nemesis not of their choosing 
or understanding, and the coliseum was filled to capacity. Before the 
referee could give the rules to the opponents in the ring, fights 
began breaking out in the stands.
Significance of the Study
In establishing the significance of desegregation as a problem
meriting study, it is important to recognize that the elimination of
biracial public schools after the Brown decision brought about racial
conflict at the "grass-roots" level in America. According to British
historian, Arnold Toynbee, the most important aspect of the history
of the twentieth century will be racial conflict. The East-lJest
Ideological conflicts are subordinate to and Influenced by how the
conflict between the white and colored races of mankind are to be
resolved.1- .What was thought of in the 1950s in the United States as a
regional problem took on national dimensions and evolved into a dilemma
that could only "be resolved in terms of action, attitudes, and
„2
behaviors of the entire country."
The selection of the desegregation of North Carolina's public 
schools as a dissertation topic might seem ambitious in scope. With 
the application of strict limitations and the establishment of careful 
parameters to thb problem statement, however, an Important, clearly 
defined panel in a much broader panorama can be examined successfully. 
Scholarly investigations of this type have been accomplished for many 
school systems in southern states. ’Regional overviews of the 
desegregation ordeal have been published that are descriptive of the 
social issues involved in the elimination of the dual school systems
^ Arnold Toynbee, "War of the Races," New York Times Magazine,
7 August 1960.
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John Popham, as quoted in the New York Times, 13 March 1956, .
in the South. Dual schools were products of biracialism, and 
blraciallsm is the single most important unifying theme of the southern 
psyche. The South is a state of mind that, although geographically 
based, transcends location and time. The mind of the South is as 
rarely left behind when its natives cross regional boundaries as it is 
acquired by outsiders as they flood the Sun-belt. There are as many 
Souths as there are types of southerners. In addition to blraciallsm, 
the common bond is a state of mind based on tradition, heritage, and a 
sense of place in time that gives ground grudgingly to the national 
sameness exemplified by the voice giving the six-thirty news on any 
television network.
North Carolina has probably been called home by more different 
genres of southern stereotypes than any other state. As one of the 
first settled regions in the political divisions that make up the 
southern states, North Carolina developed early a cultural and social 
diversity unequaled in any one state in the rest of the South. Looking 
south and west, North Carolinians can see mirrored reflections of the 
many Souths they have known within the state's own borders. North 
Carolina probably has as many elements representative of the regional 
whole as any other state in the South.^
Miami is about as far south as one can go, yet the concept of 
"Southern-mindedness" there is not as prevalent as can be found in the 
"hill-billy enclaves" of Baltimore, Detroit, or any number of northern, 
western, and middle-Amerlcan population centers.
 ^Hugh D. Graham, Crisis in Print CNashville: Vanderbilt University
Press, 1967), p. 23,
A strong, though late-blooming, commitment to public education 
makes the state an attractive subject for the study of the desegrega­
tion of schools. This preoccupation with public schools in the 
twentienth century had clear economic overtones. The hymn of "the 
New South" proclaiming the gospel of industrialism found ready converts 
In North Carolina. The concept of tax-supported public schools was a 
tenet of "the New South" strategy for attracting development capital. 
During the first fifty years of public schools in the South, more 
notably since the 1940s, North Carolina has demonstrated a financial 
commitment to education rarely equaled in the region. The problem of 
financing a dual school* system placed a relatively high burden in terms 
of ability to pay on the taxpayers of the state. A need for money for 
education weaves a common thread through the public school movement 
in North Carolina. This study will attempt to establish that this 
common thread was picked to facilitate the unraveling of the very 
fabric of segregation in the public schools. That the infusion of an 
unprecedented amount of outside money in the form of federal aid for 
education served to markedly tempei the winds of change is a main 
thesis in this desegregation story in the South. Over a billion 
dollars of additional revenue judiciously distributed during the period 
selected for the study lends validity to the saying that "it's an ill 
wind that blows no good." The winds of change that blew through the 
South following the Brown decision destroyed the legal basis of 
biracialism, swept away the last vestiges of de lure racial segregation, 
and forever changed a way of life for the region.
Assumptions
The review of literature related to the study of the desegre­
gation of the public schools in North Carolina led to four basic 
assumptions and several secondary areas for investigation. The first 
and most basic assumption was that historical inquiry of this nature 
is a legitimate area of educational research and that contributions to 
the body of knowledge in education are valid endeavors in educational 
research. The study of an educational topic in historical terms is 
justified by "the simple desire to acquire knowledge about previously 
unexamined phenomena"'5 and the ability to organize the research data 
in such a way that it contributes to a better understanding of the 
events occurring during the period. According to the historian 
Bernard Bailyn, in this type of research, information may be presented 
and analyzed, but precise issues may remain undefined. "There are no 
specific questions and no hypothetical answers."® The motivation for 
developing this kind of study is informational in nature. There is no 
claim made to breaking new ground or to reinterpreting the events 
described. This study is an attempt to synthesize and reorganize the 
data in a way that wili help to fill an important gap in a historical 
period. The second basic assumption was chat federal aid in large 
quantities can help accomplish national goals In regional matters. 
Third, it was assumed that the Supreme Court decision rendered in
® Walter R. Borg and M. D. Gall, Educational Research, 4th ed. 
(New York: Longman, 1979), p. 377.
® Bernard Bailyn, "The Problems of the Working Historian," The 
Craft of American History, ed. A. S. Eisenstadt (New York: AHM
Publishing, 1969), pp. 202-03.
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka and the subsequent Implementation 
rulings were legal and constitutional. Finally, it was assumed that 
the issue of school desegregation was both de jure and de facto in 
disposition and that de facto segregation would continue to be a 
pervasive national problem.
In addition to these basic assumptions, the following secondary 
premises were considered pertinent to the study:
1. That districts with a smaller population of blacks are easier 
to desegregate than districts with a greater concentration of blacks.
2. Conversely, that districts with a smaller population of whites 
are more difficult to desegregate than districts with a greater concen­
tration of whites.
3. That stronger sentiments against desegregation are expressed 
by the populace in rural areas than in urban areas,
4. That state ways can eventually change folkways.
5. That de jure segregation is easier to dismantle than de facto
segregation In cases where the law is the basic reason for the segre­
gation.
6. That total desegregation is possible while total Integration 
may not be an attainable goal.
7. That desegregation is practical and desirable, while integration
may not be practicable or desired.
Limitations-
1. The focus of this study is the two decades following the Brown 
decision, 1954-1974. The twenty-year period is broken down into two
equal parts; the ten years of resistance, from 1954 to 1964, and the 
ten years of compliance strategies, fron 1964 to 1974.
2. This study makes no attempt to address the complex problems 
involved with de facto segregation other than superficially. The 
phenomenon is a distinct problem outside the scope of this investi­
gation.
3. There is no claim made to breaking new ground or to 
reinterpreting the events described. The study is an attempt to 
synthesize and reorganize the data in a way that will help to fill an 
important gap in a historical period.
4. This study is not presented as representative of desegregation 
efforts for the region. Each state took a different path to arrive'at 
the same destination, and some historical research has been published 
to describe the various efforts, The paths converge at some points, 
but the pilgrimage was generally as diverse as the situations and 
Individuals involved.
Questions Considered Pertinent 
to the Problem
1. Was Che rate of desegregation of the North Carolina public 
schools accelerated by the threat of loss of federal aid to education?
2. Why did the desegregation of North Carolina's public schools 
proceed at a faster rate and in a more orderly fashion than the 
desegregation process in other states in the region?
3. Was the twenty-year period selected for the study of desegre­
gation of North Carolina public schools the most logical time-frame 
for this project?
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4. Did coherent patterns of resistance to desegregation 
strategies emerge during the desegregation proceedings?
5. Why is de jure segregation easier to eradicate than de facto 
segregation?
6. Did the elimination of dual schools provide equal opportunity 
for blacks in the North Carolina public school system?
Definition of Terms
Segregation
Separated or set apart from others. The provision for separate 
facilities in institutions or public places.
De Facto Segregation
Kaclal imbalance resulting genuinely from housing patterns or 
demographic distributions with no basis for the separation in law.
De Jure Segregation
Racial separation brought about by deliberate legal dictum on 
constitutional, statutory, ordinance, or school board authority, to 
Include the gerrymandering of districts to avoid Integration.
Desegregation
The act of ending segregation of races in schools and public 
facilities. Desegregation is distinguished from Integration in that 
the latter implies much more than the mere removal of segregation 
barriers.
11
Integration
Removal of any barriers imposing segregation upon individuals or 
groups of various racial backgrounds so that they may function as a 
unit in a more or less stable or harmonious pattern. Integration 
implies a positive acceptance by whites of blacks as persons into the 
group or the acceptance by blacks of whites.
Organization of the Study
The study was organized into seven chapters followed by an 
annotated bibliography. Appropriate maps, tables, and graphs make up 
the appendices.
Chapter 1 includes the introduction, the problem statement, and 
the elements that define and delimit the study.
Chapter 2 is a brief review of the history of North Carolina from 
the Colonial Period to 1954, concentrating on education and racial 
segregation. The study is both chronological and thematic In nature, 
constituting a procedural effort to develop a comprehensive background 
for the investigation of the problem. Although narrow in scope, this 
chapter is necessary to explain an evolutionary cultural pattern that 
entrenched blraciallsm in North Carolina.
Chapter 3 is devoted to the 1954 Brown decision as it affected the 
North Carolina public schools. Public reaction to Brown on the local, 
regional, and national level is Included in this segment-
The "Decade of Resistance" between 1954 and 1964 is presented in 
Chapter 4. The term "all deliberate speed" wbb never more than foot 
shuffling in North Carolina and the rest of the South.
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Chapter 5 describes the Impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
other federal legislation designed to bring about desegregation com­
pliance. "Civil Rights and Civil Wrongs" brought North Carolina into 
focus as the axis where desegregation turned the corner in the South.
The "Decade of Compliance" between 1964 and 1974 is chronicled ir. 
Chapter 6, By 1974, the eleven 3tates of the old Confederacy hp'1 the 
highest level of school desegregation in the nation, and North Carolina 
was a national leader in the elimination of segregated schools.
Chapter 7 includes the summary and conclusions of the study.
Procedures
A listing of the procedures used in this study follows:
1. A search for related works was conducted in Dissertation 
Abstracts, the Encyclopedia of Educational Research, the Readers Guide 
to Periodical Literature, and the Education Index in the East Tennessee 
State University Library.
2. An ERIC and a Uninet computerized search were conducted for 
related materials in educational research and government documents.
3. A search of the card catalogs in libraries in several cities, 
colleges, and universities in Maryland, North Carolina, and Tennessee 
was completed to find primary and secondary sources related Co the 
study.
4. A study of "Southern School News," published monthly by the 
Southern Education Reporting Service from 1954 until June 1965, provided 
Information on the southern response to the desegregation issue.
5. An examination of statistical data concerning North Carolina 
which are compiled in relevant editions of the Statistical Abstract
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of the United States and the City and County Data Book was important 
to the study. Both reports are periodically issued by the Bureau of 
the Census, United States Department of Commerce.
6. Newspapers used in the documentation of this study are listed 
in the annotated bibliography.
7. A visit to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 
Washington, D.C., was an important part of the research effort. This 
visit resulted in the opportunity to examine desegregation records and 
interview individuals who were directly involved in the program in 
North Carolina. Records and personnel in the Office of Equal Educational 
Opportunity were particularly beneficial because OEEO worked closely with 
the Department of Justice in the initiation of compliance litigation 
against school boards in North Carolina who were reluctant to desegre­
gate their schools.
8. A visit to the State Department of Education in Raleigh, North 
Carolina, provided desegregation information on the public schools and 
afforded opportunities to interview individuals who were involved with 
the compliance proceedings at the state level.
9* Discussions with school personnel in several systems throughout 
North Carolina helped to develop a better understanding of tne problems 
involved in desegregation at the local level.
10. A visit to the office of the Southern Regional Council in 
Atlanta, Georgia, provided material on desegregation statistics that 
proved helpful in developing this project.
11. A search of available primary and secondary sources In 
selected libraries in North Carolina and Tennessee pertaining to the
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desegregation of North Carolina public schools was essential in 
developing a conceptual framework for this study.
12. The selection of the primary and secondary sources for the 
study involved careful scrutiny of available representative materials 
on the topic. The analysis and synthesis of the materials are based on 
over three decades of continuing interest by the researcher in the 
subject. Blraciallsm and the dual schools were vital concerns to a 
generation of North Carolina students who started school in the late 
1940s. The issue sparked debate and discourse in the early 1950s.
With the coming of the Brown decision, debates grew into emotional 
arguments, and discourse became diatribe. Constant exposure to the 
issues involved and an opportunity to study the desegregation crisis 
as it happened helped to provide conceptual direction to the project. 
Attendance at Ku Klux Klan meetings and at seminars at Hampton 
Institute helped provide insight into the problem, although sometimes 
the dialogue created more heat than light. The opportunity to partici­
pate in the desegregation conflict and then to objectively study and 
discuss the events in a clinical manner at a safe distance made it 
possible to establish a dispassionate perspective that facilitated the 
development of this project.
CHAPTER 2
A Brief History of Education in Worth Carolina to the Brown Decision
The Brown decision of 1954, the Civil Rights Bill of 1964, and the
Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965 provided mechanisms to help
alleviate over three centuries of social discrimination in Worth
Carolina. In 1974, the black child attending public school in the
southeastern region of the country was far more likely to attend a
school that was racially desegregated than a black student in any other
region of the United States.1 Yet blraciallsm in the public school was
traditionally thought of as a southern problem. Ell Ginsberg, according
to a study published in the New York Times, argues that the Negro problem
has really been a white man's problem. Only white men throughout the
history of interracial relations in the United States have heen in
positions of influence chat could have made a real impact on Che
evolution of equal rights for the Negro, Ginsberg contended that for
2
"three hundred fifty years white America haB stood the Negro off." Two 
primary reasons account for the perception of biracialiam as a southern 
dilemma. First is the fact that the problem is more visible in the 
South because blacks in the region make up a significant percent of the 
total population. In the United States, ahout 11 percent of the popu­
lation is black. The percentage of Negroes in North Carolina and in
1 U.S., Congressional Record. y4th Cong,, 2d sess., 1976,
9938.
1 Capus M. Uaynick, ed,, North Carolina and the Negro tRaleigh:
The State College Print Shop, 1964), pp. 249-50.
15
16
other southern states is over twice the percent of those living in the 
rest of the country. The second factor is that historically the people 
in the South hove openly practiced blraciallsm as a basic premise of 
their social and cultural mores. Under the combined assault of what 
has been called by historians the Bulldozer Revolution, the Second 
Reconstruction, and Sun-belt Immigration, the foundations of southern 
heritage have crumbled. In North Carolina, where blacks constitute 
one-fourth of the total population, hiraclalism as practiced in the 
past generations in the public schools as well as in virtually all 
aspects of public life has been relegated to history.
Legal blraciallsm came early and stayed late in North Carolina; it 
was finally eradicated only after centuries of suppression and oppression. 
Confrontation and violence flared frequently in the constant efforts to 
keep the Negro In his place. Blacks' gains were incremental and usually 
at least temporarily reversed as whites gave way grudgingly in the face 
of Inevitability. It was two steps forward, one or more steps backward 
repeated over time, and some generations of blacks made little or no 
progress at all in the battle for dignity. Seeds of the irrepressible 
conflict were sewn in the 16U0a when the first slaves were brought into 
the colony. Bitter fruits were to be harvested as a result of this 
unfortunate development. Secessionists made North Carolina the first 
colony to declare for Independence from England in 1775. It was the 
Negro slave question that made secessionists declare their independence 
from the United States in 1860, and nearly a century later secessionist 
sentiment was aligned against the black equality movement in education..
17
Inequality In education was not United solely to Negroes In North
Carolina. For over two centuries education was deemed the right of the
rich and privileged. The plantation society provided for the education
of its young by employing tutors and establishing academies. All other
social classes, which made up the bulk of the population, were left to
their own devices. The first efforts to establish schools were made by
missionaries of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel around
3
1700 in North Carolina. There were no free public schools; however, 
some of the poor and orphaned were rudimentarily educated under the 
apprenticeship system that was established by colonial law.** With the 
coming of the German and Scotch-Irlsh settlers to the colony, some 
community schools were developed. Almost every effort to promote 
education was church related with the only school-associated action by 
colonial government being the defeat of education bills in the 1749 and 
1752 assemblies.^
When representatives of the North Carolina colony severed their 
ties with England, a state constitution was written to replace the 
colonial charters. Section XLI of the 1776 Constitution provided for 
a public school system, but there was no allocation of funds for
3
Edgar W. Knight, Public School Education in North Carolina (New 
York: Negro University Press, 1916), pp. 6-7.
^ Hugh T. Lefler and William S. Powell, Colonial North Carolina 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973), pp. 206-07.
5 R. D. W. Connor, The Colonial and Revolutionary Periods. 1584- 
17H3, North Carolina. I (Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Company, 1919),
p. 179 and p. 205. The 1754 Assembly appropriated S6000 for building a 
school but later used the money for the military.
6
education. The government, a democracy In name only, was dominated by 
the slave-holding eastern planters because participation in state 
government was predicated on a substantial landholding requirement.
Free schools and public education were the antithesis of the political 
and social philosophy advocated by the plantation owners. Planters 
were committed to keeping the bulk of society poor and ignorant in order 
to maintain their political supremacy and promote a slavocracy. The 
most popular sentiment among state legislators was that education was a 
private matter, not a function of the state. They felt that the state 
could not justly tax one man's property to benefit another man's child. 
Slavery and education were inevitably in conflict as institutions. The 
ruling planter class considered the two institutions to be at cross 
purposes and turned their legislative efforts toward passing laws that 
prohibited the education of slaves. Repeatedly they turned down free- 
school bills while over one-third of the adult white population of the 
state was illiterate.^ Sporadic efforts to appropriate money for public
g
schools were successful, but the money was not used for education. Some 
academies were established in the early 1800s, but the education of the 
general public was left to local initiative. Church-related and 
subscription, or old field schools, were broadcast throughout the state,
£
Fletcher M. Green, Constitutional Development in Southern Atlantic 
States, 1776-1860 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
1930), p. 95.
* Connor, Colonial Period, pp. 43y-4b.
® Connor, Colonial Period, p. 479. A bill was passed in 1U25 to 
provide money for the establishment of common schools, but no schools 
were built.
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but they provided for only a small percentage of the school-age 
children.
The 183Us were marked by a surge of Jacksonian Democracy which 
elevated the common man and gave the Individual a greater voice in 
government. This spirit of democracy was manifest in North Carolina by 
the constitutional reforms of 1835 which paved the way for a redistri­
bution of the legislature and a referendum on public schools. As a 
result of this plebiscite, North Carolina passed the legislation and 
provided the funds to establish 1250 school districts. A school was
to be built in each district; the first common schools were opened in
91840, and, by 1846, there was a school in every county of the state. 
Through the 1840s and 1850s, under the direction of Superintendent of 
Common Schools, Calvin H. Wiley, public education was made available to 
every white citizen. By the time that support for the "peculiar 
institution" caused North Carolina to secede from the Union, the state 
had one of the best school systems in the South. The common schools 
operated effectively throughout most of the Civil War, only to collapse 
along with the Confederacy in 1865.
A way of life collapsed with the defeat of the Confederacy in 18b5, 
changing most established institutions in general and the public schools 
in particular. For over two hundred years, the philosophical commitment 
to education had been shackled by the institution of slavery. Negroes 
were brought into the colony early, and, at the time of the American
® M. C, S. Noble, A History of the Public Schools of North Carolina 
(Chapel 11111: The University of North Carolina Press, 1930), pp. 70-74.
20
revolution, more than 25 percent of the total population were slaves*
By 1830 Negroes made up one-third of the total population. The growth 
of the black population, In conjunction with abolitionist activities 
and actual slave insurrections In the South, Influenced legislative 
action in North Carolina during the 1830s. With a large percentage of 
blacks, state legislators were concerned about the Insurrection 
potential and passed a series of acts to control the growing Negro 
population. These laws, known as slave codes, greatly restricted the 
blacks' mobility and rigidly controlled their social interaction. Legal 
restrictions on Negro education extended beyond the slave codes. The 
teaching of slaves to read and write was outlawed, and free Negroes were 
forbidden to teach or preach* These restrictions undercut some of the 
objection to free public schools and helped pave the way for the educa­
tional progress in the 1840s and 1 8 5 0 s , B y  1860, the black 
population had increased to 361,000 and constituted 36 percent of the 
state's total population. By the outbreak of the Civil War there were 
30,000 free Negroes In North Carolina.^ Because of the large number of 
blacks In the state, the legal separation of educational opportunity 
along racial lines was to be repeatedly reinforced by legislative 
action over the next century.
Following the Civil War, the economic and political mechanisms of 
the South were in total disarray. Under military Reconstruction, the
R. D. W. Connor, Rebuilding An Ancient Commonwealth. 1784-1925, 
North Carolina. II (Chicago: The American Historical Society, Inc.,
1929), pp. 23-24.
^  John Hope Franklin, The Free Negro In North Carolina 1890-1860 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1943), pp. 17-18.
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political and economic vitality languished as the southern people went 
through a period of withdrawal precipitated by the rapid change in 
their way of life. During this time the highest premium was placed on 
acquiring the basic necessities of food and shelter. Few people showed 
enthusiasm for the economic realignment required to replace the slave- 
based plantation system which had consumed much of the capital 
expenditures in the ante-bellum period. In addition to the economic 
basef a way of life had been destroyed, and southerners seemed reluctant 
to move in a new direction. The national government, however, was 
determined to change the Institutions, mores, and direction of the state 
of North Carolina along with the rest of the South,
Early in 1865, Che United States Congress created the Freedmen's 
Bureau to help carry out reconstruction programs in the southern states. 
In North Carolina, the Freedmen's Bureau was in operation between 1865 
and 1869. In addition to monitoring the state's governmental machinery, 
the bureau established an educational system for Negroes which organized 
431 schools. The special emphasis on Negro education ended when the 
1868 Constitution was ratified and the Freedmen's Bureau was phased out. 
This 1868 Constitution proved useful in restricting the civil rights of 
the state's large Negro population. Article 1, section 27 and Article IX, 
sections 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 11 of the constitution all dealt with the 
separation of races and provided a fundamental base for the "Jim Crow" 
laws which evolved as the legal pressure to insure civil rights for the 
Negro from the federal level of government waned. Native Carolinians 
took control of government from the Carpetbagger Regime in the early 
1870s, By subsequent amendments to the Constitution of 1875, they
22
established a dual system of state public schools under the provision 
that "the children of the white race and the children of the colored 
race shall be taught in separate public schools."^
Opposition to educating blacks retarded the growth of North
Carolina's public school system prior to 1900. The legislature passed
a bill to allow the division of taxes for public schools to be divided
between black and white schools on a formula based on the amount of
taxes contributed by each respective race.13 This legislation was
later declared unconstitutional because it violated the "separate but 
*
equal" provision written into the state constitution. As a result 
of the reluctance of government to tax to support schools for both 
races, the State Department of Education became primarily a statistical 
bureau.^ By 1900 education1 in North Carolina was still well below its 
stage of development in the late ante-bellum period.
The reasons that the state's school system had languished following 
the Civil War go beyond the simplistic explanation of poverty. While 
it was true that with the collapse of the Confederacy, North Carolina 
had lost an estimated investment of $250,000,000 in slave property, 
there were a multitude of other problems that compounded the education 
Issue.15 Public education had never benefited to any extent from the
Letter, Malcolm Seawell, Attorney General of North Carolina, 
Policy Statement, October 18, 1963 in Facts on Film. Southern Education 
Report. 1964,
Connor, Rebuilding An Ancient Commonwealth, p. 278.
14 Charles L. Coon, "School Support and our North Carolina Courts," 
North Carolina Historical Review 3 (July 1926): 397-408.
15 Albert Coates, The School Segregation Decision (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 1954), p. 21.
capital equity that was tied up in slavery. One factor that had stymied 
educational progress was the Negro problem which had resulted from 
slavery. It was largely the Negro problem which led to the struggle 
over politics and government chat retarded The public school movement. 
The Reconstruction period had seen a succession of Republican governors 
In North Carolina. The South's nemesis, Thaddeus Stevens, had presented 
a bill for the reconstruction of North Carolina that guaranteed 
Republican control of the state prior to the "redemption" of the compro­
mise of 1877,*® By including the blacks in the election process, while 
excluding numbers of whites, this plan had made the Negro a potent force 
in state politics. Much to their chagrin, North Carolinians became 
accustomed to seeing black faces in unprecedented places during the 
reconstruction period. They accepted Negroes in public offices and 
serving on juries only because white people had no choice or recourse 
in the matter. Racial mixing in public frequently occurred. Randolph 
Shotwell, Ku Klux Klan leader and editor of the Asheville Citizen, made 
observations that bear testimony to the unusual situation.Shotwell, 
who was convicted of "Ku Kluxing" and sent to a federal penitentiary in 
New York in 1872, stated that "long processions of countrymen entered 
the village by various roads mounted and afoot, whites and blacks
C. Vann Woodward, The Burden of Southern History (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1960), pp. 93-95.
17 Thad Stem, Jr., The Tar Heel Press (Charlotte; The Heritage 
Printer, Inc., 1973), p. 51.
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marching together, and In frequent instances arm-in-arm, a sight to 
disgust even a decent Negro."!®
The federal Civil Rights Act of 1866 was passed to protect the 
civil liberties of Negroes as citizens and to guarantee them all the 
rights enjoyed by white citizens. Along with the passage of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, Congress approved other bills to 
reinforce their constitutional guarantees. With the Civil Rights Act
19of 1875, the rights of blacks were insured to an even greater extent.
After the adoption of the 1875 Act, the blacks successfully tested their
freedoms by using most of the public accomodations that had been denied
them in the past. The whites reluctantly complied with the laws because
they needed to impress Congress with their willingness to operate their
state government without federal supervision and because they needed
the black support at the polls* Between 1876 and 1884, fifty-two Negroes
2flwere elected to serve in the state legislature of North Carolina. u The
uneasy alliance of this fusion system dominated state politics until
21the 189Us. In 1885, a Negro newspaperman from Boston aggressively 
tested his civil rights in several North Carolina cities including 
Wilmington. He was so impressed with his fair treatment that he wrote 
his editor optimistically reporting that the situation was better than
C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career, of Jim Crow (New Yorks 
Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 41.
!y Woodward, Burden of Southern History, p. 78.,
20 Woodward, Strange Career of Jim Crow, pp. 27-28 and 54.
21 Thomas D. Clark and Albert A, Kirraan, The South Since Appomattox
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 65-66.
expected. In his letter he said, "If you should ask me, watchman tell
us of the night . . .", he would reply, "The morning light is 
22breaking." The facts confim that this black newspaperman was overly 
optimistic and that while racism was still strong, it was of necessity 
masked. If he had visited Wilmington again thirteen years later, 
instead of the morning light that he predicted was breaking, he would 
have seen the light from buildings burning in the worst race riot of 
North Carolina's history. ^  For almost a decade, however, the Negroes 
were treated with some dignity and a lot of hypocrisy.
Democrats had gained control in 1877 when popular Zebulon B. Vance, 
who had been removed as governor during the Civil War when North 
Carolina came under control of the Union, was elected. With the help 
of the blacks, the Democrats were able to control the statehouse until 
1897. Agrarian unrest, brought about by the economic distress suffered 
by the farmers, spawned the Populist or Red-Shirt movement. Using 
fusion tactics against the Democrat leadership, the farmers put 
together a coalition of blacks and Republicans that was strong enough 
to put their man in as governor in 1896. D. L. Russell was the only 
Republican to win the gubernatorial election for almost a century after 
the "redemption" in 1877. Unpleasant memories of reconstruction days 
and the rising determination to put the Negro in his place caused many 
of those same red-shirts and white Republicans who had engineered the
22 Woodward, Strange Career of Jim Crow, p. 41.
^  Knight, Public Schools in North Carolina, p. 324.
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coalition to march in "white supremacy" parades in 1898. The open
attack on the Negro led to violence and racism throughout the state as
the movement to disfranchise the Negro gathered momentum. Backed by
local legislation to effect "Jim Crow" laws and the "separate but equal"
ruling in Flessy at the national level, the voters of North Carolina
effectively eliminated the Negroes from meaningful participation in 
25
politics. The Negro's place in the social system and the determination 
of white North Carolinians not to allow racial mixing in the schools had 
been the most Important factors in the decline of public education in 
the state following the Civil Mar. Once the problem was solved, educa­
tion became an important issue.
With the disfranchisement of the Negro the Democrats moved back 
into firm control in the election of 1900. Now that the danger of racial 
mixing in the schools was behind them, North Carolina Democrats elected 
Charles B. Aycock, who was running on a "better schools" platform.
Aycock had campaigned strongly for universal education, and he was 
elected governor by a clear plurality. Biraciallsm was now again 
firmly entrenched in North Carolina's social structure, so state leaders 
felt secure in making a commitment toward attempting to eliminate 
illiteracy, which for almost a half-century had been an increasing 
concern. According to the U. S. Census, North Carolina had one of the
24 Clark, South Since Appomattox, pp. 72-73; Knight, Public Schools 
in North Carolina, p. 323, and Woodward, Strange Career of Jim Crow, 
p. 89,
2-* Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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26highest illiteracy rates in the nation. The new governor, in a series 
of well-publicized meetings, turned the focus on the school program. 
Aycock believed in the education of the Negro as long as the schools 
were segregated. Ironically, one of the methods used to disfranchise 
the Negro was illiteracy, and, once the black's place in society had 
been reestablished, the state began to take steps to educate all the 
children regardless of their race.
Aycock*s effectiveness as an education governor rested mainly on 
the fact that he was able to successfully convince leaders of business 
and industry that the best investment the state could make was in a 
better school system. Either the governor was correct in his conviction 
that good education promotes Industrial development or the times were 
pregnant for Industrial growth because, as the state improved its 
education effort, the industrial climate evidenced concommitant improve­
ment. North Carolina embarked on a steady course of progress in Industry
and education that moved the state ahead of the rest of the South in 
27both areas. This confluence of education and Industry draws attention 
to another determinant in the progress of the state's schools.
In addition to the effect of the political struggle to establish 
the dominance of the Democrat Party based on white supremacy, disfran­
chisement of the Negro, and biracialism, education in North Carolina 
was dramatically influenced by the rise to power of the businessman.
26 Hugh V. Brown, E-Qual-ity Education in North Carolina Among 
Negroes (Raleigh: Irving-Swain Press, Inc., 1964), p. 72.
^  V. 0. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949), pp. 208-10.
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Although for over a decade following the Civil War the state's economy
had languished, toward the end of the seventies there was some evidence
of an enterpreneural reawakening. Cotton prices, driven upward by
28scarcity, brought new money to the South, The scattered textile
plants that had been in operation in North Carolina before the war,
and had survived, were enlarged; new manufacturing concerns were
established. Soon the cotton mills' combined output was greater than
jo
the ante-bellum textile production.
By the 1880s, a new excitement had begun to pulse in the South,
and southern blood quickened to the promise of a northern-oriented
industrialism. The prophecy of a "New South" that would take a
defeated people back into the mainstream of American life generated
30enthusiasm throughout the region. Evangelists of the "New South,"
such as Henry Grady and his disciples, preached the gospel of 
1 1
industry. North Carolinians, being fundamentalists by religious 
preference, responded to the apostles of the mill. Here was a dream, 
something to be taken on faith, and it fit the psychic mechanism of
Clark, South Since Appomattox, p. 60.
Holland Thompson, The New South (New Haven: Vale University
Press, 1919), pp. 86-87.
30 Francis B, Simkins, "New Viewpoints of Southern Reconstruction," 
The Journal of Southern History 5 (February 1939): 49-61; Arthur S.
Link and Rembert W. Patrick, eds., Writing Southern History (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1965), p. 320.
31 Paul M. Gaston, "The New South," The South and the Sectional 
Image, ed. Dewey W. Grantham, Jr. (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 23- 
28.
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the people. Undaunted by a heritage removed from the American way, 
the state embraced the philosophy of industrialism and clung tena­
ciously to the "New South" version of the great American dream.^3
This industrialism centered around textiles, which remained for 
years the state's major economic base. Additionally, North Carolina 
saw increased manufacturing productivity in the tobacco and furniture 
industries. The rapid growth of big business in the state was 
responsible for developing financial and business leaders who greatly 
influenced the state's political as well as economic decisions.
These labor-intensive industries employed a large number of 
workers; therefore, because decisions affected the economic well-being 
of so many people, the business and industrial leadership became the 
most important factor in the state's politics and government. Attracting 
and promoting industry became one of the major goals of state government. 
To facilitate the economic objectives, leaders needed to cultivate a 
progressive image, and they realized that improvement of schools was 
both an ingredient and a result of the state's economic concerns.
Better schools were*good for business.^
Governor Aycock deserves credit for enlisting the state's 
business leaders in the public school effort, and he also should be
32 George B. Tindall, "Mythology: A New Frontier in Southern
History," The Idea of the South: Pursuit of a Central Theme, ed. Frank
E. Vandiver (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 1-15.
This idea of faith, dreams, Imagination, and unanalytical acceptance of 
circumstances by southerners is a major theme in the writings of Cash, 
Woodward, Warren, Faulkner, Wolfe, Caldwell and Henry Adams.
^  Woodward, The Burden of Southern History, pp. 16-25 and 168-82.
^  Key, Politics in State and Nation, pp. 210-11.
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credited with the establishment of equal treatment of the Negroes in
the division of school revenues. His principles on the revenue issue
were buttressed in state law and by the U.S. Supreme Court. Blacks
had won suits to make sure that the laws were at least superficially 
35enforced. A real commitment to public education had been made;
Aycock and subsequent governors promoted free public schools for both
races. With more adequate tax revenues allocated to education, the
state's school system became a model for the South. Under the
"separate but equal" law, black students in North Carolina were
afforded some of the best educational opportunities for Negroes south
of the Mason-Dixon Line. School laws were applied generally to both
races; however, Negro schools were usually inferior to the schools for 
36whites. Several outside sources provided additional revenue for
blacks' schools. The Peabody Education Fund, the JuliuB Rosenwald
Fund, the Jeanes Fund, the Slater Fund, and the General Education
37Board all made direct contributions to Negro education.
It was the Industrial leaders, in their determination to promote
North Carolina's image as a progressive state, who probably made the 
greatest contribution to education. These leaders of business and 
industry increasingly controlled government in North Carolina, and 
they positively influenced attitudes in support of better schools.
Aside from their opposition to child labor laws, which adversely
35 Lowerv v. School Trustees. 140 N.C. 33, 52 S.E. 267 (1905). 
Brown, E-Qual-ity Education, pp. 115-16.
Henry A. Bullock, A History of Negro Education in the South
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 117-46.
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affected the large textile Industry, business leaders consistently
Ip
backed progressive education legislation. With their support, more 
was accomplished in the first three decades of the twentieth century 
than had occurred in all of the state's history.^
During this period, North Carolina made steady gains in providing 
better schools for both races. Outside of temporary lulls during 
periods of recession, the state legislature proved receptive to 
supporting bills to improve the schools in every session. They 
lengthened the school terms and enacted compulsory attendance legis­
lation. During the 1917 session, the General Assembly ordered a 
comprehensive study of education in the state. The result of the 
long-term study was the creation of the State Department of Public 
Instruction by the legislature in 1921. During the same legislative 
session, the General Assembly created the Division of Negro Education 
which was given the responsibility of providing an Instructional 
program for the Indian schools as well as operating the black schools.^ 
The establishment of the State Department of Public Instruction 
was a major step in North Carolina's educational development. Local 
communities had been relegated the responsibility for funding the 
schools in their communities, with supplemental money coming from the
Katharine Du Pre Lumkin, Child Workers in America (New York: 
International Publishers, 1937), p. 187; Mercer G. Evans, "Southern 
Mill Hills," The Survey 62 (April 1929): 140* Broadus Mitchell,
"Employers Front," The Virginia Quarterly Review y (Octover 1930): 501.
39 Stem, Tar Heel Press, p. 140.
^  Brown, E-Qual-ity Education, pp. 100-01. Indian schools had 
previously been under local control.
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scate. With the advent of the Department of Public Instruction, the 
state began moving toward increasing state control of education and 
major state funding with local supplementation.^ The increasing 
interest in the schools by the state's business leaders was being 
translated into government initiative.
Government leaders realized that with the growing state commitment 
to education more public money had to be raised. The state's mounting 
investment in the public schools was becoming too great for the 
traditional state funding mechanisms. A study of the state's expen­
ditures would indicate that in some years the government spent over 
half of the public revenues on education. The neophyte Department of 
Public Instruction was becoming heavily involved with school consoli­
dation funding and developing a vast transportation network. In 1931, 
under Governor 0. Max Gardner, the state assumed fiscal responsibility 
for a minimum school term of six months.^ This was during the 
depression, and traditional sources of state revenue were decreasing 
as state education expenses were increasing. Although the state's 
taxpayers were hard-pressed by the economic conditions, the schools 
were becoming visibly better. More money, however, had to be made 
available if the state's educational goals were to be realized. During 
the interval between the biennial sessions of 1931 and 1933, a new 
School Machinery Act was developed by a state education committee and 
promoted to Increase revenues. Predicated on the passage of an
^  Coates, School Segregation, pp. 20-21.
42 o. Max Gardner, "One State Cleans House," Saturday Evening Post. 
2 January 1932, pp. 23 and 72-74.
unpopular three-cent sales tax, the School Machinery Act can be
viewed as a gauge of public commitment to education in North Carolina.
Despite strong opposition, Governor J. C. B. Ehringhaus supported the
three-percent sales tax and sold the tax measure as the only way that
/ *1
the school term could be extended to eight months. The passage of 
the sales tax by the General Assembly in 1933 in the middle of the 
depression Indicates the strength of public sentiment for education 
that has prevailed in twentieth-century North Carolina. Although 
unpopular with retail merchants who had to collect it, the three-cent 
sales tax proved to be a very effective method to generate revenue for 
the schools even in times of economic distress.^
In addition, there were ocher measures of success in education 
that were not so visible. These.improvements eventually began to show 
as statistical measurements were employed and comparisons were made in 
the study of the schools. An example of progress in educational 
funding was the expenditures in excess of twenty-million dollars for 
the 1933-34.school term.^ The first annual appropriation in the 
state's budget for schools was only $100,000 in the school year 1899-1900 
which amounted to only one-half of 1 percent of the 1933 amount.^® Per- 
pupil expenditures were over six times greater in 1930 than they were 
in 1915, and teachers' salaries for the same period more than tripled.
**3 Stem, Tar Heel Press, pp. 247-48.
^  George B. Tindall, The Emergence of the New South (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1967), p. 369.
^  Brown, E-Qual-ity Education, p. 125.
34
The literacy rate for about the same period Increased from 54,3 percent 
to 90 percent which was a real measure of educational progress. The 
per-pupil expenditure for Negroes increased by about the same percent­
age as for the whites, but there was still a marked difference in the 
school funds as they were divided between the races. ^
Although Negro schools improved at about the same rate as did 
schools for the whites, racism still limited the black's hope for 
fairer treatment. The depression compounded the problem. Federal 
intervention again increased the racial tensions and the fears that the 
Negro status would change at the expense of the whites. Several of 
Roosevelt's programs to help the impoverished during the New Deal Era 
seemed to benefit the Negroes more than the whites. It was a resur­
facing of old problems connected with who pays the taxes and who gets 
the benefits that had repeatedly antagonized North Carolinians. The 
federal relief lists and the rolls of the public works programs showed 
a heavy percentage of blacks signed up for benefits. The make-work 
programs paid more than day wages in the "cheap labor" state.
Employers complained that they could not get help nor afford it when 
it was available because of the relief programs.^® Federal adminis­
trators of the New Deal agencies made sure that Negroes got a greater 
portion of the benefits according to their numbers because they were 
in greater need. Resentment grew among the whites for some of the 
same traditional reasons that have always undergirded racism. The
4? Bullock, History of Negro Education, pp. 172-81. 
48 Tindall, Emergence of the New South, p. 478,
only outlet for the hostilities and frustrations of the whites was at 
the local level, and it was at that level that the social stratifi­
cation mechanisms operated. "Jim Crow" laws were enforced and refined, 
becoming more firmly entrenched by the reaction to the "outside" 
pressures. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People was Increasingly active, and the open friendship between the 
President's wife and Negroes was a source of constant irritation.^ 
Because of his attitude toward the blacks, Franklin D, Roosevelt was 
the most profaned president ever to enjoy landslide victories at the 
polls in North Carolina.
In education the "Jim Crow" laws affected every aspect of public 
school operations. Everything was separate, If not equal. Even the 
textbooks had to be kept separate according to the students' race.^ 
Whites, who had shared not only the same water bucket but often the 
same dipper in old schools, could not drink from the same water 
fountain with blacks in the few public buildings that they were allowed 
to occupy at the same time.
The fact that "separate but equal" public school facilities were
failing everywhere to educate the Negro was dramatically documented in
51
Gunnar Myrdal's study of blacks in the South. In North Carolina, 
however, those inequities were losing ground. It was not any decline 
in enthusiasm for a racial caste system that waB moving North Carolina
L 9
Clark, South Since Appomattox, p. 392, The Association is 
hereafter referred to as the NAACP.
50 Woodward, Strange Career of Jim Crow, p. 102.
^  Gunnar Mydral, The American Dilemma (New York: Harper & Row,
1944), pp. 879-907.
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Co moderation. Those lawyers in the statehouse were responsible for
promoting more equal treatment for the blacks. Over the years, a
series of Supreme Court rulings had been eroding the "separate but
equal" concept. Highly sensitive to legal evolution, leaders in North
Carolina's government began working to close the gap before It was too
late, When the Supreme Court ruled that salary differentials based on
race were unconstitutional In the public schools, most southern states
disregarded the ruling. Four years later, in 1944, North Carolina was
the only southern state in compliance, and other equalization progress
was being made throughout the public schools.^ North Carolina meant
to keep the Negroes in their place even if it meant spending more tax
money proportionately on the blacks to make sure that the letter and
the intent of Plessy was in conspicuous compliance. North Carolina was
the most fair-minded state in the South in racial matters pertaining
53to schools because they intended to keep biraclalism intact.
The effort to upgrade and equalize the state's public schools 
took an ever-increasing amount of tax revenues. When the first bills 
for federal aid to education began to appear in Congress in the early 
1940s, they were viewed as a blessing. The mood changed when amendments 
were added to involve equitable distribution of federal education money 
to blacks. While it was an acceptable source of revenue for North 
Carolina leaders, the bill was deserted by most southern congressmen,
Coates, School Segregation, pp. 22-23. 
^  Clark, South Since Appomattox. p. 351.
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and it failed.^ North Carolina wanted education money from any source,
and a federal commitment to help educate the state's children would
have relieved some of the state burden. The economic stimulus of
World War II helped finance the public programs during the 1940s, but
North Carolina remained a relatively poor state.
World War II probably caused as much change In the United States
as any other five-year period in history. Change was constant and
dramatic in North Carolina, and it extended to the Negro. The war years
created opportunities for employment unprecedented in the state. One
55black leader was quoted as saying, "Thank God for Hitler." The war
economy created more job opportunities and better pay for the Negro than
had ever existed in the past. The improved economic status of the
black gave rise to new mobility and new militancy in the black community.
The militant spirit was evident when Negro leaders Issued a statement of
what the blacks wanted and expected in the South. In a meeting in
Durham, North Carolina, in 1942, black leaders developed a long list of
expectations involving equal rights for the Negro in most areas of
social intercourse. The statement, which was Labeled the Durham
Manifesto, demanded equal opportunity in education. The Manifesto
reads in part, "It is imperative that every measure possible be taken
to insure an equality of education to Negroes and, indeed, to all
56underprivileged people."
54 Tindall, Emergence of the New South, p. 497.
55 Stem, Tar Heel Press, p. 285.
55 Thomas D. Clark, ed., The South Since Reconstruction (New York: 
The Bobhs-Merrill Company, 1973), p. 351.
The Durham Manifesto created such controversy that the University 
of North Carolina funded an extensive study which was published under 
the title What The Negro Wants, The blacks who contributed to the 
book startled the professors editing the book by starting their demands 
at about where the most radical blacks had been expected to end their 
proposals for societal change. In his essay that was included in the 
book, a young Roy Wilkins called for an end to segregated schools. 
Wilkins, later to become one of the moderate leaders in the civil 
rights movement, stated that "there can be no equality with segre­
gation . . . the Jim Crow public school system would seem to be all 
the proof n e e d e d . T h e  publication of the book caused an increase 
in the level of tension in North Carolina. Howard Odum, the prominent 
University of North Carolina expert on interracial relations, wrote 
extensively about the rising level of racial tensions caused by the 
social flux during the war years. According to Odum, the relations
CO
between the races had deteriorated to an alarming extent. Roy 
Wilkins gave testimony to that fact by noting that although Negroes 
were making a real contribution in the military forces, they were 
treated as second class citizens when they tried to serve their 
country. He cited the example of a Negro teacher who, when he went 
to a recruiting office in Charlotte with four of his students, was
57 Clark, South Since Reconstruction, p. 351.
CQ
Woodward, Strange Career of Jim Crow, p. 119.
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attacked and beaten by the recruiter. In North Carolina, patriotism 
had its price.59
While the 1940s saw some educational' progrees for the blacks, 
most of the efforts in education were to upgrade the quality of the 
schools in general. In 1941, the education effort was focused on 
changing the public school graduation requirements from eleven years to 
twelve. Three years later, the state went to a full nine-month school 
term for both races. That same school year, 1943-44, saw the compul­
sory attendance age raised from fourteen to sixteen.^ Near the end 
of the 1940s, the General Assembly asked the governor to appoint a 
committee to make a comprehensive study of the public school system. 
This study pointed out the progress made in the total school program 
and revealed some glaring inequities in the dual-school system.
This report entitled Education in North Carolina: Today and
Tomorrow was prepared by the State Education Commission and served as 
a base for legislative action to upgrade Negro schools. When Governor 
Cherry presented the report to the biennial session of the General 
Assembly, progress in school finance was obvious. In the years after 
the state took control of the public school system in the early 1930s, 
educational expenditures had more than tripled.^ In the past eight 
years, the school outlays had increased to more than twice the 1940
5® Clark, South Since Reconstruction, p. 357.
^  Brown, E-Qual-itv Education, pp. 129-32 and Tindall, Emergence 
of the New South, p. 720.
^  Education In North Carolina: Today and Tomorrow. Report of
State Education Commission to Governor Cherry, 24 September 1948, 
p. 545.
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expenditure while the population had shown an increase of only 13 
percent. Federal aid to education, which had been only a fraction 
of 1 percent in the early thirties, had grown to over 2 percent by 
19AO largely through New Deal legislation. Impact aid and agricultural 
subsidies had accounted for increased federal funding until by 1948 they 
both constituted over 7,5 percent of the total state education budget. 
This federal revenue had helped make it possible for the state to have 
the best public school system in the South. On the debit side of the 
report was the problem of the dual-school system. Class sizes in Negro 
schools and a few white schools ranged as high as forty students per 
class. The level of education attained by teachers varied greatly.
Some schools had excellent college preparatory and vocational courses 
while others had courses that did not prepare students well for anything. 
There were marked differences among all schools, but when Negro schools 
were compared to white schools, the contrast was dismal. On 
standardized achievement tests, the black children scored from one to 
two grade levels below white students. The report concluded that the 
greatest inequities existed In school facilities. School plants ranged 
from attractive, well-designed school buildings to "unsanitary, over­
crowded shacks." There were few decent Negro school buildings in the
state.62
Material concerning differences in the black and white schools 
comes from pages 142-143 on test data, 545 on school expenditures, and 
571-572 on contrasting conditions of State Education Commission Report.
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The best measure of the Inequity between the black school 
facilities and those for the whites was starkly brought out by the 
statistical evidence. While the Negro student accounted for about 
one-third of the public school enrollment, the value of white school 
property wsb almost eight times greater than the value of the Negro 
schools. It was clearly evident that the white school facilities were, 
on the average, over twice as good as the Negro buildings during the 
1940s Since the difference In educational facilities appeared to be 
the biggest problem, the state legislature approved a $50,000,000 
appropriation and bond issue for upgrading public school facilities. 
Voters approved the bond issue in a 1949 referendum.^
The decade in which the blacks would break the color barrier in 
schools in North Carolina began with one of the worst examples of 
racist politics in half a century. This senatorial campaign that was 
described as "a display of racial bitterness such as this state had 
not witnessed for fifty years" put liberal educator Frank P. Graham out 
of the United States Senate before he had an opportunity to learn his 
way around. ^  Graham had been appointed to the Senate in 1949, and in 
his first campaign to keep the seat, he was crushed by Willis Smith. 
Publicists for Smith's position declared that "the whole N double A CP" 
was backing Graham to the hilt.^ The dynamics of the voter support
63 Patrick McCauley and Edward D. Ball, Southern Schools: Progress
and Problems (Nashville: Southern Education Reporting Service, 1959),
p. 51.
^  Coates, School Segregation, pp. 19-20, and State Education 
Commission Report, pp. 307-08 and 571.
^  New York Times. Ii6 June 1950, ^6 Stem, Tar Heel Press, p. 254n.
for Smith, who was running on an openly racist, "white supremacy" 
platform, clearly reaffirmed the North Carolina voters' stand on 
racial Issues and reiterated the social statement that made North 
Carolina's blend of progressive conservatism peculiar. The election 
of Smith reconfirmed that North Carolina voters were determined to 
keep the Negro in his place.
With the movement to reinforce the "separate but equal" dictum,
the state went about trying to equalize the dual-school system
determinedly. Concerned about the.encroachment of blracialism
standards by the federal courts, the state legislature appropriated an
additional fifty-million dollars to upgrade schools, and the Negro
students began to receive for the first time a really equitable
portion of state educational expenditures. North Carolina led the
South consistently in public-school-expenditures effort, and now the
68Negro students were getting their share. The results of the 
equalization effort began to emerge statistically; for every dollar 
spent on white students, the Negro students now got ninety-one cents. 
Where the legislature had found obvious disparity— in Bchool property- 
enough progress had been made in the early fifties to reach near­
parity. North Carolina was now spending more on its black school 
children than its white students.^ If in North Carolina state 
education was a "sacred duty" as the Supreme Court of North Carolina
67 Numan V. Bartley and Hugh D. Graham, Southern Politics and the 
Second Reconstruction (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1975), p. 25
and Tindall, Emergence of the New South, p. 645.
6® McCauley, Southern Schools, p. 26.
69 McCauley, Southern Schools, pp. 37 and 148,
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had declared in one of Its decisions, the Negro children now benefited
70from that sanctity.
Placing a high premium on education made the North Carolina tax­
payers have to dig far deeper into their pockets than did their 
neighbors. The state ranked fifth from the bottom in per capita 
income in the nation while they ranked fifth from the top in public 
school expenditures as a percent of total personal income.71
The school budget for the school year 1953-54 was set at just 
under 150 million dollars, and state officials were very aware of the 
decreasing revenue from the federal level. With the extra money that 
had become available because of the buildup of federal installations 
during World War II, North Carolina budget makers had begun to depend 
on federal aid for education. In the years immediately following the 
war, almost 8 percent of the total school revenue was coming from 
Washington. This was no small blessing to a state in which per capita 
earnings were extremely low and educational effort was exceptionally 
high, Nearly seven-million dollars in federal largess had been 
available to the public schools in 1948.^ Now as the school expendi­
tures increased enormously in the effort to improve the dual-school 
system, the percentage of the federal funds decreased substantially. 
The taxpayers in the relatively poor state were faced with making up 
the difference. What had been a dependable source of revenue for the
^  School District v, Almanace County, 211 N.C. 213 (1937).
71 Harry S. Ashmore, The Negro and the Schools (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1954), pp. 115 and 144-45.
72 State Commission of Education Report, p. 545,
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public schools was greatly diminished in a time of need. As the
federal installations were cut back to peacetime levels, the dollar
amount of federal aid in the 1953-56 school year was actually less
than had been received in 1968. The total revenue from federal sources
was only about half of the percentage that the state's public schools
had received in the post-war years. As taxes had to be increased
to make up for the revenue loss, state budget directors began to
realize just how important the additional revenue from federal aid had
become. It was a lesson well learned that would figure prominently
76
in the eventual breaking down of segregation barriers.
According to the 1950 Census, North Carolina had the second largest 
Negro population in the United States. Georgia had more blocks than any 
other state, however, their total Negro population was only a few 
thousand more than that of North Carolina. When compared statistically 
with the white population In North Carolina from 1960 Co 1950, there 
was a decline in the percentage of the Negroes— because of emigration—  
although their population figures increased marginally. The Negroes 
constituted about 25 percent of the state's total with a population of 
1,067,353 compared to a total of 3,016,576 whites.
Most of the Negroes lived in the eastern half of the state with 
the heaviest percentages occupying, the black-belt that had teen a part 
of the old, plantation South. There were nine counties with a black 
population of over 50 percent; this number of black majority counties
^  This section of federal aid is based on figures from the 1968 
State Commission on Education Report and McCauley, Southern Schools, 
pp. 26 and 89.
^  Clark, South Since Appomattox, p. 185.
45
was down from nineteen In 1900. Forty-three additional counties had
a black population between 25 and 50 percent.^ Blacks could be a
potent force in local politics which had been proved to North
Carolinians' dismay immediately following the Civil War. Generally
impoverished and repressed in 1950, the Negroes had little Impact on
state politics. That they were a potential force to be dealt with was
evident to North Carolinians by the rise in the number of voting-age
Negroes who were registered to vote between 1940-1950. In 1940, out
of the blacks eligible to vote, only 10 percent were registered. By
1950 this number had risen to 18 percent, and with the rising militancy
displayed in the black communities, segregationists had reason for 
76concern. Out-migration continued to be a means of registering 
discontent; from 1930 to 1950, North Carolina had lost a large number 
of blacks, and following 1950, 207,000 more blacks left the state.77 
The Negro citizens were getting restless and making demands; the 
"white supremacy" majority was getting uneasy— especially in the 
eastern half of the state— because blacks wanted to vote.
Two reactions to the black unrest were immediately obvious. In 
most southern states, the extremist elements worked diligently at 
keeping the Negroes In their place. This was the extra-legal route,
Brown, E-Qual-itv Education, p. 145; Coates, School Segregation, 
p. 32; Ashmore, The Negro, pp. 188-90.
Allan P. Slndler, Change in the Contemporary South (Durham:. Duke 
University Press, 1963), p. 125.
77 W. D. McClurkin, ed., High Schools in the South (Nashville: 
George Peabody College for Teachers, 1966), pp. 5 and 267.
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even though it often enjoyed legal sanction. The second reaction was 
legitimate control through the mechanics of government that had worked 
in the past. An Inherent problem Involved in using legal strategies 
to control blacks was that law is evolutionary and tends to erode 
over time as exceptions become precedent. There were plenty of 
segregationists in the state who were willing to emulate the illegal 
tactics of their fellow extremists in other states. There were also 
Che lawyers in the statehouse who worked on legal innovations to deal 
with the problem.
There were sevhral examples in the early 1950s of the extremists' 
search for a solution such as night-riding, cross-burning, and general 
Ku Kluxing. Much of the violence and racial harassment was in the 
eastern half of the state and probably contributed to the high migra­
tion rate in the eastern counties. A series of conflicts broke out in 
early 1952 in the southeastern part of the state near the South Carolina 
border. For over a year the violence and continual conflicts kept 
Robeson County--together with its neighboring counties— in a constant 
state of lawless turmoil. The area was an armed camp during the period. 
More Chan a dozen peonle were flogged, crosses lit up the nights, and 
kidnapping and assaults were common. In a public statement to the 
Klan, the Solicitor of Robeson County told the members that if they broke 
the law they would be charged, arrested, and vigorously prosecuted in 
the state's court system. In 1953 after several of the Klan's members 
had been prosecuted and convicted, the General Assembly passed the
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scrongesc anti-Klan legislation in the South. By their actions the
legislators reiterated their conviction that North Carolina was, and
78would remain, a state of laws.
While the lawyers who ran the state government made it clear that 
they would uphold law and order, they worked on legal strategies to 
maintain the segregation that most voters of North Carolina demanded.
One strategy had long been employed and was periodically refined. This 
technique had been devised to assure Democrat political control in the 
state at- the expense of the Republican Party. The Republicans were 
districted out of real political power through sophisticated gerry­
mandering techniques in the west as the blacks might be in the east.
The black strategy was not as clearly defined as the Republican strategy 
because the threat of a concentrated black vote had been of little 
consequence after 1900. With the growing militancy among blacks and 
their demands to participate in elections, political control techniques 
would have to be developed. The example of the dispersal of Republican 
strength might be used against the blacks as effectively. Although the 
members of the Republican Party were concentrated in the uplands along 
that spine of Republicanism that runs down into the South along the 
range of the Appalachian chain, political districts dissipated their 
impact. Even though the party made up one-third of the registered 
voters in the state, the Republicans could elect only a few local 
legislators and were rarely able to send one of their members to 
Congress. They had the numbers, but the districts were drawn to
"Hard Times for the Klan," New South. March-April 1952), pp. 6-7, 
Clark, South Since Reconstruction, pp. 496-97.
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neutralize their numerical advantage. The Tenth District was a perfect 
example. The Tenth ran from the Tennessee state line above Elizabethton 
past Charlotte over a hundred miles to the east— from Mitchell to 
Mecklenburg. Of the six counties forming the district, only 
Mecklenburg County had a strong Democrat majority. The remaining five 
western counties ranged from staunchly to moderately Republican in 
voting strength. Mecklenburg, containing Charlotte— -the largest city 
in the state— with its heavy percentage of urban Democrats, provided 
the margin that usually eliminated Republican hopefuls. Charlotte 
blacks, who were mostly registered as Democrats, helped maintain the 
party strategy. ^  As the number of black voters increased, the 
districts might have to be rearranged. That was a time-tested r,law 
and order" way of dealing with political forces. Before the techniques 
to neutralize the black vote were necessary, the legal minds in state 
government were faced with a more important consideration in the Brown 
decision.
The speck that appeared on the far horizon in Justice Harlan's 
dissent concerning the Plessy decision had been growing almost unnoticed 
through a half-century. With the gradual erosion of the "separate but 
equal" doctrine, North Carolina's leaders became aware of gathering 
clouds and began making belated equalization efforts in the dual­
schools program. By 1954 enough progress had been made toward meeting 
constitutional requirements that they felt confident that the state
79 Sindley, Change in the South, p, 183; also see Bartley, Southern 
Politics, p. 91; Key, Southern Politics, pp. 223-27; and Tindall, 
Emergence of New South, pp. 166-67.
could ride out the impending storm and emerge with institutions intact.
The leaders were concentrating more on legalisms than realities,
however, and North Carolinians were unprepared for the flash of
80lightning that struct; on May 17. Therefore, the storm that broke 
with the Supreme Court's ruling drove many of the state's people into 
the extremists' camp.
Coates, School Segregation, p. 25.
CHAPTER 3 
Decade of Resistance
Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al. (1954) was a 
culmination of the United States Supreme Court's deliberation of five 
school desegregation cases involving Kansas, Virginia, South Carolina, 
Delaware, and the District of Columbia, The cases were essentially a 
challenge to the "separate but equal" doctrine that had been established 
in 1096 by the Plessy v, Ferguson (1896) decision. Originally involving 
racial segregation on railroad accommodations, Plessy v. Ferguson under­
girded the legal concept of "separate but equal" facilities in a broad 
spectrum of areas which included the segregation of children in public 
schools. Known as the "Jim Crow" doctrine, the Supreme Court's Plessy v. 
Ferguson ruling which legitimatized segregation solely on the basis of 
race was severely eroded by 1953 when the school desegregation cases were 
grouped under one title. Actually the District of Columbia case, Bolling 
v. Sharpe, was not added to the Brown compendium until the final Brown 
action because of procedural differences in the case. These cases were 
to change laws nearly a century old that represented a way of life for 
forty million Americans in the South. Over four and one-half million 
of those Americans lived in North Carolina.
The theoretical "Separate but equal" based on the Plessy v. Ferguson 
ruling never translated into much more than one-half of an equation.
While the reality of separation was accomplished in the public schools 
of North Carolina, the concept of equality was illusive even after it 
became a major goal. In a 1948 report to Governor Cherry, a select
50
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committee had focused on the great differences in educational oppor­
tunities available to Negro children when contrasted with those 
available for white children. This report made by an independent 
committee that Included future governor William Q. Umstcad stated that:
The State Constitution provides in part as follows:
'The children of the white race and the children of the 
colored race shall be taught in separate schools but there 
shall be no discrimination in favor of or to the prejudice 
of either race.'
The report concluded that the allocation of educational funds had not
2
followed the mandate of the legislature or the constitution. The 
response by the state legislature to the frank admission that "separate 
but equal" was not working in North Carolina was a significant increase 
in the allocation of fiscal support for the Negro schools. Progress 
was made toward equalizing educational expenditures and facilities for 
Negro students that was unmatched by other states in the South in the 
early 1950s. Educational equality in the fiscal sense appeared to be 
a realistic goal in 1954 when the U.S. Supreme Court changed the rules 
concerning the conditions that constituted educational equality. The 
landmark case, Brown v. Board of Education, that forever changed the 
structure of education in the South attacked the dual-school systems
* Education in North Carolina: Today and Tomorrow, Report of State
Education Commission to Governor Cherry, 24 September 1948, p. 571.
 ^Education in North Carolina, p. 589.
 ^Harry S, Ashmore, The Negro and the Schools (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1954, pp. 153-59.
52
that existed by statute in twenty-one states and the District of 
Columbia.^
The first of the cases that led to the Supreme Court decision read 
by Chief Justice Earl Warren in the early afternoon of May 17, 1954, had 
initially reached the federal court system in the summer of 1951. When 
the petitions were declared unconstitutional in the federal district 
courts, the NAACP had decided to UBe these cases for a direct assault on 
segregation in the nation's public schools. The concern of governments 
dedicated to the maintenance of the dual-school systems deepened as these 
cases began reaching the U.S. Supreme Court in 1952. Cognizant of the 
extensive preparations for arguing these cases by the capable civil rights 
attorney Thurgood Marshall and a host of competent NAACP lawyers, state 
officials increased their efforts to improve black schools.5 The reading 
of the Brown decision rendered the belated school equalization endeavors 
meaningless,^ After five months of deliberation, the court had ruled 
that laws requiring racial segregation in the public schools were 
unconstitutional. The justices had unanimously agreed "that in the field 
of public education the doctrine of separate but equal has no place. 
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal," May 17, 1954,
 ^Albert P. Blausteln and Clarence C. Ferguson, Jr. Desegregation 
and the Law (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957), pp. 1-46.
® Blaustein and Ferguson, Desegregation, pp. 45-53,
6 Patrick McCauley and Edward D. Ball, Southern Schools; Progress 
and Problems (Nashville: Southern Education Reporting Service, 1959),
pp. 2-3,
 ^Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 Sup. Ct. 686, 98 L. 
Ed. 873 (1954).
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narked a turning point in the long struggle for equal rights by the 
Negro, but throughout the South it was hailed as "Black Monday" and 
narked the beginning of the end to a way of life based on legal 
biracialism.
The reaction to the Brown decision in North Carolina was predictably 
negative. Many astute historians and scholars had considered the state 
to be ready for integration of the public schools because they viewed 
North Carolina as being closer to the national expectations and national 
norms than other southern states, With a reputation for progressive 
action in education and race relations, the state was considered to be 
moderate and open to the forces of change. Traditionally, the coopera­
tion between white and black leadership had been positive and effective. 
Overall relations between the raceB had been harmonious and progressive 
for half of a century.® As an economically impoverished state with a 
strong commitment to education, North Carolina struggled under the tax 
burden of a dual-school system.^ The economic relief that would be
enjoyed by Integration of its schools appeared to make the state a likely
candidate for desegregation compliance. When Negro journalists had 
visited the state to assess the degree of racial harmony, they had 
declared North Carolina a model community in its race relations and a 
living answer to the riddle of race.^® A University of North Carolina
® V. 0. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949), p. 205.
® Ashmore, The Negro and the Schools, pp. 144-45.
^  News and Observer (Raleigh), 17 .Tulv 1947.
authority on race relations, Howard W. Odum, predicted that Integration 
would go better than expected.^ Some representatives of the news media 
In the state Initially felt that reaction to the Supreme Court's 
desegregation decision would be generally positive in nature and that 
North Carolina would abide by the high court ruling.^ This was the 
positive side of the issue, and the optlmlstB were generally Ignoring the 
latent racism that had dominated social intercourse throughout the state's 
history. The optimists should have known better because it was North 
Carolina's Professor Ulrich B. Phillips who had described the South as 
"a people with a common resolve indomitably maintained— that it shall be 
and remain a white man's country."^ The social stratification based on 
race was deep-rooted in tradition, history, and regional mores. North 
Carolina was one of the few states that sometimes took biraciallsm a step 
further to tri-racialism in applying the "separate but equal" doctrine 
based on Plessy v. Ferguson. In the southwestern part of the state, as 
well as In a few eastern counties, where there was a significant Indian 
population, there were sometimes three separate restroom facilities.
In education. North Carolina had white schools, black schools, and 
Indian schools. The Cherokee, Lumbee, and the minor tribes were not 
interested in going to colored schools and often were not welcome in 
white schools.
^  C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 150-51.
Greensboro Daily Hews, IS May 1954.
13 C. Vann Woodward, The Burden of Southern History (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1960), p. 10.
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When an Associated Press reporter, only a few days after the
Brown decision, predicted that North Carolina was apparently willing
to try to circumvent the Supreme Court verdict, he was only stating
what most North Carolinians already knew.^ The prominent attorney,
Irving Carlyle, as the keynote speaker at the 1954 North Carolina
Democrat Convention, stated that "as good citizens, we have no other
course except to obey the law as laid down by the Court. Carlyle,
the leading candidate to replace Clyde Hoey in the United States Senate,
disqualified himself in North Carolina politics by saying that the
Supreme Court ruling should be followed.Political leaders in tune
with the popular sentiment would not have made such a mistake. The
memory of United States Senator Frank P. Graham's defeat in the 1950
Democratic Primary was too fresh in the minds of the astute North
Carolina politicians. Graham, former president of the University of
North Carolina and one of the South's most prominent educators, had
been appointed to the Senate in 1 9 4 9 . The following year, running as
a progressive liberal with the support of Governor Kerr Scott, Graham
was defeated by conservative Willis Smith who ran a "White-People-Wake-
Up" campaign. The strong vote for Smith, generated by the worst display
of racial invective since the white-supremacy elections at the turn of
18
the century, did not go unnoticed by North Carolina politicians. They
^  Greensboro Daily News. 23 Hay iy54.
^  New York Times. 23 May 1954.
16 Dick Dabney, A Good Han (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976)
pp. 142-43; Paul R. Clancey, Just a Country Lawyer (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1974), pp . 152-53.
17 1R
Key, Southern Politics, p. 206. New York Tines, 23 May 1954.
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had few illusions about how the majority of "North Carolina voters felt
about the desegregation issue. When Governor William B. Umstead
expressed terrible disappointment with the Court decision and when
former governor Kerr Scott, who was engaged in a successful run for the
United States Senate, stated that he was against the Brown ruling, only
19the optimists were surprised.
In the weeks following the high court decision, Governor Umstead 
led the resistance movement for the state. Although already a dying 
man, having suffered a heart attack the day after his inauguration in 
1952, Umstead displayed remarkable fortitude in directing the segre­
gationist Initiatives. Soon after the Court ruling, the Governor asked 
the Institute of Government at the University of North Carolina to
21
study the ramifications of the Brown decision and make recommendations. 
At the end of May, he made a public statement charging the Supreme Court 
with a usurperous attack on "states rights" and brought attention to the 
gains made in the public schools toward equalization of educational 
facilities. On the legal front, he directed the State Attorney General, 
Harry McMullan, to initiate a "friend of the Court" brief with the 
United States Supreme Court. Critics claimed that had Umstead and other 
prominent North Carolina leaders directed their energies and leadership 
toward promoting compliance strategies Instead of resistance efforts, 
the desegregation of the public schools could have been accomplished 
in short order. Objective observers, however, had to admit that Bill
Greensboro Daily News, 10 May 1954.
20 Albert Coates, The School Segregation Decision (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1954), pp. 36-119.
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Umstead, sick as he was, still had no difficulty ascertaining the 
predestined route of the parade. Knowing the route allowed him to
move to the front and head a popular cause which is an important part
of political leadership in a democratic state.
Within a few weeks the press began to lose its initial enthusiasm
for law-abiding compliance and generally adopted a wait-and-see atti­
tude. The editorials reminding that "North Carolina has an unbroken 
record of never turning backward," an inspirational slogan that had been 
used repeatedly since the Civil War, gave way to more conservative 
admonitions against extremist excesses on either side of the desegre­
gation issue,21
In June, Governor Umstead had another opportunity to help the 
resistance program when Senator Hoey died in office. The Governor 
replaced Hoey with Sam Ervin, a Morganton attorney and jurist, who 
shared Umstead's states-rights and "separate but equal" philosophy. The 
appointment of Senator Ervin insured that North Carolina would have an
able and eloquent spokesman in the nation's capital to work constantly
22for the maintenance of the dual-school concept. As the summer passed 
and it became obvious that nothing would be done to affect the coming 
school year, tensions ebbed. In August, the University's Institute 
of Government presented its report with recommendations to the 
governor. The alternatives or courses of possible action that were 
presented to the State by the University Institute were:
21 Greensboro Daily News, editorials, 19, 30 and 31 Hay 1954.
22 Dabney, A Good Man. pp, 178-81; Clancey, Just a Country Lawyer, 
pp. ,170-99.
1. North Carolina could take the position that the Court had 
ruled, so let them enforce their decision. The State could attempt to 
evade the Court ruling anywhere along the spectrum from passive 
resistance to open defiance.
2. It could accept the Supreme Court decision and get on with
the task of desegregating its public schools.
3. The State could stall for time, seeking to avoid confrontation
with the Federal government and keeping the schools open while it
23explored ways of minimizing the impact of the Supreme Court decision.
Given these three alternatives, leaders in the state considered the 
viability of numbers one and three as possible courses of action. 
Alternative two, acceptance and compliance, never received serious 
consideration as a course of action, Option three was favored by 
moderates. It was very likely that other states would attempt open 
defiance of the Supreme Court ruling, and by stalling for time, North 
Carolina could maintain the public school system and see how other 
states fared in their impending confrontation with federal authority. 
After reviewing the institute's report, Governor Umstead appointed a 
select committee to develop a plan of action that would "preserve the 
state public school system by having the Bupport of the people."24 
Lieutenant Governor Luther Hodges, chairman of the State Board of 
Education, also appointed a Board Committee to study the problem;
23 Albert Coates, The School Segregation Decision (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1954), pp. ii-lii.
^  Southern School News. September 1954, p. 10.
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however, it was clear that the Governor's special statewide committee
25
would be responsible for developing the major course of action.
Governor Umstead appointed his biracial committee on August 4,
1954. The Special Committee on Education was made up of nineteen 
members and was led by its chairman, the Honorable Thomas J. Pearsall 
of Rocky Mount, a former speaker of the State House of Representatives. 
Having distinguished himself as a state leader in several political 
offices, Pearsall enjoyed the respect and confidence of leaders 
throughout North Carolina. The advisory committee began meeting on 
a regular basis as the school year 1954-55 began with schools all over 
the state operating on a segregated basis.
After the initial enthusiasm for law and order cooled soon after 
the Supreme Court ruling, conservative and extremist sentiments began 
appearing in the press as newspaper editors began to realize that the 
majority of North Carolinians heavily favored maintaining segregated 
schools. There was a large amount of vocal opposition to the Brown 
decision. Tension was high because most people had understood the 
Court ruling to mean immediate integration of the schools. Public 
indignation and editorial outrage quickly subsided when a second 
military Reconstruction failed to materialize. A guarded atmosphere 
of optimism grew as it became obvious that the federal government was 
not going to put blacks in white schools immediately. The hopeful 
attitude of the white segregationists was encouraged by a president
25 Luther H. Hodges, Businessman In the Statehouse (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1962), pp. 79-80.
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who admitted °that stateways can never change f o l k w a y s . T h e  ominous 
black cloud of desegregation which threatened in the hot summer of 1954 
to wash away the stability of historical custom and generational social 
mores in a single cloudburst became a mere speck on the horizon.
On the legal front, the Brown decision had included, at the end 
of the written opinion, permission for the states affected by the 
ruling to appear as amici curiae before the court. A written request 
by the Governor had to be filed by September 15, 1954 f and the "friend 
of the Court" briefs had to be submitted by October 1, 1954. Attorney 
General Harry McMullan filed a well-researched, carefully worded brief 
for the state. In his document, citing the same cases the Supreme Court 
had used in coming to the decision, the Attorney General accepted the 
power of the federal courts to issue orders to direct state school boards 
to stop denying Negro children admission to public schools solely on the 
basis of race. McMullan also conceded the equity powers of the high 
court in ordering relief, for the plaintiffs. His brief rejected, however, 
federal court authority to require state boards of education to take 
affirmative action on desegregating schools and denied the Court's right 
to order specific or prescriptive remedies in desegregation proceedings. 
Federal courts must not be allowed to "take the assignment of children 
to specific state school buildings out of the hands of the state school 
officials and place it in the hands of Negro children," read the North
2b Gilbert Osofsky, The Burden of Race (New Vork: Harper 6 Row,
Publishers, 1967), p. 428.
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Carolina brief.27 The brief further argued, baaed on precedents 
presented, that the Court "in the exercise of its equity powers can 
permit a gradual adjustment from the existing school system to a system 
not based on color distinctions."^® North Carolina, with its first legal 
response to Brown, indicated the direction the state would follow in the 
desegregation conflict. The state's leaders wanted time to exhaust all 
legal efforts and to see how other states fared in their more direct 
confrontation with the federal government. Although segregation senti­
ment was very strong in North Carolina, the state traditionally was a 
state of law. Lawyers historically had controlled state-government; 
the "big business" interests had been the policy-making body. Lawyers 
ran the state; they knew best that the law is evolutionary in nature and 
that litigation molded the law over time. Legal resistance could 
provide active resistance against the law of the land without 
Inviting the presence of federal troops to enforce the law which had 
happened during the Reconstruction Period. The "friend of the Court" 
brief was but the first shot in the legal battle to avoid desegregation 
of schools. There were many more skirmishes to come.
In the fall of 1954, Governor Umstead died, and Lieutenant Governor 
Luther Hodges assumed the gubernatorial duties. Hodges was only the 
second governor in the century who did not have the traditionally 
prerequisite degree in law. The only elected governor who was not a 
lawyer was Kerr Scott, a politically astute farmer. Hodges had been a
27 Brief of Harry McMullan, Attorney General of North Carolina, 
Amicus Curiae, cases 1-4, Supreme Court of the United States, October 
Term, 1954, p. 12.
2® Brief of Harry McMullan, p. 13.
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successful corporate executive with over twenty years experience In 
Democratic Party politics and a record of both state and federal 
service. He was also a graduate of the University of North Carolina, 
another helpful prerequisite to state political leadership In North 
Carolina. Partially because of his non-legal background, Hodges did 
not have the support of the Umstead camp In his successful campaign In 
1952 for Lieutenant Governor and was consistently denied access to the 
Inner circle of state leadership prior to Governor Umstead’s death in 
November, 1954. Upon taking the oath of office, the new governor 
accepted Umstead's staff and commitments for the term, which included 
the popular stance of legal resistance to desegregation of the state's 
public schools.
The Governor's Special Advisory Committee on Education was asked by 
the new governor to continue the work on developing recommendations on 
the desegregation issue. On December 30, 1954, the committee submitted 
a report which Governor Hodges presented on January 6 to the General
7Q
Assembly in his State of the state address. The report urged that the 
state devise strategies to accommodate the ruling in the Brown 
decision while making every effort to maintain its public school system 
intact. The report stated "that the mixing of the races forthwith in 
the public schools throughout the State cannot be accomplished and 
should not be a t t e m p t e d . T h e  only specific remedy of consequence 
offered to legitimately deal with the Supreme Court ruling was practical,
29 Hodges, Businessman in the Statehouse, pp. 1-80.
30 Southern School News. February 1955, p. 14.
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technical, and creative in its legal ramifications. This tactic 
recommended that "complete authority over the enrollment and assignment 
of children in public schools and on school buses" be removed from the
T1
responsibility of the State Board of Education. The legal authority 
could then be transferred to the local jurisdiction of school boards in 
the city systems and the one-hundred county systems throughout the 
state. Termed the Pupil Assignment Plan, this tactic became the 
mechanism by which state leaders were to Impede implementation of the 
Supreme Court's desegregation decision. The committee plan meshed well 
with the "friend of the Court" brief that petitioned for a long period 
of time in which to deal with the desegregation process and reflected 
the influence of the lawyers who had been appointed to the Governor's 
Special Advisory Committee on Education. It was an astute legal 
strategy requiring that any effort by federal authorities to force 
compliance with desegregation proceedings had to be engaged on a case- 
by-case basis against local school boards throughout the state. The 
maneuver promised a legal nightmare and a lawyer's dijeam.
If enacted in law and deemed constitutional, the act in one man­
euver eliminated the possibility of federal authorities bringing 
one suit against the State Board of Education to eliminate dual 
schools. It would remove the litigation arena from one site in 
Raleigh to the myriad legal jurisdiction of school systems 
throughout the state. The Pupil Assignment Plan was a clever strategy 
designed to keep the desegregation deliberations in the calm of the
^  Southern School News. February 1955.
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legal court systems and away from conflict in the streets. It was 
perhaps the most effective resistance strategy devised by any of the 
southern states and circumvented the tragedy and embarrassment of open 
racial conflict and confrontation with federal troops. The potential 
for violence and social disruption was as prevalent in North Carolina 
as in other Southern states; however, the violence and the open conflict 
with federal authorities that occurred in Little Rock, Clinton, and a 
score of localities throughout the South was probably avoided by this 
basic legal ploy which served North Carolina well.
The 1955 session of the General Assembly endorsed the Committee's 
recommendation that efforts be made to meet the mandates of the Supreme 
Court's ruling without really changing the structure or viability of 
the existing school system. Bills were introduced in both houses to 
transfer the authority of pupil assignment from the State Board of 
Education to local county and city boards. There was no mention of 
race in the carefully worded, legally correct bills; the act was to 
provide that pupil assignment would be carried out in "the best interest 
of the child i n v o l v e d . " ^  Other more openly segregationist bills were 
proposed* 0ne called for the termination of state funds of any school 
that attempted to desegregate, while another recommended the use of 
state funds for support of private schools set up to avoid integration 
of the public schools. The legal forces prevailed in floor debate, and 
the Pupil Assignment Plan passed in April by a large majority, The 
new law provided for appellate relief for parents not satisfied with
32
North Carolina General Statutes. 1955, Chapter 366,
their child's assignment. Disgruntled parents could petition the local 
school board for reassignment, and if the petition were denied, they 
could take their case to the state courts. The plan effectively 
removed the State Board of Education from the litigation proceedings and 
set up an expensive and time-consuming mechanism that had to be pursued 
on an individual baBiB for any parents who wished to have their children 
schooled in an integrated environment. The new law was roundly 
criticized by Negro organizations throughout the state to no avail. The 
law was carefully grounded in legal theory. It did not conflict with the 
Brown ruling; it did not threaten to close schools or withhold funds if 
a system integrated under the "local option" clause; and it did not 
assure segregationists that desegregation would not occur. What it did 
insure was that the desegregation process would be slow, expensive, and 
hopefully not worth the effort.
About the same time that the North Carolina state legislature was 
passing the Pupil Assignment Act, a representative of the state was 
involved at the national level in arguing the amicl curiae brief. From 
April 11 to April 14, 1955, the Supreme Court listened to the states' 
attorneys in the second phase of Brown v. Board of Education which was 
to result in the implementation decision. Attorney General McMullan, 
who had prepared the "friend of the Court" brief was ill during this 
period and unable to address the Court. An Assistant Attorney General,
I. Beverly Lake represented North Carolina in the proceedings. Only 
six states sent their attorneys general to take part in the litigation 
that was to determine the parameters of the desegregation decision on 
federal, state, and local levels. The states' attorneys' basic argument
was Chat the Supreme Court should direct the school districts Involved 
in the Brown decision to admit Brown and the other plaintiffs to the 
public schools and close the matter. This would have made it possible 
to have each Individual case argued on the basis of its merits in the 
sequential context of the lower courts which would delay the impact of 
the decision for years. In his presentation for North Carolina, Lake 
argued that "an attempt to compel the intermixture of the races in the
public schools of North Carolina would result in such violent opposition
33as to endanger the continued existence of the .schools." He asked the
Court to consider the divergent conditions existing in North Carolina
and to allow sufficient time and ample discretion so that the ruling
might possibly obtain the intended results. In its opinion announced
May 31, 1955, the Supreme Court agreed that implementation of the
May 17, 1954, ruling should take into account existing local conditions
and proceed "with all deliberate speed" in eliminating the process of
assignment of children to schools on the basis of race. The decision
remanded compliance proceedings to the lower courts and ordered them
to carry out the law of the land, adding that constitutional principles
34would not yield simply because of disagreement with them. The Supreme 
Court had spoken on the implementation question, and its final ruling 
in the Brown case seemed no immediate threat to North Carolina's schools.
33 Assistant Attorney General of North Carolina, Amicus Curiae, 
cases 1-4, Supreme Court of the United States, April 11-14, 1955.
34 Earl Warren, "Inside the Supreme Court: The Momentous School
Desegregation Decision," The Atlantic Monthly, April 1977, pp. 35-39.
The Chief Justice was explaining in the article the decision of Brown 
v. Board of Education, 349, U.S. 294(1955), 28, 52, 150-51, 158-79.
The 1955 General Assembly had adjourned after adopting a resolution
that claimed mixing of the races In the schools was not practical and
that any such action would be dangerous for public schools in the
state. The legislators accepted the recommendations of the Governor's
Special Advisory Committee on Education and asked the governor to
appoint a new advisory committee to conduct an ongoing study of the
problems stemming from the Supreme Court ruling on desegregation.
In a speech at Duke University on June 21, 1955, Governor Hodges
announced that Thomas Pearsall would again head the Advisory Committee
on Education. The size of the committee was reduced to seven men to
35make it more effective and less cumbersome. This time there was no 
mention of a need for a biracial committee. Governor Umstead had 
gotten into trouble on that issue with his nineteen-member group. The 
three Negroes whom he had named to the committee had all been employees 
of the state, and charges of "tokenism" from the black community had 
been embarrassing. Furthermore, even though they were castigated by 
the blacks in the state who favored immediate integration of schools, 
they were still subjected to tremendous pressure from the state's Negro 
leadership to openly advocate integration. Hodges meant to avoid a 
similar problem, so he chose a committee made up of white lawyers and 
elected officials. The committee was charged to develop a plan that 
would prove both workable and in technical compliance with the Supreme
35 For a more thorough description of the "Pearsall Committee" which 
consisted of W. T. Joyner of Raleigh, R. 0. Huffman of Morganton, Senator 
Lunsford Crew of Roanoke Rapids, Senator Uilliam Medford of Waynesville, 
Representative E. F. Yarborough of Louisburg, and Representative 
H, C. Philpott of Lexington, see Hodges, Businessman in the Statehouse, 
pp. 82-84,
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Court decision regarding the operation of public schools. The 
committee met frequently, as often aB twice a week for almost a year, 
in headquarters set up in the Agriculture Building in Raleigh. They 
studied desegregation strategies and responses being developed in other 
states as well as the problems at home in an effort to devise alterna­
tives that would be both acceptable and legal.
Events in the summer of 1955 increased the tension in North 
Carolina concerning the desegregation issue. One-fourth of the state's 
population, over 1 million^blacks, understood the Brown decision to mean 
immediate school desegregation. In their view it was already one 
school-year overdue. Segregationists, including the state's white 
leadership, were searching for any legal strategy that would continue 
the dual-school structure. In this time of turmoil, they were getting 
mixed signals which raised the hopes of the white majority. In the 
second Brown decision, they had been encouraged because the Court had 
aBked for "a reasonable and prompt start" to develop a plan and "all 
deliberate speed" within the context of the local conditions to end 
segregated public schools. Satisfied that compliance proceedings were 
being delayed and could be avoided for years, perhaps even generations, 
school boards across the state had begun meetings to duly discuss 
reasonable plans to comply with the Court decision at some future date. 
Then in July came the legal opinion from a native North Carolinian,
Judge John J. Parker, chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit in the hearing of Briggs v. Elliott that added
36 U.S. Census. 1950.
a new dimension to the Brown decision. Judge Parker, one of the most 
respected jurists in the South, interpreted the Brown decision to mean 
that the Court "has not decided that the states must mix persons of 
different races in the schools . . . .  What it has decided, and 'all 
it has decided, Is that a state may not deny any person on account of 
race the right to attend any school that it maintains." The judge went 
on to say that the ruling "does not require integration.' It merely 
forbids discrimination. It does not forbid such segregation as occurs 
as the result of voluntary action. It merely forbids the use of govern­
mental power to enforce segregation,"®^ This interpretation of Brown 
was gladly endorsed by some of North Carolina's leaders, but it was 
soundly rejected by the black leadership. It increased black militancy 
on the issue at a time when they were mustering their forces to attack 
segregationist resistance. Voluntary segregation became a part of 
Governor Hodges' overall strategy to maintain the dual-school system, 
but black leaders "poisoned the well" on that issue. The majority of 
blacks wanted integration immediately, while for the majority of whites, 
the desegregation of schools constituted a threat to the way of life 
that they were dedicated to maintain. The concept of "voluntary
segregation," which was openly rejected by the black leadership, was
38being promoted in speeches across the state by Governor Hodges.
Adding to the confusion was a speech by Assistant Attorney General
Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp, 776, 777 (E,D.S.C, 19551. 
Ironically, the NAACP had been responsible for successfully pressuring 
the Senate to refuse confirmation of Judge Parker when President Hoover 
appointed him to the U.S Supreme Court in 1930. .
3® Greensboro Daily News, 23 June 1955.
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X. Beverly Lake advising "every community in the state to be prepared
to operate private schools to avoid integration." Lake's speech
angered the blacks to the extent that the NAACP called for his removal
from office. Governor Hodges came to the defense of his staff member
and attacked the NAACP for what he termed bringing in outBide agitators
39to put pressure on the state leadership to promote integration. The
governor claimed that North Carolina people of both races were opposed
to Integrated schools. This claim was summarily challenged when the
flrBt school desegregation petition was filed in a county In the
western part of the state. ^
It is not surprising that a suit for relief would be filed in one
of the western counties because the black population in the uplands was
so sparse that some counties did not have either an elementary school
or a high school that Negro students could attend. A black child in
Mitchell County could attend a Negro elementary school in an adjoining
county, but to attend high school that same child would have to cross
adjoining counties to reach a secondary school. While the state
provided transportation for such students, the trip of over a hundred
miles each day on difficult mountain roads took hours and created a very
41
real hardship on a black child who wanted to get an education.
39 Governor Hodges, in a speech at Llncolnton claimed that his 
decision would not be affected by pressure groups such as the NAACP.
See Hodges, Businessman in the Statehousc, p. 86,
Asheville Citizen. 18 August 1955.
As a child in Mitchell County, I remember the Negro school bus 
that carried these children paBt my house about dark each evening; it 
left in the mornings before I got up and passed several schools where 
the children could have attended on its daily journey.
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Governor Hodges made two speeches In August, 1955, that delineated 
his position clearly. On August 8, the governor made his "Crossroads" 
speech that was broadcast live by ten television stations and sixty 
radio stations. "North Carolina now stands at the crossroads," the 
Governor proclaimed at the beginning of the speech. The choice would 
be made, in the months ahead, between the integration of schools or the 
abandonment of schools. Hodges discussed the history of public 
education in North Carolina and the gains that had been made in the 
effort to equalize Negro and white schools. He discussed the work of 
the Pearsall Committee and the impact of the Brown decision on North 
Carolina's schools. Pointing out the possibilities suggested by Judge 
Parker's interpretation of Brown. Hodges made an eloquent plea for 
voluntary separation of the races in the public schools of the state 
and called for a display of temperance and racial harmony throughout 
North Carolina. In his conclusion, he said: "We in North Carolina have
remained comparatively calm and restrained during this difficult period, 
but that hasn't meant we don't feel strongly on the subject." He stated 
that the problems had been met not as two races, but as one citizenry 
attempting to do best for the children. By promoting cooperation and 
positive attitudes, he concluded that North Carolinians could "come 
through this situation with our public school system intact and with 
our basic traditions i n t a c t . T h e  speech was lengthy, carefully 
prepared, and eloquently delivered; while it was in no way racist, it-
The entire text of Governor Hodges speech is printed in Thomas 
D, Clark, ed. The South Since Reconstruction (New York: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, 1973), pp. 377-94.
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was blatantly segregationist. Hodges' statewide talk was harshly 
criticized by the black leadership, condemned by a few prominent whites 
as avoidance of the issue, but generally well-received by the vast 
majority of North Carolina's citizens.^ Governor Hodges was Moses 
leading his people out of the wilderness. For the North Carolina blacks, 
however, the "Promised Land" was in the other direction.
The black citizenry in North Carolina felt strongly about the 
desegregation issue. The Brown decision had inspired hope; they had no 
intentions of letting the white‘leaders in the state circumvent their 
drive for equality now that the wall had been breached. The Brown ruling 
had created a chink in the armor of biraciallsm; school desegregation 
was only the beginning battle of the war for civil rights, and full 
equality. Governor Hodges' appeal for "voluntary segregation" fell on 
deaf ears in the black community. His approach was temperate; it was 
logically presented; it was rational; however, it was more of the same.^ 
The black leadership had witnessed a changing of the guard. The old 
leadership which had worked long and hard for peaceful coexistence and 
racial harmony waB losing ground to the younger, more militant leaders. 
Compromise leaders, who often held their power positions because they 
were accepted by white leaders and felt that blacks could best be served 
by accommodating white authority, had lost influence. Moderate leaders 
who were susceptible to white influence were forced out of power. The 
black community wanted leaders who were militant on school desegregation
43 Charlotte Observer, 9 August 1955.
44 Thomas p. Clark, The Emerging South (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1961), pp. 197-98.
45in decision-making roles. Thus when Governor Hodges took his
"voluntary segregation" to black audiences, he received a cool reception.
At Shaw University in Raleigh, the Governor addressed the all-black
North Carolina Teachers Association and called upon its members to
cooperate in the program of "voluntary segregation" to preserve the
school system of the state. The educators were polite but unenthus-
iastic. In newspapers the following day, they issued a strongly-worded
reply that called for full and prompt integration of the public 
46
schools. In early November in a speech in Greensboro, the Governor
was given a cold reception by the black audience at North Carolina
Agricultural and Technical College. Even though his speech was
repeatedly interrupted, Hodges refused to believe that the students’
hostile attitude was representative of North Carolina's black citizenry.
He claimed that North Carolina’s public schools opened without incident
47
in the fall of 1955 with complete and voluntary separation of races.
The desegregation suit brought in the United States Court of Appeals
48
by North Carolina blacks in the fall of 1955 belied that statement.
The Pupil Assignment Plan which was North Carolina's basic strategy 
for avoiding or prolonging implementation of desegregation proceedings 
was put to the test only a few months after becoming law. The law had
45 M. Elaine Burgess, Negro Leadership in a Southern City (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1960), pp. 178-86, This
is a study of Negro leadership in Durham, North Carolina.
46 Raleigh News and Observer, 28 August 1955.
47 Hodges, Businessman in the Statehouse. pp. 90-91.
48 Carson v. Board of Education, 227 F, 2d 789 (4th Cir, Ct„ 1955)
been carefully crafted, and the beat feature of the law was that it 
was painstakingly legal. North Carolina had traditionally been a 
state of law*— the law of lawyers— since the Civil War. The attorneys 
who wrote the law were well aware of the legal concept known as 
"exhaustion of remedies" doctrine. In strict accord with judicial 
practice, the Pupil Assignment Law had been constructed to take optimal 
advantage of extending the litigation as far as possible. In removing 
the authority for pupil assignment from the State Board of Education and 
vesting the power in the local school boards, the state had established a 
lengthy procedure to deal with— -and discourage—-the desegregation action. 
The plan provided that the local school board make the pupil assignment. 
If parents of a student were dissatisfied with their child being assigned 
to a black school, they had to appeal the assignment to the school board. 
If a satisfactory remedy was not provided, their next appeal had to go 
to the state superior court. The next step in the appellate process was 
the state supreme court. All this had to occur just to reach the federal 
court level under the "exhaustion of remedies" doctrine before the liti­
gants could hope to obtain relief if their case was successful. The 
case that was brought in the fall of 1955 against the county school board 
that had denied the Negro child admission to a white school in McDowell 
County had been started in the federal district court in North Carolina 
and moved to the United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals ordered the federal district court to dismiss the case 
without prejudice as premature. Statutory remedies had not been 
exhausted, and the plaintiffs were back at the starting point where they 
had to begin their litigation again, this time through the state courts
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to again reach the federal level. The Pupil Assignment Plan had worked
just as it had been designed to operate, and the Negro plaintiffs had
learned an expensive, time-consuming lesson. It was quite clear that
the school year 1955-56 would Bee no breaking of the color barrier in
49
the public schools of North Carolina.
In the spring of 1956, southern members of Congress gave moral and 
tactical support to the state leaders who were waging the war to main­
tain segregated schools. Host southern Congressmen signed a "Declaration 
of Constitutional Principles" that denounced the Brown decision as abuse 
of judicial powers and an encroachment on the powers of the state. The 
attitudes of the majority of the people of North Carolina were firmly
entrenched behind the ten representatives and two senators who signed
50
the "Southern Manifesto," as the statement became popularly called.
That North Carolinians were willing to support segregation at the polls
became all the more obvious with the defeat of two representatives who
5 1refused to sign the manifesto in the fall elections.
A few weeks after the March signing of the "Congressional 
Manifesto," the Pearsall Committee released an official report, keeping 
the segregation news on the front page of newspapers throughout the state. 
The committee recommended that the state's Pupil Assignment Law be
^  Henry A. Bullock, A History of Negro Education in the South 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 2581 arid BlauBtein and
Ferguson, Desegregation and the Law, pp. 250-52.
U.S. Congressional Record, July 13, 1956, 12760-12761, and New 
York Times, 12 March 1956.
Reed Sarratt, The Ordeal of Desegregation (New York: Harper &
Row, Publishers, 1966), p. 41.
continued with some modifications and that a constitutional amendment
be passed authorizing tuition grants for students who did not want to
attend desegregated schools. It also proposed a local option clause
that would permit a community to close their schools if they were
forced to integrate.^ Governor Hodges approved the plan, and, the
following day in a press conference, he announced that he would call a
special session of the General Assembly to consider the constitutional
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changes necessary to make the plan law. The NAACP immediately went on
record as opposing the "Pearsall Committee" plan, as did the State
Congress of Parents and Teachers. Host state leaders supported the plan
which accommodated both the segregationists and the moderates who favored
5 4
a gradual, peaceful adjustment to integrated schools. The Governor 
called for the special session and on July 23, 1956, addressed a joint 
session of the two houses. He explained the plan and asked for a prompt 
and positive action.^ After his speech, the legislators returned to 
their chambers and began a four-day session that resulted in an over­
whelming approval of the plan and the legislative mechanics that made 
it workable. Several other bills were introduced expressing stronger 
segregationist sentiment, but they were easily defeated. The General
North Carolina Advisory Committee on Education, Report to the 
Governor, the General Assembly, the State Board of Education, and the 
County and Local School Boards of North Carolina (April 5, 1956).
^3 Raleigh News and Observer. 6 April 1956.
Uilliam Bagwell, School Desegregation in the Carolinas (Columbia; 
University of South Carolina PresB, 1972), pp. 95-96.
^  Capus Waynick, ed., North Carolina and the Negro (Raleigh: The
State College Print Shop, 1964), p. 231. Complete text of the Pearsall 
Plan is found on pp. 236-38.
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Assembly adjourned on July 26 after one of the shortest legislative
sessions in memory. Their task was finished; it was up to the people
to make the Pearsall Plan law in a special election in the fall. The
proposal was the topic of heated debate throughout the summer. The
press generally supported the plan as being a moderate, middle-road
device, somewhere between "outright defiance of the Supreme Court
„56
Mandate and outright defiance of Southern folkways and custom.
Pressure was growing for emergency options because a number of
desegregation suits had by this time been filed and were making their
57way slowly through the court system. Schools in North Carolina began
without incident or integration in the fall of 1956, and in early
September the majority of voters in every one of the state's one
hundred counties voted for the amendments that made the Pearsall Plan
law. In the largest voter turnout for a special election in the state's
history, the plan passed by an almost five-to-one majority. The massive
turnout and the huge majority left little doubt where the citizens of
58North Carolina stood on school desegregation.
With the fall election of 1956 that enacted the Pearsall Plan,
North Carolina's legislative initiative to impede the desegregation of 
schools ended. Of the three options available to fight integration of 
the public schools, only the Pupil Assignment Plan was used effectively.
Greensboro Rfecord, 27 August 1956; Greensboro Daily Mews 
16 July 1956*
57 xom Flake, Statistical-Summary of School Segregation-Desegregation 
in Southern and Border States (Nashville; Southern Education Reporting 
Service, 1961), pp. 27-28.
58 U.S. Commission, Civil Rights: Southern States, p. 69.
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The local option to close schools was never employed, and only a brief 
flirtation with tuition grants ensued. North Carolina had a strong 
commitment to the public school system. The state traditionally had 
the smallest non-public enrollment in the South which consisted of 
approximately 2 percent. North Carolina would not support private 
schools with public m o n e y . T h e  state leadership knew that ultimately 
they had to comply with the Supreme Court ruling; the Pupil Assignment 
Plan was used to delay desegregation as long as possible to pave the 
way for a peaceful and lawful transition to a single-school system.
The £lan took for granted that ultimately the desegregation suits 
would move through the courts and that black children would gradually 
move into the white schools of the state. Indeed, Colonel Joyner, one 
of the attorneys who helped develop the plan, admitted that it was 
inevitable, even desirable. In an address before the North Carolina Bar 
Association, he said:
One of the nightmares which besets me on a restless 
night is that I am in a Federal Court attempting to defend 
a school board in its rejection of a transfer requested by 
a Negro student, -when a showing is made in that court that 
nowhere in all of the State of North Carolina has a single 
Negro ever been admitted to any one of more than 2000 
schools attended by white students.*^
The die had been cast; now all that remained was for the first blacks—
and Indians— to be admitted to the state's public schools.
59 John W. Yeates, "Private Schools and Public Confusion," New 
South, Fall 1970, p. 84.
60 Greensboro Daily News, 2b October 1956.
CHAPTER 4
The Decade of Resistance: Token Desegregation
Nineteen hundred and fifty-six had been an important year for 
North Carolina's move toward the desegregation of Che public schools. 
Two key leaders were up for election in November, and they had made 
their positions clear an the issue. They were with the people of 
North Carolina. In March, Senator Sam Ervin had helped draft the 
"Southern Manifesto," and in April he blasted the Supreme Court for its 
desegregation ruling.* Governor Hodges had taken his desegregation 
stance repeatedly. There was strong interest by some local leaders in 
beginning desegregation proceedings in a few city school districts in 
the fall of 1956. Since Hodges was running on his "voluntary 
segregation" position, state officials quietly petitioned these systems 
to delay their desegregation Initiatives until the following year.
This led NAACP attorneys to charge that at least six North Carolina 
communities had been ready to desegregate that fall but had delayed 
their action because the governor had intervened. While the NAACP was 
unable to prove this in court, it was undoubtedly true for study groups 
had been meeting on the desegregation issue in Asheville, Charlotte, 
Winston-Salem, and Greensboro since the summer of 1954. There is
* Sam Ervin, Jr,,"The Case for Segregation," Look, 3 April 1956, 
pp. 32-33.
 ^Reed Sarratt, The Ordeal of Desegregation (Hew York: Harper and
Row, Publishers, 1966), p. 93.
3 Winston-Salem Journal, 15 February 1957.
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little question that these cities were ready to get on with making an
effort to begin public school integration.^
The NAACP charges led Governor Hodges to encourage the enactment
of anti-NAACP legislation when the General Assembly met in the spring.
Strong opposition to the proposal developed In both houses. The point
was made that if any citizen in North Carolina wanted to belong to any
dues-paylng organization that either supported or opposed desegregation,
they should be permitted to do so. It was a point well-taken because
some of the members of the General Assembly belonged to White Citizens
Councils. The legislative body rejected the proposal. It was one of
the few times that the General Assembly went against the governor on
his separation-of-races positions, and North Carolina was the only
state in .the South to reject anti-NAACP laws.**
A tension-filled summer was in store for North Carolinians, because
it was increasingly clear that 1957 was going to be a year of decision
on the desegregation issue. Officials of three of the largest cities
in North Carolina were meeting on a regular baBis on the schools issue.
Near the end of July, the school boards of Charlotte, Greensboro, and
Winston-Salem by agreement met on the same night and announced that
they would begin desegregation programs for the fall term in accordance
6
with the regulations of the state's Pupil Assignment Law. Since the 
state's constitutional requirement for separation of races in the
^ Henry A. Bullock, A History of Negro Education in the South 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 249.
^ Sarratt, The Ordeal of Desegregation, p. 36.
6 Asheville Citizen and Raleigh News and Observer. 24 July 1957.
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public schools had been declared invalid the previous year, the school 
boards were acting within legal authority in coming to their decision.^ 
Reaction to the desegregation issue was predictably intense. Although 
widely predicted and generally expected, the announcement of the 
desegregation decision sounded the call for action by the extremist 
groups. The major segregationist organizations in the state were the 
Patriots of North Carolina, the White Citizens Council, and the Ku Klux
Klan. During the month of August 1957, a flurry of activity by these
and other segregationist proponents served to raise the level of tension 
markedly. At a Klan rallv in Monroe, on the outskirts of Charlotte, 
a speaker claimed that the Klan could muster 50,000 men before the
opening of school to put a stop to any integration, voluntary or other­
wise. In Winston-Salem, a Patriot leader addressed the school board, 
arguing against desegregation because Negroes paid less taxes than 
whites. In Charlotte, a local Patriot leader presented a petition 
signed by over sixteen- thousand people favoring segregation. In
Greensboro, a Patriot's attorney filed suit asking for an injunction
8to prevent the desegregation plans.
To counter the widespread Klan, Patriot, and Citizens Council 
action, the pro-segregationist forces, comprised mostly of NAACP and 
PTA groups, worked diligently to promote peaceful integration sentiment. 
The blacks, constituting 25 percent of the state's population, were the 
largest group of integratlonists. At the other end of the spectrum was
7 Covington v. Montgomery County School Officials, 139 F. Supp. 161, 
163 (M.D.N.C. 1956).
® See Charlotte Observer. Raleigh News and Observer. Winston-Salem 
Journal, Greensboro Dally News and Record for month of August 1957.
about the same number of die-hard segregationists. Occupying the 
middle ground was over half the state’s population who supported 
long-standing tradition and regional social customs but who were also 
accustomed to supporting law-and-order measures. They had grown up 
with the traditional patterns of segregation, but they were leaders 
among the southern states in conforming to national standards in legal 
controversies.^ Despite the "Jim Crow" laws, there was a prevalent 
attitude of racial moderation in the relations between the white and 
black communities.^ It was within this moderate majority that 
occupied the middle ground that the decision would be made concerning 
the degree of resistance to racial mixing in the schools. The strongest 
factors that influenced this moderate middle beyond traditionalism and 
legalism were leadership, religion, and the media.
The "Bible Belt" which includes all of North Carolina means 
Protestant Christianity. Protestants make up 97 percent of North 
Carolina’s church memberships.*’* Of the Protestants, members of the 
Baptist Church greatly outnumber all others. There were mixed feelings 
about where the church leaders stood on legal desegregation because 
ministers were in the forefront in extremist groups at both poles. 
Segregationists who traditionally coalesced around religious leaders
^ Melvin M, Tumln, Desegregation: Resistance and Readiness
(Princeton: University Press, 1958), pp. 151-52.
C. Chilton Pearson, "Race Relations in North Carolina: A Field
Study of Moderate Opinion," South Atlantic Quarterly 22 (1924) and 
Capus Haynlck, North Carolina and the Negro.
H  Thomas D. Clark, The Emerging South (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1961), p. 266.
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worried about the Influence of the ministers. The prominent leader of 
the Patriots of North Carolina, W. C. George was quoted as saying:
"The group most difficult to combat and the group most Influential, 
perhaps, in bringing this evil upon us are the ministers." In the 
other camp, Spottswood W. Robinson, III, an NAACP attorney, had said: 
"The worse obstacle we face in the fight . . .  is the white p r e a c h e r . " *2 
The state's largest religious organization, the North Carolina Baptist 
State Convention, whose members make up one-fifth of the state's total 
population, supported the peaceful desegregation of schools. Many 
communities had blraclal committees set up by the churches to discuss 
peaceful ways to comply with the Suoreme Court ruling. Although there 
were notable exceptions, the clergy lined up mainly with the proponents 
of law and order. Their position had a beneficial influence on promot­
ing the legal desegregation of s c h o o l s , ^
Another factor, important in greatly influencing public sentiment, 
was the media. The Brown decision and its aftermath probably generated 
more reports and sold more newspapers than any other story in the 1950s 
throughout the state. The newspapers of the state's largest cities were 
moderate and progressive in their reporting, and the media statewide 
generally followed their influence. The Raleigh News and Observer 
traditionally supported education and the Democrat party. The 
Greensboro Dally News promoted a moderate approach to the race relations
12 Sarratt, The Ordeal of Desegregation, pp. 273-74,
1^ Herbert Wey and John Corey, Action Patterns in School 
Desegregation (Bloomington: Phi Delta Kappa, Inc., 1959), p. 26;
Capus Waynick, ed., North Carolina and the Negro (Raleigh: The State
College Print Shop, 1964), pp. 1-30.
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and compliance with the Brown decision. The Charlotte Observer and the 
Winston-Salem Journal were organs of big business. They both were 
dedicated to maintaining good public images for the communities and 
promoted desegregation as good for business. As newsmen, the 
reporters, however, were obligated to report the news, and segregation­
ist excesses made good copy. By the questions they asked and by the 
emphasis newsmen put on their reporting, the media often made news as 
well as reported news; however, in preparing for the opening of schools, 
the press usually gave an even-handed account of the events related to 
desegregation. In editorials, the papers generally supported peaceful 
compliance with the law of the land. Compared to news reporting in 
other southern states, the North Carolina media was positive in the 
approach to school integration and responsible in handling the sensitive 
issue.
The North Carolina leadership, as a factor in influencing sentiment 
on the desegregation issue, will be viewed here in two dimensions.
Since the turn of the century, two factions have controlled the state 
in tandem. While the Democrat politicians led the dance, the state's 
representatives of big business and industry called the tune. Lawyers 
generally administered state government at the higher levels; leaders 
of business and industry were the policy-making body. ThlB combination 
worked effectively for over a half-century and was largely responsible 
for the state's image of moderation and progress. That a powerful 
agricultural bloc did not develop in the state's political structure
Wey and Corey, Action Patterns in School Desegregation, p. 200; 
and Sarratt, The Ordeal of Desegregation, pp. 251-52 and 260.
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was largely due to the small size of the farm operations and the fact 
that many of the rural citizens were black. Contributing to this 
phenomenon was the fact that although North Carolina led the South in 
percentage of farm-dwellers, it also led the region in the proportion 
of its labor force employed in manufacturing.^
If the political leaders had to court the state's pro- 
segregationist voters* the business leaders had no such obligation. In 
their view, desegregation was good for business; racial conflict might 
discourage outside capital and the image of North Carolina as a 
progressive state which business leaders had worked hard to cultivate.
While Governor Hodges maintained a segregationist position, leaders of
*
industry felt that desegregation would be in the best interests of the 
state. These leaders controlled some of the state's most influential 
newspapers. They also had great community influence in the industrial 
centers. When industralist James G. Hanes called a meeting of business 
leaders in Winston-Salem.to discuss the coming school year, he was 
mustering support for the peaceful integration of the schools. While 
he personally opposed desegregation, it was the law of the land, and 
to defy the law would hurt the image of the region. Attending the 
meeting were the leaders who controlled the vast majority of the 
financial resources of Forsyth County. They decided that there would 
be no trouble when desegregation was implemented and passed the word 
that opposition would be bad for business, insuring that the opening
^  V. 0. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949), pp. 206-217.
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of school would be peaceful.**’ Many such meetings across the state 
had a tremendous moderating effect on the state's populace.
By the end of August 1957, the tempo of the Interest and the 
level of concern rose. When the ambassador of racism, John Kasper, 
announced that he was going to be in North Carolina for the opening of 
schools, the media and the Governor voiced strong opposition to his 
visit. State leaders, Including officials of the Carolina Patriots, 
warned that he was unwelcome.^ A native of New Jersey and executive 
secretary of the Seaboard White Citizens Council, Kasper had been 
responsible for increasing the tensions In the violence that had 
accompanied the desegregation of the high school in Clinton, Tennessee, 
in the fall of 1956. Led by this roving segregationist agitator, the 
mobs in Clinton had become so violent that Governor Clement was required 
to send a hundred state highway patrolmen to restore order. These 
forces were followed by seven M-41 tanks and three armored personnel 
carriers supported by over six hundred national guardsmen. They 
occupied the town for the next three weeks to carry out the desegregation 
process. These actions got Clinton, Tennessee, and John Kasper a lot of 
attention.1® Many North Carolinians opposed Kasper's visit because of 
the trouble he had caused in Tennessee.
Schools in Greensboro were scheduled to open on September 3, 1957, 
while the opening date in Charlotte and Winston-Salem was September 4.
Sarratt, Ordeal of Desegregation, p. 290; and Wey, Action 
Patterns in School Desegregation, pp. 23-24.
H  Greensboro Daily News, 27-2G July and 25-26 August 1957.
18 Hugh D. Graham, Crisis in Print (Nashville: Vanderbilt
University Press, 1967), pp. yj-iUl.
The rise in tension that accompanied the desegregation plans was largely
due to the promise of demonstrations and open resistance by all the
major extremist factions of the segregationists. The threats of
violence and the level of concern of officials in the week preceding
the opening of the schools brought Governor Hodges out of his neutralist
stance. The Governor made a statewide appeal on radio and television
for law and order as tho “North Carolina way." He stated chat "we will
19not tolerate any lawlessness or violence." John Kasper arrived in 
Greensboro on August 31. He spoke at the Greensboro Courthouse and at 
some White Citizens Council meetings urging open resistance and promoting 
white resistance to racially-mixed schools. His success in fanning the 
fires of racial conflict was nominal. The resistance factions in all 
three cities did not live up to their promotional declarations. City 
officials had made adequate preparations. The police were well organ­
ized and carried out twenty-four hour patrols of the school sites for 
weeks; law and order prevailed. Crowds gathered at most of the schools 
to be desegregated with leaders of the White Citizens Council, the Ku 
Klux Klan, and the North Carolina Patriots in attendance. They were, 
however, outnumbered by curiosity-seekers, by members of the news media, 
and probably by plaln-clothes policemen in the crowds. The extremists 
were largely subdued, probably less by a desire for racial harmony 
than by the prospects of inspecting the interiors of a North Carolina 
municipal jail. The Greensboro students entered the schools with no 
problem except for the taunts of a few hecklers. Several of the crowd
19 Charlotte Observer and Raleigh NewB and Observer,
1 September 1957.
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members followed Che black students Into the hallways of the school 
building, but they were escorted off of the school grounds by police. 
Newsmen and segregationists alike were told to leave after the students 
entered the building. School officials reported that most of the 
commotion on opening day was caused by "outside news media represen­
tatives*" On September 4, the Greensboro Senior High School was
desegregated by a black student "without incident" as attention focused
20on Charlotte and Winston-Salem.
There waB little to report from Winston-Salem. The planning
there had even gone so far as to include a statement of policy covering 
21
the event. Charlotte's opening day of school was a bit more exciting. 
Media representatives ruled the day. The press was looking for news, 
and the segregationists in the crowds were cooperative. There was a 
highly publicized spitting episode involving a fifteen-year-old Negro 
girl and several minor incidents that gave Charlotte bad national 
publicity,^ Local officials did not sufficiently control the situation, 
allowing newsmen into the schools. Photographers and reporters followed 
students into their homerooms. In view of the avalanche of news media 
and the opportunity for the segregationists to display their sentiments 
on national television, it was perhapB a little surprising that there 
was no real trouble. Charlotte took its lumps, but North Carolina
20 Greensboro Daily News. 3, 4, and 5 September^ 1956.
21 Sarratt, Ordeal of Desegregation, p. 260.
22 "Desegregation of Charlotte's Schools," Life, September, 
1957, pp. 53-54.
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broke the racial barrier in the public schools in the fall of 1957.23 
Only eleven black students were admitted to schools in the three 
systems. All three cities had received requests for admittance to the 
white schools by black students "as had the boards in Raleigh, Chapel 
Hill, Bryson City, Old Fort, and Mecklenburg County."2^ There were 
several suits petitioning for the admittance of black students to 
white schools pending in the courts at the time. There had been a lot 
of tension and alarm caused by the issue; however, after the relatively 
uneventful beginning, the whole thing seemed like a lot of bother for 
a simple process. Tt constituted only a token beginning, but at least 
it was a start.2"*
Although the desegregation effort beginning in North Carolina in 
the fall of 1957 fell far short of an enthusiastic endorsement of the 
Brown decision, when contrasted to the occurrences in Clinton the year 
before and in Little Rock, it gave rise to guarded optimism from many 
quarters. The national media, after the disappointment in North 
Carolina, moved on to Little Rock where their appetite for drama and 
excitement was rewarded. The hecklers in Creensboro and Charlotte paled 
in significance when Governor Faubus's circus got underway in Little 
Rock in the days following North Carolina's peaceful Integration of the 
selected schools. The reporter's dream of continuous national headlines
23 New York Times. 5 September 1957.
^  William Bagwell, School Desegregation in the Carolinas 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1972), p. 103.
23 Southern Regional Council, Special Report on Charlotte, 
Greensboro, and Winston Salem. September 1957, p. 9; Tumin, 
Desegregation, p. 13.
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went on for weeks as the Arkansas National Guard was "federalized" and 
President Elsenhower was forced to send in the 101st Airborne Division 
to carry out court-ordered desegregation. It was late November before 
the Integration crisis was stabilized enough to withdraw the troops 
from the Arkansas school grounds. In the interim, the schools in North 
Carolina were operating in a very normal fashion. While most of the 
citizenry had been opposed to racial-mixing in the schools, there was 
a certain satisfaction in being able to do something that their neigh­
boring states could not accomplish. The number of black children in 
the schools that were desegregated was so minimal that it seemed 
hardly worth worrying about, and being labeled "progressive and 
moderate" in national terms was good for business. Governor Hodges, 
who was chairman of the Southern Governor's Conference, and four other 
southern governors met with President Elsenhower to discuss the Little 
Rock situation. North Carolina's governor acted as an Intermediary 
between the President and Governor Faubus in an unsuccessful effort to 
reconcile their differences in the desegregation conflict. Hodges, as 
a result of the successful school experiment in North Carolina, was 
getting some national attention. In the winter, he was invited to 
speak on school desegregation before the Harvard Law School Forum. His 
explanation of North Carolina's approach to desegregation was well 
received by the press and people as he spoke in other sections of the 
United States. In fact, after the Little Rock ordeal, North Carolina's 
success— limited as it was— looked so good that Hodges was asked by the
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United States Information Agency In November to discuss the desegre­
gation topic on a Voice of America broadcast.26
All of this speech-making must have seemed a bit strange to 
fellow-North Carolinians who had elected Hodges the previous year when 
he was running on a "voluntary segregation" platform. The Governor 
had not changed; however, the times had changed, and most of the people 
understood that fact. The Governor had taken a position that was 
untenable over time. Business leaders In North Carolina had supported 
limited desegregation, and as his political position eroded, Hodges 
was forced to change with the times. He latched on to the "law and 
order" segment of his political stance and remained a popular, effective 
governor.
Explaining the state's position jto the people while the Governor 
was making speeches across the country fell to the lawyer leadership 
in state government. In a series of speeches beginning in early 1958, 
Malcolm Seawell— the Attorney General of North Carolina-stated clearly 
the course of action the state must pursue to avoid social and legal 
conflict. In speeches that drew strong and mixed reactions, Seawell 
told the people that they must follow the law of Che land on the 
desegregation issue and that to take a course of defiance of the law 
would result in irreparable damage to the state and its people. He 
pointed to the example of federal troops with bayoneted rifles forcing
26 Luther H. Hodges, Businessman in the Statehouse (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1962), pp. 110-18. Also see 
James W. Patton, ed., Messages. Addresses, and Public Papers of Luther 
Hartwell Hodges. Governor of North Carolina 1954-1961 (Raleigh: Council
of State, State of North Carolina, 196*3),
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desegregation in Little Rock. The only choice open to the first
officer of the law in North Carolina and the people was to obey the
law. The choices were clear; as Attorney General, he had to enforce
compliance of the desegregation laws or recommend that the state go out
of the business of education. Legally, those were the only two options.
Seawell promoted compliance with the law and maintenance of the schools.
In his "North Carolina at the Crossroads" speech, the Attorney General
presented an argument for compliance that left no room for rebuttal.
The specter of federal troops with bayonets made an impression on the
people of North Carolina. Two recent Issues of a national news
magazine had stated that it was the general consensus that North
Carolina had the best program for dealing with desegregation of any
27of the southern states. Seawell reminded the people that North 
Carolina was called a "middle of the road" state, and he explained In 
graphic terms that it would be beneficial to stay in the middle of the 
road on this issue. He advised the people of the state not to be
28influenced by extremists on either side of the desegregation issue.
Once the school desegregation process started and North Carolina 
lined up on the side of law and order, the rest of the decade following 
the Brown decision was largely a story of statistics. The Pupil 
Assignment Act was repeatedly upheld in the federal courts against 
challenges of blacks impatient with the almost interminable pace of 
compliance. Desegregation evolved in fractional increments of
^  U.S. News and World Report, 27 September 1957, pp. 32-33 and 
4 October 1957, p. 100.
Thomas D. Clark, The South Since Reconstruction (New York:
The Bobbs-Merrell Co., 1973), pp. 454-59.
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percentage points giving real substance to the question concerning 
what constitutes "all deliberate speed." If "justice delayed is justice 
denied," then a question about North Carolina's concept of justice was 
in order. The fact was, meager as the gains were, the state was 
leading the southeast in compliance.
The process of desegregation, although slow, was orderly in North 
Carolina and procedurally correct; the delaying strategy gave the people 
time to prepare for the inevitable. The extremists had their moments, 
but the incidents were so scattered across the state and the leadership 
so firm in their "law and order" stance, that the actions created more 
Interest than significance. The segregationists' meetings often took 
place in clearings in the "piney woods" far from the school house.
They usually took place at night; the schools operated peacefully 
during the daylight hours. The segregationists generally did little 
damage to the broom sage and red clay of their meeting places. The 
audiences were treated to race-baiting and whlte-segregatlonist, 
religious fervor. They often went home with hatred burning in their 
hearts, hymns ringing in their ears, and chigger-bltes scattered over 
their bodies.
One of the more interesting Incidents occurred near Maxton in 
Robeson County during January of 1958. A large group of members of the 
Ku Klux Klan gathered for a cross-burning to discourage the Interest in 
integration efforts of the Lumbee Indians. The fact that they were 
"Ku Kluxlng" Indians instead of Negroes is noteworthy. The Klansmen 
intended to disrupt an Indian public meeting, stage a rally, burn a 
cross, and generally raise a little hell. They had Invited Klan Wizard
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"Catfish" Cole to appear at the rally, and there was a large crowd In 
attendance. Angered at the effontery of a number of previous cross- 
burnings and speeches directed at them, the Indians attacked the Klan 
.rally in force. Armed with rifles, shotguns, and pistols, the Indians 
effectively dampened the enthusiasm for cross-burning. There was 
yelling, screaming, gunfire, and general disorder that resulted in 
Klansmen taking cover in ditches, behind cars, and running for their 
lives. No one was seriously hurt, and the rally dissolved into 
confusion and the darkness. Governor Hodges publlcally condemned the 
Klan and threatened them with severe legal prosecution. North Carolina 
had some of the strongest antl-Klan laws in the South on their books, 
so his threats were not idle. The Governor went on to censor Che Indians 
for using weapons and force against the lawless element. The whole 
episode took on comic proportions when it was reported statewide in the 
press, but the potential for serious injury and the promises of 
retribution by Klansmen brought on strong statements supporting law and 
order against segregationist excesses.
North Carolina had a long history of clusters of Klan activity 
in the state. The Klaverns were generally made up of religious, racist 
white trash— but violent white trash as the numerous floggings, cross- 
burnings, and nlght-ridings attest. They were able to cause a lot of 
tension and trouble but were never able to really affect the peaceful 
school desegregation.^ The ridicule heaped on the Klan as a result 
of the ignominious rout at the hands of the Indians for a time disrupted
no
Clark, South Since Reconstruction, pp. 491-94.
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their activities. An August 1958 parade in Burlington met with little 
success; however, the Klan's meetings and night-riding continued.
Another interesting segment of the segregationists' posturing 
was the publicity attracted by the Episcopalian minister James Parker 
Dees of Statesville, A nephew of federal judge John J. Parker of the 
U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals who ruled on many of the North 
Carolina desegregation suits, Dees denounced the NAACP as "the greatest 
enemy that the Negro people have responsible for "driving the Negro 
race to destruction,"30 This speech which pointed out that black birds 
and blue birds did not mix and discussed the folly of intermingling 
Black Angus cattle with Herefords was used as a segregationist tract.
The state's leading segregationist organization, the Patriots, dlstrib-
3 1uted 190,000 copies of the speech. Dees was elected president of the 
North Carolina Defenders of States Rights in early 1959. In a policy 
statement, Dees stated: "We are concerned primarily with the preser­
vation of racial segregation in our public schools . . ." in a critical
time "when the destruction of the white race through racial amalgamation 
is being carefully planned . , . ."32 While the clergyman's position on 
integration was at variance with the public posture of the Episcopal 
Church, the Bishop of the North Carolina Diocese did nothing beyond 
suggesting that Dees spend more of bis energy on his church responsi­
bilities.
3® Sarratt, Ordeal of Desegregation, p. 276.
Sarratt, Ordeal of Desegregation, p. 276.
32 Sarratt, Ordeal of Desegregation, p. 277.
Educators were sometimes involved in extremist organizations.
The president of the Patriots of North Carolina, W. C. George, was a
professor of anatomy at the progressive University of North Carolina.
George made a study to attempt to prove that Negro mental capacity was
33generally inferior to that of whites. At the other end of the 
spectrum were professors at Negro colleges leading militant black 
groups. The educators who took extreme positions on integration 
demonstrated that extremists on both sides of the issue were not all 
white trash or black rubble. They were simply people who were out of 
step with the majority of North Carolina citizens and who were caught 
up in the rising tide of the movement to end racial discrimination in 
the state's public schools.
After the initial flurry of excitement and concern subsided in 
the fall of 1957, an attitude of highly developed, adroit complacency 
set in as only one more school system was added to the state's 
desegregation compliance totals in the following school year. This 
system, Wayne County, was the first rural system to Integrate in 
North Carolina. The tokenism approach to desegregation was receiving 
excellent press coverage. The courts had viewed the procedure as a 
"good faith" beginning, and the media was touting it as "a model for
e /
the rest of the South." The state's Attorney General defended this 
"gradualism" approach before a U.S. Senate Committee in 1959. He was 
quoted as saying that the people of North Carolina were "making a 
genuine effort to gradually adjust themselves to the new, and what
33 Sarratt, Ordeal of Desegregation, pp. 189 and 273. 
^  Greensboro Daily News, 27 Hay 1959. •
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seems to them to be revolutionary, requirements Imposed by the 
decisions of the Supreme Court. . . His argument was supported by 
the fact that other southern states were making less progress on the 
desegregation issue.35
Even Governor Hodges was backing away from his segregationist 
stance, but he still recognized that public sentiment had not really 
changed that much. In a conference with human relations leaders in 
1959, the governor was quoted as saying, "Gentlemen, I suspect that 
personally I am about as liberal as any of you on this racial matter, 
but I am in politics and I can't afford to express such views. If . . . 
I leave politics or the political climate changes, and I feel free to 
express liberal views, I will do so."36 Hodges recognized that conser­
vatism on racial issues still got votes in North Carolina. The state's 
senior Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., used that fact to his advantage. He 
still maintained that the Court's decision effectively abrogated a
Constitutional premise that could only be legally changed by the
37
amendment process. His conservative posture had allowed him to spend 
less than $5,000 to win both the primary and the general elections for 
another six-year term in the U.S. Senate. "The times, they were a- 
changing," but conservatism might never be unpopular in the state of 
North Carolina.3®
Greensboro Daily Hews. 27 May 1959.
36 William Bagwell, School Desegregatlln in the Carolines 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1972), p. 106.
37 Waynick, North Carolina and the Negro, p. 227.
38 Dabney, A Good Man. p. 180.
Changing times were evident in the gubernatorial contests in 
1960 In the state. Clear choices were presented by the candidates 
vying for the state's highest office. Representing the segrega­
tionist wing of the Democrat party was I. Beverly Lake who, as 
Assistant Attorney General, had represented North Carolina in the 
amicus curie arguments before the Supreme Court in 1955. Lake, a 
Columbia Ph.D. and a former Wake Forest University law professor, made 
a strong defense of segregated schools his main issue. Malcolm Seawell 
who, as the state's Attorney General, had promoted desegregation as the 
state's only course of action on the issue was viewed as the integration 
candidate. Terry Sanford, a lawyer, whose views on the issue were not 
clear-cut, was seen as the moderatej middle-of-the road candidate.
Lake ran well enough in the black-belt lowlands and in the blue-collar 
districts of the cities to force a runoff with Sanford in the primary. 
With Seawell out of the contest, there was still a clear choice. 
Concerned by Lake's virulent racism, Governor Hodges and the state's 
business leaders threw their support to Sanford although as a Kerr 
Scott follower he was a bit too liberal for their tastes. Lake ran 
well everywhere except in mountain counties and made a credible showing 
with 44 percent of the vote. Sanford won the election with strong 
support from the establishment forces and near-unanimous backing from 
the black voters. As a Kennedy Democrat, the new governor had been 
elected on a progressive platform that gave strong emphasis to the 
promotion of better schools.39
39 Numan V, Bartley and Hugh. D. Graham, Southern Politics and the 
Second Reconstruction (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1975), p. 76.
By the time Sanford took office In 1961, ten systems had 
Initiated the gradualism desegregation strategy, and <*ighty-two black 
children were attending previously all-white schools in the state.
Chapel Hill, Durham, High Point, and Raleigh— all city schools— had 
enrolled black students in white schools for the first time. Craven 
County and Yancey County joined Wayne as the only rural schools to 
desegregate. Of the ten systems now integrated, only Yancey County 
had been desegregated by court order. The other nine systems enrolled 
black students under a voluntary plan consistent with the state's 
Pupil Assignment Act. Yancey County, nestled between McDowell County 
and the Tennessee line, crosses the Blue Ridge mountains at the highest 
point in the United States east of the Rockies. This county was one of 
those that had no separate schools for their black population and sent 
the Negro children to schools in another county. Although Yancey 
County officials tried to avoid Integration by offers to open up schools 
within the county to accommodate the children, the federal court ruled 
that the Negroes must be allowed to enter the two white high schools 
in the fall of 1960.4°
An irony of the Yancey County court order was the situation in 
adjoining McDowell County which had brought suit in federal court in 
1954 before the Brown decision was rendered. In three separate cases, 
the McDowell litigants went to federal court repeatedly seeking both 
equal facilities and the right to attend white schools. The case that 
started the plaintiff's journey on the legal treadmill was Carson v.
4° Tom Flake, Statistical Summary of School Segregation- 
Desegregation in Southern and Border States (Nashville: Southern
Education Reporting Service, 1961). p. 29.
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Board of Education of McDowell County. In federal court when the Brown
decision was announced, the case was subsequently dismissed because, 
the relief asked for had been made available. When the black students 
were denies admission again, the parents went back to federal court 
seeking an Injunction to prevent the school board from refusing to 
admit the Negro children. This time their case was dismissed as prema­
ture because statutory remedies had not been exhausted,^ The 
plaintiffs then entered their plea in the state court as a class action 
to include other Negro children in the county. They were turned down 
in the superior court, so they appealed to the North Carolina Supreme 
Court in May 1956. . This action was eventually dismissed because it 
was improperly drawn. The suit had been brought as a class action, 
and the North Carolina Pupil Placement Act required actions to be 
brought on in an individual basis.^ The litigants were then unsucess- 
ful in a suit to have the Pupil Placement Act set aside as offering no 
remedy in Carson. At that point the litigants went to federal court 
again to ask for a declaratory judgment based on Brown allowing 
students to enroll in schools without regard for race. Federal Judge 
Wilson Warlick ruled that the Pupil Assignment Act must be followed 
which led to the Carson v. Warlick caBe.43 This litigation went on and 
on exhausting the plaintiffs and a lot of money. When McDowell County 
finally voluntarily desegregated their schools in 1964, the students 
who first asked the courts for permission to enter the white schools
Carson v. Board of Education, 117F, 2789 (4th Cir.Ct. 1955).
4? Joyner v. McDowell County Board Education, North Carolina,
92 S.E. 2d 795 (1956).
Carson v. Warlick, 238 F Supp ed 724.
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probably had children of their own. The Pupil Assignment Act proved 
effective over time. It was repeatedly judged as legal and effectively 
controlled the rate of the desegregation progress.^
Terry Sanford was often compared to Charles B. Aycock as an
education governor. He campaigned on the "quality" schools issue, and
he made quality education one of his primary goals. While he encouraged
the comparisons between his administration and Aycock*s on education,
Sanford's task In dealing with the Negro and the school was much more
complicated than his earlier predecessor. Educational leaders pointed
to Aycock*s public school legislation a s  a model for the rest of the
South; Sanford wanted North Carolina's desegregation progress to show
the way in the southern states. In his "The South Is Rising Again”
speech in July, 1961 before the South Carolina Educational Week
Conference in Columbia, Sanford challenged the South to establish
quality education as an achievable goal. While most southern governors
were searching for means to circumvent the Supreme Court's ruling, the
North Carolina governor avoided any trace of resistance to the Court's
decree In his address. He quoted Walter Hines Fage*s statement: "I
believe In the free public training of both the hands and the mind of
45
every child born of woman." Depicting children of the region as 
unable to compete in a national job-market because of their poor schools, 
Sanford challenged the rest of the South to equal North Carolina's
44 Carson v. Warlick ond Wheeler v. Durham City Board of 
Education, 309F 2d 630.
^  Memory F. Mitchell, ed., Messages. Addresses and Public Papers 
of Terry Sanford, Governor of North Carolina 1961-1965 (Raleigh, N.C.
Historical Commission, 1966), p. 15b.
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commitment Co quality education for all the people. The governor's 
enthusiasm for improving education mitigated to some degree his 
"softness" on desegregation which still worried a lot of people in the 
state.
While he was perceived as being "soft" on desegregation, there was
little doubt where Sanford stood on the "law and order" Issues. The
governor dealt with extremist actions as firmly as Luther Hodges had,
and he had to deal with more of them. The sit-in demonstrations
started in the winter of 1960 in Greensboro and within a week spread
46
all across North Carolina. Soon Civil Rights marches and protests 
began disrupting North Carolina communities. The growth in civil rights 
activism and militancy gave rise to a concomitant increase in white 
segregationist activity in the state. Governor Sanford repeatedly spoke 
out against the rising militancy of the Ku Klux Klan. By the summer of 
_1963, mass demonstrations by civil rights activists and by segregation­
ists spread across the piedmont area of North Carolina. These 
demonstrations led to confrontations and some violence on a frequent 
basis. Sanford had his Attorney General Capus Waynick assemble some 
ISO Negro leaders in Raleigh on June 25, 1963. At this meeting, the 
governor made an address that clearly stated his position on unruly 
demonstrations, Sanford told the blacks that the white man was not the 
enemy in the civil rights conflict. He stated that the enemies of the 
people of North Carolina were Ignorance and an inherited social system 
that would take time and education to dismantle. The governor took his
Bullock, History of Negro Education in the South, pp. 27-76,
stand for strong law enforcement and peace-and-order. He ended his 
talk with the admonition to put an end to racial conflict and let 
reason temper actions.^ As a Kennedy Democrat, Sanford*s words had 
more Impact with the blacks than Governor Hodges', lie was perceived 
in the black community as a progressive leader, and this image 
probably saved the state considerable difficulty on the desegregation 
issue. Sanford dealt respectfully with the black leaders, meeting with 
them on a frequent basis and promoting moderation. The governor openly 
admitted to the need for social change. He believed that racial 
differences were a local problem that needed to be solved within the 
state. His support among white people in the state grew with his firm 
handling of racial disorder and fostered the gradual acceptance of the 
social changes that were occurring with the desegregation of the 
schools.^®
As the Klan activities increased near the end of his term, Governor 
Sanford gained greater respect from both races with his firm stand 
against the hooded order. If other southern governors had taken a 
similar law-and-order stance against Klan excesses, some of the violence 
attending school desegregation probably could have been avoided. In a 
widely publicized speech on the subject, In response to growing concern 
about Klan activities, Governor Sanford said "the Ku Klux Klan is not 
going to take over North Carolina." He listed the statutes that 
pertained to controlling the Klan and advised that the FBI, the State 
Highway Patrol, and local law enforcement officers were going to be
^  Clark, The South Since Reconstruction, pp. 395-398.
Uaynick, North Carolina and the Negro, pp. 2-3.
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used against Klan activities. Sanford added that court officials had 
been ordered to bring lndlctnents against violators of the Klan 
statutes. The governor ended with, "Let the KKK get this clear, I am 
not going to tolerate their Illegal actions, and the people of North 
Carolina are not going to put up with it."^ Terry Sanford's strong 
position on "law and order," with both the black activists and the 
white segregationists who advocated racial conflict, had a positive 
influence on the tensions created by the compliance process to desegre­
gate the public schools. The governor's influence helped to keep most 
of the integration decisions in the board rooms of the local school 
authorities*
At the end of the decade following the Brown ruling, forty of the 
state's school districts had successfully Implemented desegregation 
compliance in their schools. An additional county, Harnett, had 
desegregated some of their Indian student population. Nearly twenty- 
thousand students who had previously attended Negro or Indian schools 
had been admitted to white schools. Of the many actions filed to 
pressure recalcitrant school districts, only two had actually resulted 
in court-ordered desegregation. Many cases were at the time pending, 
and there Is no question that suits filed against several of the 
voluntarily desegregated schools had helped accelerate their desegre- 
gation process.
49 Mitchell, Messages of Terry Sanford, pp. 623-24. 
Flake, Statistical Summary, 1963-64, pp. 35-38.
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In the fall of 1963, the Attorney General of North Carolina 
Issued a policy statement in a letter which proclaimed: "The man­
datory requirement as to enforced separation In Article IX, section 2, 
by the 1875 amendment, Is no longer the law In North Carolina. I
think the official position is that the race provision is no longer 
51
the law." That this was a moot point is clearly evidenced by the 
fact that in the school year of 1963-64 only 1,865 Negroes, or one-half 
of 1 percent of the black students In the state, were attending white 
schools.^
That even this small percentage was not truly representative of 
the state's desegregation status became evident later in the year In a 
controversy which once again centered around the Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
System. Advocates of desegregation charged that the system's adminis­
trators were evading the law and were trying to maintain the status quo. 
Spokesmen for the system claimed that they were making a sincere effort 
toward gradual compliance. Harry Golden, editor of Charlotte's Carolina
Israelite, said: "They're sincere all right— sincere in trying to do as
53little as possible, as gradually as possible." Out of this controversy 
came some facts that helped to clarify the dubious progress that the 
system had made since the initiation of their voluntary plan. While 
desegregation of the school system was at best negligible, 490 Negroes 
were attending desegregated schools in Charlotte-Mecklenburg out of a
Letter, Attorney General of North Carolina, Policy Statement, 
October 18, 1963.
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Calculations based on 1963-64 figures in Flake, Statistical 
Summary, p. 35.
53 Editorial, Carolina Israelite. February 8, 1964, p. 4.
total Negro enrollment of over 20,000. In the light of cold reality
the picture was even more bleak. Of the 490 Negroes enrolled with
white students, 418 attended Bethune Elementary School which had a
54
total enrollment of 425. These figures made It obvious that to judge 
the extent of desegregation by number and percent of Negro students who 
were not in all-Negro schools distorted the true picture of the state's 
integration statistics. The placement of a single non-Negro student 
in an otherwise all-Negro school--in Charlotte's case, seven white 
students— had the effect of transferring large numbers of Negro students 
for statistical purposes to schools which were not all-Negro schools.
This served to facilitate de jure Integration while promoting de facto 
segregation. Bethune School's figures made over one-fifth of the state's 
desegregation total of 1,865 blacks in schools with whites invalid 
which automatically reduced the state's integration figures of only .53 
percent of the black student population to a more realistic .41 percent. 
An indication of the state's commitment to desegregation was the fact 
that, out of all school districts with Negroes, over one-fourth of 
the state's black students attending non-Negro schools were in the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district.^5 Thus, a decade after the Brown 
decision, the Civil Rights Act of April 1964 which was aimed directly 
at eliminating the dual-school system found the sovereign state of North
^  Aaron Cohodes, "Failure of a Plan," Nation's Schools, February 
1964, pp. 41-42.
Calculations based on statistics from Cohodes, Nation's 
Schools, p. 41 and Flake, Statistical Summary, p. 43.
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Carolina with an almost unblemished record of delay and evasion in its 
ten-year history of integration effort. Hard desegregation evidence 
indicated that North Carolina’s Public School System would have the 
opportunity to make a fresh start at school desegregation in the 
second decade after Brown.
CHAPTER 5 
Catalyses of Compliance
The school year of 1964 began in North Carolina with little evidence 
on the surface that the school system was in a turmoil or that the dilemma 
of a decade was reaching the critical stage. The Civil Rights Bill of 
1964, which was signed into law on July 2, 1964, had shaken school 
officials over much of the state out of the ten-year lull of inactivity 
which had followed the initial excitement over the Brown decision.1
The Supreme Court ruling in Brown had generated a lot of sound and 
fury but had accomplished very little. The Civil Rights Act was much 
more wide-ranging in intent. To conservative North Carolinians, the 
new law was another liberal assault on traditional values. They had 
depended on Sam Ervin and B. Everett Jordan in the Senate to carry the 
fight against federal legislation that attacked their institutions.
Senator Ervin had been their main hope. The country lawyer from the 
foothills hamlet of ttorganton had been waging a fairly successful battle 
against civil rights legislation since 1956. With degrees from the 
University of North Carolina and Harvard Law School, Senator Sam, as 
he was often called, was not just any "country lawyer." He enjoyed a 
well-deserved reputation as an authority on Constitutional law. Any 
person who wanted any civil rights legislation at all was a liberal as 
far as Senator Ervin was concerned, and this position was responsible
1 Rfeed Sarratt, The Ordeal of Desegregation (New York: Harper &
Row, Publishers, 1966), p. 56.
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for his widespread popularity In North Carolina, He was a guardian of
a literal interpretation of the Constitution and an outspoken critic of
the liberties that he felt the Supreme Court took in interpreting
2
Constitutional law.
The administration's civil rights bill attacking segregated 
schools that had been introduced in 1963 was not as drastic as had been
expected, given the Kennedy position and the temper of the times. Open
racial conflict was raging in North Carolina as well as all over the 
South. Hearings on the bill before the full Judiciary Committee were 
scheduled in the summer of 1963 Just when racial tensions were at their 
worst in North Carolina. In a series of televised debates with Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy, that sunner, Senator Ervin had represented the 
South well. Kennedy stated facts while the Senator argued the law. The 
Attorney General presented numerous figures to clearly demonstrate that 
desegregation was not working in the South. Senator Ervin told the 
story of the mountaineer who, when told that "figures don't lie," 
replied, "yes, but liars sure do figure."^ The debate on the relative 
merits of the bill went on for monthB in a summer fraught with civil 
rights agitation that included Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" 
speech in front of the Lincoln Memorial. Senator Ervin defended his 
state by contending that North Carolina had effectively educated the 
Negro without mass desegregation. He said that as a state legislator
^ Charlotte Observer, 15 November 1955. p. 3.
^ Dick Dabney, A Good Man: The Life of Sam T. Ervin (Boston;
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), p. 215.
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he had "always fought for liberal appropriations for the adequate
education of North Carolina's children,"^ The hearings ended, and the
civil rights bill lost momentum. The racial violence in the South
continued, but with the assassination of the President in November,
it became clear that a civil rights bill which Kennedy had promoted so
rigorously would pass in the next session of Congress.
When the much stronger civil rights legislation was introduced in
the spring of 1964, Senator Ervin joined other southerners in one of the
longest filibusters in history to defuse the bill. The Presidential
assassination had, however, guaranteed the passage of the Civil Rights
Act. The North Carolina Senator's many amendments devised to weaken the
bill all failed, and after seventy-five days the Senate invoked closure.
Nine days later, on June 19, the full body approved the measure with its
threatening school desegregation ramifications intact.** In the Civil
Rights Bill of 1964 were the mechanics that would be used effectively to
attack biraclalism in the public schools of North Carolina.
The particular aspect of the 1964 Civil Rights Law which held real
significance for North Carolina school administrators was Title VI—
Federal Aid. This part of the law:
Provides that no person shall be subjected to racial 
discrimination in any program receiving Federal aid.
Directs Federal agencies to take steps against discrimi­
nation, including— as a last resort, and after hearings-- 
withholding of Federal funds from state or local agencies 
that discriminate.^
c
 ^Dabney, A Good Man, p. 215. Dabney, A Good Man. pp. 219-21.
® Gilbert Osofsky, The Burden of Race (New York: Harper and.Row,
Publishers, 1967), pp. 570-72.
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Since the North Carolina public schools had long depended on 
federal financial aid to supplement state allocations, school officials 
realized that the United States Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) had finally been provided with an effective desegregation 
Instrument. Concomitantly, the Office of Equal Educational Opportunity 
(OEEO) began marshaling their forces for an assault on the segregated
7
school systems of the South to try their new weapon in hostile country. 
Local administrators on the county and city district levels brushed the 
dust off plans that had been prepared over the years— and In some cases
initiated— in preparation for the anticipated visits. They hoped to 
prove to HEW representatives that they were in the process of making an 
attempt "with all deliberate speed" at desegregation of their respective 
districts.
The HEW officials moved gingerly into the South, and North Carolina 
was not flooded with OEEO enforcement officers as had been anticipated. 
The main impetus for desegregation was shifted from the federal courts 
to the officials of HEW where the power of the purse could be a useful 
persuader. Every federal agency giving financial aid to education was 
required to issue regulations to implement desegregation proceedings in 
each school district.® School boards, seeing their districts* federal 
funds jeopardized, began making token efforts and taking tentative 
steps toward desegregation. HEW began receiving plans for compliance
7 The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Office 
of Equal Opportunity will be hereinafter referred to as HEW and OEEO, 
respectively. OEEO w s b  at that time an enforcement arm of HEW.
® John A. Hannah, "Southern School Desegregation," Report of the 
United States Commission on Civil Rights (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1967)
pp. 1-2.
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Co be studied, and many formerly all-white schools began to show a 
sprinkling of black faces. There was little resistance because the 
integration percentage was so small, but the handwriting was on the wall. 
School administrators began to talk of 1965 in apprehensive terms. While 
little real progress had been made, the wheels had finally been set in 
motion; they would prove difficult to stop and impossible to reverse.
The elections of 1964 came two months after school started. Since 
a governor cannot succeed himself in North Carolina, every fourth year 
requires extensive governmental adjustments. Sanford's term was almost 
over, and many white Democrats were filled with a sense of relief. The 
early 1960s had been a period of unsettling social change. Sanford 
had proved to be too much of a Kennedy liberal to the voters In the 
essentially conservative state. On the positive side, he had proved 
equal to the task on "law and order” issues, and North Carolina had 
escaped much of the chaotic violence that had rumbled through the South 
during the period. Blacks had been restive during his term, and "white 
supremacy” extremists had agitated on a regular basis. With blacks 
challenging segregation standards on all fronts, the potential for con­
flict was ever-present. Confrontation between Negroes and whites was 
occurring on a dally basis throughout the state. While there was some 
violence and bloodshed, the Governor had taken a firm hand with both 
white extremists and black militants. Much conflict was avoided or 
neutralized by the Governor's strong stand on the law.
Most of Sanford's peacemaking efforts, however, went beyond dealing 
sternly with lawless elements. The Governor was a compromiser and 
negotiator. In his strategies for defusing racial tension, he avoided
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the posturing and stagecraft that seemed the forte of so many southern 
governors. In calling for reason and logic as an approach to conflict 
situations, Sanford helped to keep the lid on a boiling issue. He was 
recognized as a skilled mediator and a fair-minded leader by both races. 
During his administration, biraclal human relations committees were 
established in municipalities acrosB the state. Many problems were 
worked out dispassionately in meeting rooms instead of violently in the 
streets.7 The problem for moBt whites was that such an approach 
required good faith and integrity to be effectively employed. The 
changes that resulted were too fast and wide-sweeping to suit white 
North Carolinians. Many felt that Sanford, in keeping the peace, was 
compromising the social institutions. They preferred a leader like 
Senator Ervin who in throwing himself in front of the civil rights 
steamroller insured his reelection for a lifetime.^ Ervin's stance on 
the issue was very popular, but he was not facing racial conflict. 
Sanford's position was unpopular( but immensely practical in the context 
of the times. The strongest criticism was that Sanford, and the times, 
were moving too much on social issues.
There was little doubt that a conservative Democrat would win the 
1964 election. The three top contenders were all conservatives. 
Reactionary I. Beverly Lake, the former Wake Forest professor, came in 
a close third behind Judge L. Richardson Freyer and Judge Dan K. Moore.
® Capus M. Waynick, North Carolina and the Negro (Raleigh: The
State College Print Shop, 1964), pp. 17-187.
10 Paul R. Clancey, Just a Country Lawyer (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1974), p. 177.
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In the runoff election, Moore with the help of the Lake faction defeated 
Preyer who had the support of the Sanford organization,^ The conser­
vative victory, however, proved too little too late In the school 
desegregation matter.
Former governor of North Carolina, Luther Hodges, in a 1964 address, 
described "a social revolution centering on the demands of Negro rights, 
and given the whole history of this nation and of the world itself, the 
ultimate outcome cannot be in d o u b t , H o d g e s  at the time was United 
States Secretary of Commerce, and his public stance had changed dras­
tically since his earlier efforts In North Carolina to impede the 
desegregation of schools. His philosophical bent had not changed that 
much because, even while he was fighting the desegregation ruling, he
admitted privately that his position on the issue was necessary for
13political reasons. Luther Uodges could tell which way the winds of
change were blowing. Change appeared inevitable; it was only a matter 
of time.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 helped North Carolina end years of' 
fractional percentage measurements in desegregation calculations. The 
desegregation figure for North Carolina's public school system in the 
school year of 1964-65 was 1.42 percent. This was not a very significant 
figure in light of the fact that the Negro students constituted over
^  Nuraan V. Bartley and Hugh Graham, Southern Politics and the 
Second Reconstruction (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1975), p. 76.
Luther H. Hodges, "What Kind of America," from The Deep South 
in Transition, ed. Robert B. Highsaw (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama 
Press, 1964), p. 43.
William Bagwell, School Desegregation in the Carolinas (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1972), p. 106n.
115
30 percent of the total enrollment In North Carolina's public schools, 
and Che 1.42 percent figure was based only on the number of Negroes 
enrolled as a percent of the total Negro enrollment. In other words, 
almost one in every three students In North Carolina's public schools 
was black, while less than one Negro student in every 200 students was 
enrolled in a desegregated school.^ Nevertheless, even these 
insignificant totals showed promise of a start being made.
September came too early for the vast majority of North Carolinians 
in 1965. The spring of 1965 had seen the passage of the massive Federal 
Aid to Education Act, Public Law 90-10. This law, better known as the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, was enacted on April 11 
and provided the carrot by which federal officials felt that the balky 
desegregation donkey could be moved. This legislation created a set of 
teeth for the Title VI section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by 
providing for a substantial increase in educational funding for public 
schools.
Three weeks after enactment of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965, the Office of Education issued its first set of 
standards designed to implement Title Vi's desegregation requirements. 
These standards, known as guidelines, were based upon the regulations 
issued by HEW to put the provisions of Title VI into effect. The 
guidelines provided three methods that a school could use to qualify for 
federal funds. First, the school district could agree to do away with
^  Calculations based on statistics in Tom Flake, Statistical 
Summary of School Segregation-Desegregation in Southern and Border 
States 1964-65 (Nashville: Southern Education Reporting Seryice, 1965),
p. 43.
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the dual school system, completely desegregate, and file an assurance 
of compliance— HEW Form 441. Second, school districts under a United 
States final court order to desegretate schools could submit the order 
and agree to comply with it to become a Court Order District. The 
third method was for districts that fell into neither category. These 
districts could submit a voluntary plan that the Commissioner of 
Education felt would be a step toward school d e s e g r e g a t i o n . ^  Most of 
North Carolina's schools fell into the third category. These districts 
submitted voluntary compliance plans on HEW Form 441B, and they were 
designated Freedom of Choice districts.
The school districts were faced with the fact that they must accept 
one of the three planB provided by the guidelines or risk losing the 
federal funds. The sanction of withdrawal of federal assistance had 
acquired more significance with the increased federal spending for 
education. Federal financial assistance had become a large portion of 
local school budgets, and North Carolina public school administrators 
stood to lose over ninety-six million dollars if they were not able 
to satisfy the United States Office of Education.^
The long hot summer was fast coming to a close, but the local 
situation showed promise of becoming much warmer. The western portion 
of the state, because of its mountains, had usually been snared the 
oppressive heat that plagued the central and eastern section of the
^  Personal Interview with Gregory Anris, 14 June 1968.
Ifi Financial figure obtained from files of Office of Education, 
Washington, D.C.
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state In late summer. Long before the frost started creeping down the 
ridges, It became obvious that the sociological climate of this region 
would be much cooler than the rest of the state because of the low 
density of Negro population in the area. The rest of the state huddled 
under the white sun; the powdery dust from the parched earth and the 
hostile tension of over two-thirds of the state's population hung heavy 
in the air as the last of August and the opening of school came In 
tandem. The hard-core resistance was crystallized In the eastern half 
of the state, where some counties had a population of around 70 percent 
Negro. The central part of the state, traditional center of Ku Klux 
Klan activity, stirred uneasily.
A few districts in the western end of the state that had only a 
handful of Negro students filed HEW Forms 641 which assured that these 
systems did not "maintain any characteristic of a dual school 
structure."^ Of the "441 districts" only one school district had a 
percentage of Negro students that exceeded 10 percent. That was the 
Cabarrus County system which had a total black student enrollment of 
13.5 percent, and their best effort at school desegregation was 18.5 
percent or 157 of 1,102 Negro students enrolled in desegregated schools 
for the 1965-66 school year. Needless to add, this figure did not meet 
the requirements set up for compliance under HEW Form 441. Most of 
the districts which filled out HEW Form 441 fell short of the specified 
requirements for the year, but some were able to completely do away 
with the dual school. All these districts were in the western end of
^  Hannah, "Southern School Desegregation," p. 57,
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Che state with the single exception of Dare County on the east coast, 
which contrary to the general demographic pattern contained a non­
white population of only 7 nercent.m
Another phenomenon of North Carolina's desegregation pattern in the 
fall of 1965 was the "Court Order" districts. Prior to the enactment 
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the major action of the 
federal government in school desegregation had been in the courts.
After federal money became the whip used by OEEO, negotiation became 
more important than litigation. Therefore, most "Court Order" districts 
were the reluctant stepchildren of the pre-Tltle VI era, and while 
they provided a broadcast pattern, they made up a significant one. In 
1965, there were seven county districts and thirteen city districts 
under "Court Order" desegregation. The city*districts had a nan-white 
student enrollment that averaged about 28 percent of the total enrollment. 
Of the seven counties, three had "Court Order" city districts indicating 
a dual suit, and four were in areas of a relatively high concentration 
of Negro population. The significant conclusion to be drawn from these 
figures, was that the frequency distribution of "Court Order" districts 
lay heavily in the city districts where the Negroes represented only 
one-fourth of the population but were hetter organized and had enough 
affluence to bring litigation against the segregated school.- Further, 
according to the Census of 1960, over two-thirds of the Negroes in North 
Carolina lived in a rural situation and had not filed suits against
Dare County percent of non-white population based on Southern 
Regional Council Map of 1960.
119
their respective school districts,"^ In twenty-eight school districts 
that were composed of over 50 percent Negroes enrolled in the public 
schools, only one, Caswell County, was under Court Order to desegregate. 
The other twenty-seven were operating under the Freedom of Choice plan. 
Halifax County district, which was made up of roughly 77 percent Negro 
and 23 percent white students, had only 1.7 percent of its Negro 
students attending desegregated schools in 1965. This Indicated that 
these people were either satisfied with second class schools or that
20
they were not well organized or affluent enough to force desegregation.
t
The much predicted and long dreaded confrontation did not take
place in the fall of 1965. Moderation prevailed, and only sporadic
incidents and scattered violence occurred as "Freedom of Choice" provided
a way out in the areas that were committed to hard-core resistance.
According to state officials, the number of blacks in desegregated
21
schools almost doubled to a total of over 8,000. The gains were made 
in areas of low Negro concentration, and local politicians pointed with 
pride to areas that had complied and had become "441 districts." In the 
schools which became "441 districts," the students, after the initial 
tensions drained away, went out of their way to cooperate and get along 
together. There was obvious paternalism and false enthusiasm engendered
19 United States Census. 1960. Total non-white rural population in 
North Carolina is 65.7 percent of the total Negro population.
2^ Calculations based on 1965 figures from the files of OEEO and 
HEW. I was assisted in the use of the files hy Dr. Gregory Anrig, 
Director of 0E0.
21 "Southern Schools Report," U.S. News and World Report. 
13 September 1965.
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by the situation. The educational climate based on false premises 
could not remain static and did not; many of the Negro students were 
hard Dressed to compete In the classroom. The enthusiasm often became 
toleration, toleration sometimes became rejection, and the students in 
many instances segregated themselves within the school. The black 
students, victims of an inferior school system, soon were able to 
relax, and some of the pressure was relieved. The equilibrium, 
although it did not improve, generally did not deteriorate. Gradually, 
some of the Negroes who were better students moved into the academic 
mainstream, and in many schools across North Carolina much progress 
was made toward racial harmony.
The school year had an orderly start, but during the 1965-66 term 
incidents occurred that showed evidence of resistance. During the 
school term several private schools opened for whites. For the first 
time, tuition grants were requested, and legislative approval of the 
first such grant led to a court decision against state aid to private 
schools that propagated segregated schools. The Court ruled that the
flight of white children to new or established private or parochial
22schools promotes resegregation. On April A, 1966, state tuition 
grants for attendance at segregated private schools were declared 
unconstitutional in North Carolina. ^  The local systems that had 
chosen "Freedom of Choice" plans as a method of compliance enrolled
22 United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F 2d 
836 (5th Cir. 1966).
23 Hawkins v. North Carolina State Board of Education, C.A. No. 
2067, W.D.N.C., April 4, 1966.
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very few black children although located in areas of high concentration 
of the Negro population. The poor desegregation showing by these 
systems led the President to designate the Attorney General as the 
coordinator of all Title VI activities in late: 1965,^ New guidelines 
were developed that were procedurally more strict. In May of 1966 
several southern Congressmen served notice on the Commissioner of 
Education that not only were the guidelines too harsh, but in their 
opinion they were illegal. Eighteen senators sent a letter to President 
Johnson entitled "A Most Solemn Petition."
This letter, signed by both of North Carolina*s senators, B. Everett 
Jordan and Sam Ervin, Jr., protested the abuse of power involved in 
imposition of the guidelines and beseeched the personal intervention of 
the Chief Executive to right the wrong and revoke the order. Their 
petition appealed to the President to intervene and prevent illegal, 
unfair, and unrealistic action of the Office of Education. President 
Johnson reportedly replied that he considered Che guidelines to be fair, 
and no significant change occurred in the Office of Education's dealings 
with North Carolina.^
The performance on school desegregation in North Carolina during
1965-66 was anything but reassuring, and the number of Negro children 
attending schools with white children was very low. In 1954, the year 
of the Brown decision, 293,965 Negroes attended all-Negro schools; eleven 
years later 331,282 Negro students attended all-Negro schoolsr— an increase
24 James R. Dunn, "Title VI, The Guidelines and School Desegregation 
in the South," Virginia Law Review 53 (January 1967): 55.-
^  Southern Regional Council, Special Report, School Desegregation 
1966: The Slow Undoing (Atlanta: SRC Press, 1966), pp, 14-16.
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of almost forty thousand. While they lost ground in numbers, they 
gained proportionately. Six and one-half percent of the Negro students 
attended schools that were not 100 percent Negro, but this figure 
dropped to 2.1 percent if only the Negro students who were attending 
schools with less than a 95 percent Negro student body were counted.2® 
The Commission on Civil Rights found that the slow pace of desegregation 
was attributable to the Freedom of Choice Plan adopted by most school 
districts as the most suitable method of desegregation.27
Disappointment with the poor desegregation statistics for 1965 
led to a new resolve by the federal agencies. Many desegregation 
strategists were beginning to realize that "Freedom of Choice" could 
never be free in areas where blacks were repressed and impoverished.2® 
Plans for the 1966-67 school year were developed to require a greater 
desegregation effort with more exacting compliance guidelines. Congress 
had approved the largest federal aid for education appropriation in 
history. North Carolina was scheduled to receive almost twice as much 
federal aid as the states outside the South were apportioned. Federal 
officials felt that they had both the strategy and the financial clout
2ft
Calculations based on Appendix, p. 1, SCR Special Report, U.S. 
Commission on Civil Right "Southern School Desegregation," p. 10, and 
Flake, Statistical Summary, pp. AO and 44.
27 Hannah, "Southern School Desegregation," p. 3.
2® Lloyd R. Henderson, "Is It Worth It?" Journal of Law Education 
A, no. 1 (1974): 46.
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to make a lasting Impact on desegregation In the state's schools.
The era of gradualism in North Carolina was ov e r .29
29 U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of 
Education, Revised Statement of Policies for School Desegregation Plans 
Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1966), pp. 6-7.
CHAPTER 6 
The Decade of Compliance
The final phase of the desegregation of the public schools In 
North Carolina began in 1966, and the compliance totals rose steadily 
until a high point was reached in Che early 1970s. Although resistance 
strategy was still a primary concern of the state's representatives in 
Congress, local leaders generally accepted the elimination of dual 
schools as a common goal. An important consideration in the acceptance 
of the enforcement guidelines was the increased federal aid to education 
which played a major role in changing the attitudes of school adminis­
trators state-wide.
In the summer of 1966, there was a marked increase in federal 
effort to increase compliance activities. Determined to make a better 
effort in the 1966-67 school year, the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare (HEW) sent more chan 100 northern law students into 
school districts of the South to monitor desegregation programs.^
These outsiders were resented, and their positive effect was question­
able because they were viewed as regulators instead of facilitators. 
Another effort directed toward enforcement was initiated by strategists 
of the Equal Educational Opportunities Program of the Office of 
Education. North Carolina school districts were assigned to regional 
specialists who enforced provisions of Title VI, reviewed desegregation
 ^William Stelf, "The New Look in Civil Rights Enforcement," 
Southern Education Renort. September 1967, n. 7.
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plans, and conducted compliance investigations.^ The major interest 
of these specialists was in the systems which had chosen Freedom of 
Choice plans because the Court Order districts were under the scrutiny 
of the judicial officers and the remaining districts had filed 
assurance of compliance forms that signified completion of desegre­
gation programs. There was a tremendous amount of work involved 
because North Carolina had 121 Free Choice districts, each with 
different local problems and various compliance proposals. A flood of 
paperwork the previous year created by the number and variety of 
desegregation plans had been a source of confusion and frustration for 
most of those responsible for implementation procedures. State 
Superintendent of Schools, Charles F. Carroll, made a plea for a 
systematic, simplified compliance plan long before the school year 
started. Carroll contended that desegregation officials had an 
obligation to provide direction for implementation of compliance 
requirements.^ His concern reflected the sentiments of local school 
administrators across the state. Faced with the threat of a cut-off 
of funds at a time when an unprecedented amount of federal aid to 
education was available made most school administrators amicable 
coward the application of compliance guidelines. If they wanted 
federal money, little could be done at the local level to resist 
desegregation mandates. Legal efforts to delay public school
2
"Southern School Desegregation," Reports. U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights, 1967. p. 32.
U.S. Congress, House, Committee of the Judiciary, Hearings, 
Guidelines for School Desegregation , 89th Cong., 2d sess., 1966, 
p. 123.
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integration had to be made in Congress. The key to avoiding immediate 
compliance was to neutralize the threat of loss of funds or to delay 
the process leading to deferment of federal aid to education. Senator 
Sam.Ervin proposed legislation to allow school districts in violation 
of the federal guidelines to continue to receive aid until Congress 
could conduct lengthy hearings. To withhold funds, federal agents 
would have to prove that local boards were intentionally discriminating 
against blacks. The North Carolina Senator called for an amendment to 
"clarify the ambiguities of Title VI.
A few weeks after Ervin's initiation, Representative L. H.
Fountain was brought into the battle in defense of Franklin County 
which was in imminent danger of losing federal money. Franklin County, 
a part of Fountain's Second District in the black belt, was faced with 
drastic changes in the school program to avoid loss of funds. Enforce­
ment officials were recommending that two grades of students be 
interchanged between white and black schools immediately. The 
unanticipated federal intervention enraged a volatile community, and 
the Congressman realized that it would be politically prudent to show 
his constltutents that they were well represented in Washington.^ 
Fountain therefore introduced an amendment to the 1966 Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act (ESEA) funding bill which would prevent the 
government from deferring funds for federal programs from a school
 ^U.S. , Congressional Record, 89th Cong,, 2d s o b s ., 1966, p. 9579.
5 Gary Orfield, The Reconstruction of Southern Education (New York: 
Wiley-Interscience, 1969), pp. 278-79.
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district until Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) officials decided 
the case against the district. Deferral of funds hod been used 
effectively against school systems in enforcement proceedings because 
delay or resistance meant operating without federal money until full, 
compliance was achieved. The Fountain Amendment passed the House but 
was watered down In a House-Senate conference committee. In final 
form, this amendment provided that "Instead of a complete ban on 
deferral, Congress required that hearings be held within sixty days 
after notice of deferral and that a decision be rendered within an 
additional thirty days,"6
Southern Congressmen realized that the real threat to the delaying 
tactics of Free Choice was the Commissioner of Education's power to 
withhold federal aid. Commissioner Harold Howe, Francis Keppel's 
successor, was proving to be much more aggressive on compliance require­
ments. At the first opportunity, southern Congressmen were determined 
to discredit the Commissioner in hopes that he would be replaced by a 
less militant official. An opportunity arose when a sentence from one 
of Howe's speeches was taken out of context and given wide publicity.
The Commissioner was quoted as saying, "If I have my way, schools will 
be built for the primary purpose of social and economic Integration." 
This quote was aired by television and radio stations across North 
Carolina.^ Howe was thoroughly denounced by opponents of school 
desegregation.
James R. Dunn, "Title VI, The Guidelines and School Desegrega­
tion in the South," Virginia Law Review 53 (January 1967): 47.
7
Orfield, Reconstruction of Southern Education, p. 285.
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In Washington, the Commissioner was called before the powerful 
House Rules Committee to answer charges that the Office of Education 
was proving to be too zealous in its enforcement program. Represen­
tative Harold Cooley of North Carolina's Fourth District began the 
proceedings by calling the enforcement efforts "deplorable and 
intolerable."8 Cooley, whose black belt district in the eastern part 
of the state joined Representative Fountain's, was in serious political 
trouble at the time. A Republican challenger was accumulating support 
in the district by denouncing the enforcement guidelines. The 
Congressman was obliged to let the people back home know he was carry­
ing the battle to Commissioner Howe, He wanted President Johnson to 
bring the Office of Education back in line. A talk with Johnson in his 
opinion, "would put an end to it and we would go back to freedom of 
choice."^ Cooley talked with the President about the enforcement 
guidelines and was given some encouragement. Commissioner Howe was 
able to weather the immediate storm, but the Office of Education was 
pushed back toward a more moderate stance.^ The battle had been waged 
in Washington by North Carolina's Congressmen, and some concessions 
from the federal officials had been won. At state level, however, 
while Congressional rhetoric might get votes and good publicity,
® U.S., House, Committee on Rules, Hearings, Policies and Guide­
lines for School Desegregation. 89th Cong., 2d sess., 1966, p. 3.
9 Orfield, Reconstruction, p. 291.
10 Orfield, Reconstruction, p. 303,
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federal dollars were making the real Impact. The Congressional 
struggle was watched with Interest, but leaders at the local level 
were no longer In doubt about the realities. The ESGA funding increase 
for the 1966-67 school year had cleared the air; most school adminis­
trators were willing to desegregate in order to get their share of the 
federal money.
For over a decade federal aid to education had averaged from 4 to 
5 percent. In the summer of 1966, the federal allocation almost 
doubled as a percent of public school expenditures in the state and was 
more than double in the actual dollars.^ The option to give up federal 
aid to avoid desegregation, in view of the increase in revenue, became 
even more unrealistic. In effect, the federal government was buying 
compliance at a dear cost.
The Congressional funding was making a dual assault on North
Carolina's resistance sentiment. First, there was the level of funding
factor. The average financial support pattern of federal aid for
1966-67 for the United States was 8 percent; in North Carolina the
12funding level was an all time high of 15 percent. The second 
federal thrust was in the dispersal of funds strategy. Most of the 
money was directed toward freedom of choice districts in the black belt 
counties and in other regions with high concentrations of black
1-1 Statistical Profile North Carolina Public Schools (Raleigh: 
Controller's Office, Department of Public Education, 1975), p. 1-43.
12 The Report of the Governor's Study Commission on the Public 
School System of North Carolina (Raleigh: North Carolina State
University Print Shop, 1968), pp. 223 and 294.
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students. In both areas desegregation plans were meeting the strongest
resistance. Many of the counties in the eastern part of the state
which had the poorest record of desegregation compliance were faced
with the loss of between one and two million dollars in federal aid.
Therefore, in the impoverished black belt districts where the need for
federal aid was greatest, a real incentive for improving their
desegregation statistics was offered. The areas most vulnerable to
economic sanctions were faced with the choice of accepting unitary
1 1schools or going out of the business of public education. State 
leaders gave the eastern counties limited options. They encouraged a 
lawful and orderly compliance with desegregation guidelines. 
Representative Fountain's home county of Edgecombe, with a population 
of just over 30,000, stood to lose over a million dollars in federal 
aid. The county's Negro population exceeded 50 percent of the total, 
yet only one-tenth of 1 percent of the black students were enrolled in 
white schools. As a comparison, Randolph County, which was about one 
hundred miles to the west of Edgecombe, received less than $300,000 in 
federal aid. Although the county's black population constituted about 
10 percent of the total, all the schools had been desegregated volun­
tarily. As a result, the county had a relatively large number of 
Negroes in white schools yet received a comparatively small amount in 
federal aid. The school districts that were benefiting the most from 
the federal money were the systems with the worst compliance records.
^  Report of The Governor's Study Commission, p. 294. The term 
unitary schools referred to a single school system. "There was to be no 
black schools, no white schools . . . just schools." See U.S. v. 
Jefferson County Board of Education, No. 23345, 5th Circuit Court of 
Appeals 5 (1966).
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Another example of the use of fiscal pressure to improve desegregation
statistics was in Robeson County. Robeson's population was less than
90,000 yet they were scheduled to receive over two million dollars in
federal benefits. Their non-white population was over SO percent, but
only about 1 percent of their non-white population— mostly Indians—
attended white schools. In order to get the federal aid, these free
choice counties had to meet compliance quotas that would drastically
change the racial composition of their schools.^ Under the new
federal economic pressures, freedom of choice was no longer free.
The desegregation issue had compounded a political problem that
state leaders had to face in the summer of 1966. Unequal representation
resulting in part from the migration of blacks from the eastern part of
the state had led to litigation, and the state's Congressional
15Districts had been ruled unconstitutional.
Governor Moore was required to call a special session of the General 
Assembly to develop a plan for redistrictlng. The problem grew out of 
an effort in 1961 to gerrymander a single Republican out of office. 
Representative Charles F. Jonas had put together enough Republican 
Party support in Mecklenburg County to win the Tenth District. Since 
Jonas could not be beat at the polls because of the Republican upland 
counties and his local support in the Piedmont, Democrats decided to 
take Mecklenburg out of the Tenth and replace it with another Democrat 
county. This would put Jonas in the Eighth where he would have to run
^  Statistics based on map of Compliance Status by Counties and 
federal funds allocations obtained from HEP.
Drum v. Seawell, 249 F. Supp. 877 (M.D. NC. 1966).
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against Representative A. Paul Kitchen in the Democrat's home territory. 
They were able to develop the "Jonas Gerrymander" because the.state 
had lost a Congressional District. The logical place to redlstrict 
was in the eastern part of the state where black out-migration had 
caused the problem. The all-Democrat redistricting committee was 
reluctant to change district lines in the conservative, pro-segrega­
tionist black belt counties because of the concern about the growing 
voter registration movement among Negroes, In an earlier session, the 
First, Second, and Fourth Districts had been gerrymandered in a pattern 
to neutralize the potential black vote, With only some small adjust­
ments, they were able to Improve the voter effectiveness of the region to 
enhance the white Democrats' political control. This 1961 redistricting 
process resulted In three districts that ran from the coast to a point 
some three hundred miles inland. The three Congressmen representing the 
districts all lived within a few miles of each other in the heart of the 
black belt. Representative Fountain lived in Edgecombe County In the 
Second District. Joining Edgecombe on the west was Nash County, home of 
Representative Cooley. The county that bordered Edgecombe on the east—  
Pitt County— was the home of Congressman Walter B. Jones. All three 
Congressmen were influential, conservative Democrats whose districts 
included counties from the Outer Banks on the Atlantic Ocean to near the 
foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains in the West.
These 1961 districts drawn by Democrats resulted in obviously 
questionable political alignments. When the mandated redistricting in 
the summer of 1966 was over, the Democrats' grand strategy seemed less 
grand. The attempt to eliminate Jonas backfired. With the Charlotte
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Observer pointing out the unfair "bacon-strips" gerrymander and
editoralizing against the maneuver, Jonas was easily reelected to 
16Congress. Then came the unconstitutional ruling and the resultant 
redistricting In 1966 which had to be conducted under the scrutiny 
of the courts. Of the resulting districts, only the Eleventh District 
remained intact. Instead of eliminating the one Republican, which had 
been one of the original goals, the Democrats lost ground state-wide. 
Of the new upland Ninth District, a state senator said, " . . .  the 
Apostle Paul couldn't be elected on the Democrat t i c k e t . T h e  new 
Congressional Districts gave the E&publicans their first consequential 
gains since the late 1800's at a time when the Republican Party 
strength was growing as a result of the desegregation issue. As 
conservative as the Democratic Party was, It was not conservative 
enough for a lot of North Carolinians. The Republic Party pointed to 
the Democratic leadership's failure to stem the tide of desegregation 
and civil rights legislation. They linked the North Carolina Democrats 
with the Kennedys, Johnson, and the proponents of the "Great Society" 
legislation that had rent their social fabric and was successfully 
putting black children in the white schools. As the number of blacks 
registered to vote grew, the number of whites voting the Republican 
ticket increased. Negroes joined the Democrat Party, and as the blacks 
registered as Democrats, whites deserted the ranks and switched to the
^  The Charlotte Observer, 16 June 1961.
■17 Douglas M. Orr, Jr., Congressional Redistricting: The North
Carolina Experience (Chapel Hill; Uniyersitv of North Carolina Press, 
1970), p. 23.
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more conservative party in growing numbers. Once again it was largely 
the Negro issue that changed the political posture in the state. Anti­
black sentiment had engendered one-party Democratic politics in North 
Carolina; now almost a century later that latent racism was returning 
the state to a two-party system.*8
The political realignment accurately reflected the social discontent 
of the state's white populace; however, progress was being made toward 
unitary schools. The local feeling toward desegregation had not changed 
in the summer of 1966; it was just that the federal government had 
raised the ante to the point that resistance was beginning to lose its 
appeal. A flood of compliance forms with acceptable desegregation 
quotas were filed with the Office of Education before the fall deadline.
The school year 1966-67 opened with a marked improvement in the 
desegregation percentage, The percent of Negroes in school with whites 
in North Carolina was 12.8 percent, and, if whites and Indians in 
schools with over 95 percent black enrollment were included, the figure 
Jumped to 15.6 percent. Either way it was figured, there was a real 
increase of about 10 percent,^ As over 50,000 black students entered 
white schools, there was a noticeable increase-in resistance. Violence 
and Intimidation flourished on a scale unprecedented in the previous 
decade as white extremists and segregationists tried to bulwark the
18
Jack D. Fleer, North Carolina Politics (Chapel Kill; University 
of North Carolina Press, 1968), pp. 135-36, and Bartley, Southern 
Politics, pp. 176-77.
^  Calculations based on figures from Flake, Statistical Summary. 
1966-67 and files of the Office of Education.
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20Freedom of Choice bastions. While most of the overt hostility was 
confined to the central and eastern regions of the state, few districts 
escaped an_increase in racial tensions. In districts with a small 
number of black students In the schools, the problems were relatively 
insignificant. In schools with larger numbers of black students, 
however, the closer the equilibrium came to racial balance, the more 
open the tension and the hostility became. There were reports of 
gunfire into Negro homes in Edgecombe County; shotgun blasts into the 
homes of Negro students and teachers in Rowan County; bombings, threats, 
Ku Klux Klan activity and gunfire in Anson County; and economic reprisal,
terrorist activity, and harassment in Harnett County, Wilson County, and
„ , „ 21 Wake County.
In Moore County, where 1100 Negro students enrolled in thirteen 
previously all-white schools, Klansmen circulated a petition to have the 
superintendent and the school board chairman removed from their 
positions. Superintendent Robert E. Lee was convinced that federal 
officials were determined to eliminate dual school systems and held his 
ground in the face of community dissatisfaction and Klan activity.
The school system was desegregated peacefully at a time when it was 
clearly evident that the majority of the citizenry favored the mainten­
ance of segregated schools,
Moore County suffered from external pressures in the summer of 1966 
that intensified the racial hostilities. As a part of Cooley's Fourth
20 "Southern School Desegregation," p. 75.
21 "Southern School Desegregation," pp. 86-88.
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District, the voters were caught up in the bitter attacks on desegre­
gation and Commissioner Howe that were launched by both candidates in 
the Congressional election. Although the school year started peace­
fully, Klan activity kept the tension level high, and racial incidents 
occurred frequently during the year. Moore County might be considered 
a microcosm for racial change across the state. Although there were 
strong feelings involved, the positive effects of the generally 
harmonious school endeavor greatly outweighed the racial incidents 
that marred the desegregation process. Other systems experienced most 
of the same problems, The white majority did not want the unitary 
schools, but they generally chose to obey the law. Even the Ku Klux 
Klan bowed to the legal forces by bringing litigation to resolve 
problems involving children of Klan members.22
There were still many districts that displayed hard-core resistance 
in the 1966-67 school year. Accepting freedom of choice as the only 
salvation and gradualism as the only sane policy, administrators 
marshalled their forces to delay compliance in many critical areas 
of the state. These "Choice" advocates felt that this method of 
desegregation was valid no matter what the results, believing that 
freedom of choice was freedom forever.23 Hiding behind Title IV,
Section 401 (6) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, they believed that 
even if Freedom of Choice did not result in desegregation of schools,
22 David Cooper, "Nobody Wanted School Desegregation,11- American 
Education, June 1967, pp. 2-4.
23 Dunn, "Title VI," p. 72.
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assignment of students to overcome racial imbalance constituted a 
violation of the law.24 As the school year progressed, however, there 
was evidence of desegregation progress despite the reluctance displayed 
by the devotees to the free choice gradualism.
Growing numbers of Negro and Indian students were being enrolled 
in white schools, and, of the 169 school districts in the state, 156 
were in compliance with the federal guidelines. The number of non- 
white students in the state's desegregated schools ranged from one In 
Fremont City schools to about 5,000 in Charlotte-Mecklenburg.25 Graham 
County had no black residents in its district. Most of the Indians now 
attended white schools. North Carolina ranked fifth among all states 
in American Indian population, and, with the exception of the reserva­
tion schools in the west, all Indian schools had been closed. The
largest Indian population was in the eastern part of the state where
26over 3,000 were enrolled in white schools. Indians and blacks were 
enrolled in almost every school district without a significant amount 
of open conflict. The peaceful school operations were the results of 
skillful maneuvering by school administrators, realistic goals set by 
HEW, moderation by the white majority, and a reluctant respect for law 
enforcement bv most of the extremists. Moderation and respect for the
24 Greensboro Record. 11 September 1966.
25 Flake, Statistical Summary, 1966-67. pp. 24-25.
^  Richard E. Lonsdale, Atlas of North Carolina (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1967), p. 59 and North Carolla Atlas 
(.Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), p. 39.
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law were responsible for much of the stability that had generally 
3erved North Carolina well in times of crisis.
The summer of 1967 was relatively calm in comparison to the three 
previous years. The people in the western end of the state had for the 
most part put their problems behind them. Many of the systems between 
mid-state and the mountains had completely converted to unitary systems 
that in several cases resulted in large numbers of black students in 
the schools. Negro population in some of the upland counties often 
exceeded 10 percent, and a majority of the schools in the region had 
enrolled significant numbers of blacks. Most of the mountain counties 
had few Negroes, and although there was no shortage of racist sentiment, 
there were not enough black students to justify strong local reactions 
to desegregation. The districts that had enrolled significantly large 
numbers of Negroes had done so with such minimal disruptions to their 
programs that only in the black belt counties and in city systems with 
large Negro populations was there cause for real concern.
Desegregation of schools was the law of the land, and the state 
leadership was still firm in their position on law and order. Governor 
Dan Moore was not Just a conservative; he had been a conservative Judge 
and epitomized the law in its constitutional essence. His election as 
governor had been assured by his contrast to the progressive, liberal—  
in North Carolina terms— -Terry Sanford. Now his bed-rock conservatism 
guaranteed adherence to the law. Compliance with the law still 
included "free choice," and the freedom of choice plans in the hard-core 
resistance areas of the central and east-central portion of the state 
constituted a gradualistic approach that tempered the attitudes of the 
segregationists.
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There were a number of federally funded desegregation institutes 
throughout the state for teachers in the summer of 1967. Most colleges 
and universities in the state had institutes lasting from two to six 
weeks. Grant money was plentiful, and many teachers took advantage of 
the opportunities available. Largely staffed by optimistic, ivory- 
tower integrationists, the institutes' effectiveness and value toward 
attacking the real problem of latent racism was questionable. The 
trouble with the desegregation Institutes were that they generally 
treated the symptoms and ignored the disease. That summer, in addition 
to funding Institutes, HEW hired local people instead of the northern 
lawyers and law students to work in the region to facilitate desegre­
gation programs. While the acceptance of these people was better than 
their predecessors' reception, the lines of resistance had already 
crystallized. There was little question that desegregation was going 
to happen; however, most white people displayed little enthusiasm for 
the prospect. Although attitudes toward unitary schools were 
generally negative, the school year of 1967-68 opened in a relatively 
calm atmosphere. An insignificant amount of violence occurred as lines 
of opposition remained generally static, and the gradualists were able 
to increase the black enrollments without arousing a great deal of 
controversy. The state received another large increment of federal 
aid.
During the school year, Negro enrollment dropped about 5 percent 
in the state. The loss of the black students was mainly attributed to 
migration. Like the Appalachian white migration, the black exodus was 
in its second generation, and by then almost everyone had relatives
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and friends In che big Industrial cities of the North. For many
Negroes, being enrolled but unwelcome in white schools was not the
answer to problems caused by racism and economic deprivation. The
North was still the "promised land." During the previous decade the
black population had shown very little growth in comparison to white
population increase. Out migration was the reason for the relative
27decline in numbers.
Desegregation percentages for the black students in 1967-68
28
climbed to 16.5 percent, which was a real gain of roughly 4 percent.
When the Indian enrollment in white schools was included, North
Carolina had over 20 percent of the state's non-white students in
29desegregated classes. A summary of the state s desegregation
progress at the end of the 1967-68 school year was encouraging:
North Carolina has a total of 159 school districts. Of these,
31 have eliminated the illegal dual system and 14 are desegre­
gating their schools under court orders. The compliance status 
of the remaining 114 districts, which are desegregating under 
voluntary plans, is as follows:
1. The desegregation progress in 67 districts is now under 
review.
2. Fourteen districts have been referred to the General 
Counsel's Office for passible action leading to termination 
of Federal financial assistance.
3. Enforcement proceedings are presently in effect against 
13 districts.
4. Proceedings have been dismissed in the cases of 13 additional 
districts, which are now in compliance with Title VI.
^  Donald B. Dodd, Historical Statistics of the South, (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 19731, pp, 38-39,
28 "Pupil Desegregation in Eleven Southern States," HEW Report,
May 27, 1968.
29 Jack Greenburg, "The Tortoise Can Beat the Hare," Saturday 
Review. February 17, 1968, pp. 57-59,
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5, The remaining voluntary plan districts are not in compli­
ance and no review la being made of them at this t i m e . 30
A Supreme Court decision which greatly accelerated the desegre­
gation effort in North Carolina was the most important development 
during the 1967-68 school year. Resulting from litigation in three 
states, the Green v. New Kent decision knocked the legal props from 
under the gradualists and die-hard segregationists by declaring 
Freedom of Choice Invalid. This ruling did not find Freedom of Choice 
unconstitutional; rather it termed free choice unacceptable if it did 
not result in positive action toward desegregation. The Court ruled 
that; "The burden on a school board . . .  is to come forward with a
plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically 
m31
to work now."
In this third major desegregation ruling, the Court was under- 
girding a change In enforcement policy which had been announced a few 
months earlier by Che Director of the Office of Civil Rights. Director 
Peter Llbassl stated that free choice had outlived its usefulness.
Free choice districts would be required to submit proposals that would 
eliminate dual systems by September, 1969, The Director's Intent was 
affirmed in the guidelines sent to southern school districts in March, 
1968. The guidelines instructed local officials to provide "an 
integrated unitary school system. Compliance with the law requires
■*Q Letter, Joshua B. Zatman to Albert Hockaday, April 23, 1968; 
received during interview with Joshua B. Zatman, Chief, Information 
Division, Office of Civil Rights, June 25, 1968.
^  Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, Virginia,
391 U.S. 430, 437 (1968),
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. . .  no Negro . . . schools and no white schools --just . . .
schools."32
In the summer of 1968 in North Carolina, there was an Increase 
in desegregation planning and political activitlty as the people of 
the state prepared for the fall opening of schools and the general 
elections. School integration was a major topic of interest both 
socially and politically because the Green v. New Kent decision 
invalidating free choice forced the issue. School officials were 
preparing for a marked increase in black enrollment for the fall.
On the political front, three presidential hopefuls made school 
desegregation a leading issue. The Democrat candidate, Hubert H, 
Humphreys was a supporter of school desegregation efforts. George 
Wallace, the third party contender, was strongly segregationist. In 
the middle was Richard M. Nixon, who along with Wallace attacked 
desegregation guidelines and the deferment of federal aid to force 
compliance. At the state level, Sam Ervin was running against an 
avowed segregationist, Robert V. Somers, for the Senate, In the 
gubernatorial contest, conservative Robert Scott— lieutenant governor 
and son of U. Kerr Scott, the former governor and U.S. Senator— was 
running against the Republican'right-winger, James C. Gardner. 
Political rhetoric concerning desegregation of schools was the main 
campaign strategy during the summer. 33
32 Orfleld, Reconstruction of Southern Education, pp. 338-339.
33 Marian W. Adelman, "Southern School Desegregation, 1954-1973 
A Judicial-Political Overview," The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science. 407 (May 1973): 39.
School opened in the fall of 1968 with a nominal amount of racial 
hostility scattered throughout the state. Most of the resistance was 
again in the eastern half of the state and was of little consequence. 
Forty-one percent of the Negro children was enrolled in schools with 
whites. This figure represented over twice the numbers attending 
desegregated schools the previous year. Clearly the Green v. New Kent 
decision attacking free choice was having an impact on public school 
statistics In North Carolina, There was obvious sentiment to get on 
with the unpleasant task throughout most of the state. A tremendous 
amount of federal aid was at stake, and economic conditions in North 
Carolina made the idea of losing federal dollars because of non- 
compliance unacceptable,
The November 1968 elections displayed once again the state's 
conservatism in politics and especially on desegregation which had been 
the dominant issue in the campaigns. In the presidential election, 
Nixon won as a Republican in a Democrat state largely on his conserva­
tive stance on desegregation. Humphreys, representing the Democratic 
Party ran well only in the predominately black precincts. On the 
American Party ticket, George Wallace made a good showing in low-lncome 
white districts. Using Wallace campaign strategy, Nixon won with 
solid support among white voters generally. Campaigning like a segre­
gationist proved to be good political strategy for Nixon in North
Carolina.35
*1/
Cooper, "Nobody Wanted School Desegregation," pp. 2-3.
Bartley, Southern Politics . pp. 127-29.
In the general elections, Sam Ervin was reelected to Congress by 
a large plurality without campaigning and with no political organi­
zation in the state.36 Although he was running against a 
segregationist, his long battle against Negro rights made him 
untouchable. In the governor's race, James C. Gardner, running as a 
right-wing Republican, made a surprisingly strong showing in losing 
to Robert Scott by a slim margin. Although Scott was a Democrat and a 
conservative, the Republican nominee's segregationist stance got him 
a lot of votes. The Democrat candidate's overwhelming support from 
the black voters— who were reluctantly voting for conservatism as the 
less repugnant of the two platforms— actually won the election for 
him.37 In voting against Gardner, instead of for Scott, the black 
vote ironically was the difference in a conservative's election where 
desegregation was the issue. A large number of incumbents in the 
race for the eleven House seats were defeated, although in almost 
every case both incumbent and challenger were conservative and 
segregationist. The realigned districts took their toll as the 
eastern black belt lost influence at both the national and local
level.3®
In the 1968-69 school year, North Carolina made significant 
progress in the movement toward a unitary school system. Its political 
position was again demonstrably conservative as the nation began to show
36 Dabney, A Good Han, p. 245.
37 Bartley, Southern Politics, pp. 130-132.
3® Orr, Congressional Redistricting. p. 117.
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disapproval of "great society" change mechanisms. While the state's 
schools were reaching a comparable racial mix in national terms, the 
rest of the nation gave indication of moving back toward a conserva­
tism that North Carolina had never left.
In 1969, President Nixon began to lead the gradual retreat on 
school desegregation Issues.39 Although the commitment to eliminate 
de lure segregation remained, the divisive problem of de facto segre­
gation grew in Importance. The school year in North Carolina went 
very well, and the federal goal of elimination of dual schools by the 
1969-70 term appeared realistic.
In July of 1969 a discernable shift in federal policy became 
apparent when the enforcement responsibilities for desegregation were 
moved from HEW to the Department of Justice. In this shift federal 
officials moved the compliance mechanism from an administrative function 
back to a case-by-case basis of litigation in the courts.40 Seeing this 
move as a sign of retreat or at least a delay in enforcement proceed­
ings, several southern states reneged on their plans for a major 
desegregation effort in the fall.^ North Carolina was not among the 
states that chose more delaying tactics. The prevailing mood seemed 
to indicate that the state just wanted to get it over with. The only
39 Adelman, "Southern School Desegregation," pp. 40-41; Fulfilling 
the Letter and Spirit of the Law (Washington: GPO, 1976}, p. 8.
^0 Francesco Cordasco, ed., Toward Equal Educational Opportunity 
(New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1974), p. 198.
43 Adelman, "Southern School Desegregation," p. 50; Cordasco,
Equal Education, p. 199.
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real resistance Co desegregation was In Che black belt, and chat region 
now had less Influence In state government due to redlstrlcting.
Even In the eastern part of the state real progress was being made 
in the most resistant areas. Rural Hoke County had a triple school 
system that desegregated and developed a unitary system that roughly 
reflected the county population percentages In the racial mix in the 
schools. Of the approximately 5,000 students, 50 percent were black,
35 percent white, and 15 percent Indian. School officials talked with 
parents, students, and community groups In preparation for the opening 
of school. Negro and Indian teachers were in&luded on the instruc­
tional staff at each school. The relatively peaceful transition gave 
school officials reason to hope that the major desegregation obstacles 
were past.^ School opened in the fall of 1969 with the usual scattered 
demonstrations. This year, however, brought about a notable twist in 
sentiment as large groups of blacks angrily demonstrated against the 
closing of all-Negro schools in Charlotte and other communities. This 
development was evidence of changing attitudes among the blacks about
* t H
the desegregation issue.
The attitudes were changing as the racial composition of the 
schools showed concomitant change. North Carolina now had well over 
half of the black students in desegregated programs. By the summer 
of 1970, it was obvious that the comparatively harmonious transfer to
^  Cordasco, Equal Education, p. 26.
^  "September Song; A Long, Long Time," U.S. News and World Report, 
15 September 1969, p. 24.
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unitary schools was almost accomplished. The practice o£ apartheid 
in the public schools as well as in many other facets of life was being 
relegated to history. The federal government's contribution of 
approximately three and a half hillion dollars a year to the state's 
economy seemed no longer at risk.4  ^ In July the Justice Department 
revealed plans to send enforcement representatives into the South to 
help solve problems involved with desegregation. North Carolina 
officials were confident that over 90 percent of the state's black 
students would be enrolled in desegregated schools in the coming school 
year.^ The progress had been made over a long, difficult period of 
time. Just when it seemed that the state had turned the corner on the 
desegregation issue, a new problem arose that was more signigicant in 
national terms than the impact at the local level implied.
The problem was busing. Three years of busing to achieve racial 
balance marked the high tide of racial integration in North Carolina, 
The problem began when U.S. District Judge James B, McMillan ruled in 
February, 1970 that the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District had to 
achieve a racial balance in its schools that reflected the general 
percentages of the district's population. This decision which consti­
tuted a financial burden on Charlotte-Mecklenburg was a frontal assault 
on urban patterns of segregation that was a greater problem for 
larger northern cities than it was for most of the rural South. The
^  Dabney, A Good Man, p. 251.
"Year of Decision for Vhlte-Only Schools," U.S. News and World 
Report, 27 July 1970.
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decision generated angry protest from many segments of the community. 
School officials in Charlotte were dismayed by the fiscal ramifications 
of the ruling. The plan would require the purchase of almost four 
million dollars worth of buses at local expense.^ While the state of 
North Carolina transported more school children than any other state 
in the South, statutes forbade the use of transportation money for the
/ 7
purpose of achieving racial balance. The decision was opposed, 
however, for a more important reason than cost alone. It attacked the 
neighborhood school concept which brought an angry outcry from black 
and white parents alike. The litigation had been brought by the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
Legal Defense Fund as an attack on desegregation in housing. Although 
it angered Charlotte blacks, the intent of the litigation was a 
grandiose attack on apartheid at the national level. President Nixon, 
who had already displayed negative leadership in the desegregation
/ Q
issue, went oh record as opposing busing to achieve racial balance.
The decision was appealed to the U,S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
49Circuit in Richmond. When the Appellate Court rejected the order as 
unreasonable, the U.S. District Judge reaffirmed his ruling, leaving 
Charlotte's school board in a hopeless legal tangle. The board
"A Southern City— Troubled, Angry, Divided," U.S. News and 
World Report, 16 March 197U, pp. 2y-32.
^  McCauley, Southern Schools, pp. 57 and 60.
48 "The gusing Quandary," Newsweek. 24 August 19/6, p. 63.
*9 "Official Policy Now of South's Schools," U.S. News and World 
Report, 20 April iy70, p. 33.
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appealed the case to the Supreme C o u r t . A s  the busing furor 
Increased, Attorney General John Mitchell issued a statement claiming 
that the Administration would not support an assault on de facto 
segregation.®* The mood in Congress was clearly anti-busing, and, 
without executive or legislative support, the Judiciary would be 
alone on the Issue.
The battle over busing was untimely in that It renewed opposition
to desegregation at a time when the problem was essentially solved in
North Carolina, The school year 1970-71 opened with a violence that
had not marred the desegregation effort in several years. Blacks and
whites demonstrated; an elementary school was bombed in black-belt
Edgecombe County, and tensions were exacerbated in districts that had
52operated unitary schools for years. Boycotts of the schools occurred 
in several communities. Some of the boycotts were by blacks, some by 
whites, and some were mixed. The Indians protested in Robeson County—  
which had once had four separate school systems— because they wanted 
to retain all Indian schools. With the uproar over busing, the fact 
that over 930,000 of the state's 1.2 million students were attending 
schools that were in total compliance with desegregation guidelines did 
not make much news.
The problem caused by busing in North Carolina led to the contro­
versial Swann decision in 1971. Chief Justice Warren Burger read the
"Tangle Over Busing," U.S. News and World Report, 2U August 
1970, pp. 11-13.
®* Judith F. Buncher, ed,, The School Busing Controversy: 1970-75 
(New York: Facts on File, Inc,, 1975), p, 102.
52 The Charlotte Observer. 21 April 1971. p. 3.
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unanimous decision which ruled chat; " . . .  reasonable transportation
must be used where necessary to eliminate racially identifiable schools
53which remain as vestiges of de lure segregation," The executive 
branch gave the ruling unenthusiastlc and qualified support. Senator 
Ervin presented an erudite brief as an amicus curaie during the Swann 
litigation in the losing cause. Acting as an attorney for the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Classroom Teachers Association, Ervin argued 
that the segregation in Charlotte was the result of residential 
patterns that were similar to existing de jure segregation in most 
cities nationwide.5^ He later made the same argument as a minority 
report to the Select Senate Committee on equal educational opportunity 
chaired by Senator Walter F, Mondale. He charged that "the committee 
appears more committed to equal mixing of bodies in the schools than 
to an equal educational opportunity . , and "that the committee!s
majority report was In direct . . . conflict with Congress' expressed
55opposition to forced integration , ,
In the fall of 1971, Congress enacted three anti-busing amendments, 
and Senator Ervin found new allies in his restrictive desegregation 
philosophy among his colleagues from almost every region of the country. 
An anti-busing bill similar to legislation that had been turned down 
when proposed by Ervin was passed in 1972. The sponsor of the bill
Winston-Salem Journal, 22 April 1971, p. 1; Buncher, School 
Busing, p. 209.
^  Clancy, Country Lawyer, p. 196.
55 Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Minority Report in Toward Equal Educational 
Opportunity, p. 408.
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Senator Robert Griffin, a liberal from Michigan, had led the opposition 
to the southern bill earlier, When Senator Ervin told Griffin that he 
was glad to see that his position on the matter had changed, the 
Michigan Senator replied, "they've gored my ox now just like you said 
they were going to,"’’*’ Griffin's Detroit District was facing desegre­
gation orders, as were many districts throughout the North and West, 
that would require massive busing to implement.
The 1972-73 school year started quietly in North Carolina, 
Resistance to Swann had diminished, but from the attitudes displayed 
by the executive and legislative branches of government the judiciary 
would have been well-advised to relax their assault on North Carolina's 
schools.^ The state had reached its high point in establishing 
unitary schools. About 94 percent of all black students were 
attending desegregated institutions. In the number of Negroes 
attending white majority schools, North Carolina was a leader in the
eg
South which led the rest of the country in school desegregation.
With the consolidation of school districts resulting from 
desegregation, the state had reduced the number of school systems to 
152. Officials had reached a point where they could be less concerned 
with numbers than with quality of programs. Racial violence caused by
^  Clancy, Country Lawyer, p. 1; The Charlotte Observer,
February 8, 1972, p. 3.
"Where Busing Issue is Hottest at the Start of a New School 
Year," U.S. News and World Report. 11 September 1972, p. 59.
58 "Official Report: South Leads Nation in School Integration,"
U.S. News and World Report, 24 January 19/2, p. 31.
resistance ta change was greatly reduced. Of the 152 systems, 122 had 
no reported student conflict resulting from desegregation during the 
school year. In an address, Superintendent of Public Instruction,
Craig Phillips, stated that "in today's society an integrated 
education is best for young people."^ He went on to say that better 
education was going on in the state than before integration. Studies 
conducted at the University of North Carolina substantiated Dr.
Phillips' contentions. An investigation on the social and educational 
impact of desegregation in a largely black district led to the con­
clusion that desegregation seemed to be accompanied by an increase in 
the quality of education.®**
By 1974, North Carolina's educational picture had stabilized. At 
the national level, the busing issue was of diminished importance. The 
executive and legislative branches were on record as opposing busing 
and supporting the neighborhood school concept. The judiciary, with 
its increasingly conservative composition, was losing enthusiasm 
for the issue. Executive and legislative leadership was backing away 
from massive federal support to desegregate schools and seemed content
f i  Ito return educational decision making to the state level. 1
59 Naomi Myles, "North Carolina Over the Hump," The Nation. 
February 14, 1972, p. 208.
60 Nancy H. St. John, School Desegregation Outcomes for Children 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), p. 25.
61 The Charlotte Observer, 18 March 1975; Buncher, School Busing 
pp. 186-92; editorial, Saturday Review of Education. March 10, 1973,
p. 18, and interview with Commissioner of Education, Terrel Bell in 
U.S. News and World Report, 16 Sente^ber 1974, pp. 42-44.
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At the state level the black Issues of desegregation and civil 
rights had radically changed the face of North Carolina politics. For 
the first time in almost a century, a Republican had been elected 
governor. To further complicate the political scene, Jesse Helms—  
whose political convictions ranged from ultra-conservative to 
embarrassingly reactionary— had been elected to the Senate. The new 
governor, James E. Holshouser, lost heavily In the black precints of 
the state but gained enough support from the white districts to win 
the election. The state had a much stronger Republican Party now that 
so many Democrats had changed political allegiance because of the race 
issue. Helms joined Sam Ervin in the Senate and made the established 
conservative look liberal by comparison on racial issues. Concomitant 
gains were made by Republican candidates over the state. The desegre­
gation issue had again polarized North Carolinians along racial lines. 
The Republican party which had been almost eliminated, as a result of 
the black stigma, now found itself in a power position because the 
Democrat Party had inherited the Negro vote.^
The federal aid that had played such an important role in desegre­
gating the schools of North Carolina had declined by percentage from 
the highest level of 15.4 percent in the 1966-67 school year to 12.6 
percent in the 1973-74 term. It had decreased marginally each 
year as desegregation totals rose, effectively operating as an 
enforcement mechanism in the elimination of the dual school systems. 
When resistance sentiment threatened the desegregation gains in the
^  Bartley, Southern Politics, pp. 175-78,
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early 1970s, the federal aid percentage of the school expenditures
moved hack up to a higher level as an Inducement to neutralize the
strong feelings over busing. Once North Carolina became a stabilized
leader In unitary schools across the nation, the level of funding was
reduced. Federal aid still remained an important portion of the
state school budget, even after the national objectives were realized,
because of the relative poverty of the state's people. The federal
contribution to the state's school budget was approximately 125 million
63
dollars for the school year 1973-74. This federal aid was up from 
about 30 million or approximately 5 percent of the state budget ten years 
earlier.®^
Twenty years after the Brown decision, federal revenues accounted
for over 152 million dollars which was more than 12 percent of North
65Carolina's aggregate school expenditures. Federal aid had become 
an integral part of the state's education budget and had played an 
important role in overcoming conservative opnosltlon to change involved 
in eliminating dual schools.
The conservative sentiment and latent racism that retarded the 
desegregation effort was eventually overridden by compliance laws and 
the desire of the state's citizenry to maintain a viable system of
63 Statistical Profile: North Carolina Public Schools (Raleigh:
Controllers Office, Department of Puhlic Education, 1975), pp. 1-40 - 
1-43.
6b See Digest of the State Budget prepared for Governor Terry 
Sanford, 1963, p. 63.
6$ N.C. State Government Statistical Abstract (Raleigh: Divisin
of State Budget and Management, 1976), p. 132.
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public schools, North Carolina led all states having large black 
populations In desegregation statistics by 1970. In the United States 
during this period, 93 percent of all black students lived in 21 states 
and the Oistrict of Columbia. North Carolina had the best record of 
desegregation effectiveness in these states and the District.^ After 
the busing for racial balance began in the early 1970s, the state's 
lead in establishing unitary schools Increased, Because of the commit­
ment to education, federal money played a key role in the desegregation 
effort. North Carolina set "great store by its system of public 
schools" and still endorsed the idea prooosed In the early 1900s that 
upgrading schools would "alleviate regional problems."67 State 
leaders have generally felt compelled to endorse the educational 
philosophy of Governor Aycock as a platform requirement for election or 
appointment to public office. North Carolina citizens accepted the 
fifth highest tax burden of all fifty states In the early 1970s, and 
the state legislature regularly allocated most of the state revenues to
£ O
the public school system. While trailing the rest of the nation, 
in terms of regional progress and commitment, the relatively impover­
ished state has made a real effort in education for all students.
66 Francesco, Toward Equal Education, pp. 102-05. 
Myles, "North Carolina Over the Hump," p. 207.
68
Francesco, Toward Equal Education, pp. 328-29.
By 1974, two decades after the Brown decision, North Carolina was a 
national leader in the movement to eliminate segregated schools, and 
legal biraclalism In education was a problem of only historical
importance.69
69 u.s. Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1976), CXXI, 
No. 95, 9938; "Fulfilling the Letter and Spirit of the Law: Desegre­
gation of the Nation's Public Schools," Report of the United States 
Commission on Civil Rights (Washington; U.S. Printing Office, 1976), 
p. 153; Francesco, Toward Equal Education, pp. 105 and 372.
CHAPTER 7
Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Summary
The problem of this study was to Investigate and describe the 
desegregation of public schools In a selected southern state between 
the years 1954 and 1974. In developing the research project that 
described the elimination of legal blraclalism In North Carolina's 
schools, public sentiment emerged as a major factor in the desegre­
gation story. Some of the key influences on public sentiment which 
helped to determine the success of the desegregation initiative were 
the public response of selected elected officials, the quiet influence 
of the state's business leadership, and the role of the media in 
presenting the information to the public.
North Carolina's public schools were unusual when compared to 
other states with dual systemB because, despite the fact that the state 
had one of the largest black populations in the nation, the desegre­
gation drama proceeded peacefully and successfully, albeit slowly. 
Throughout the twenty-year period that was required to completely 
eliminate the dual school structure Chat existed at the time of the 
Brown decision, an abiding commitment to preserve a stable public 
school system was demonstrated by the people of North Carolina. The 
desegregation ruling and the compliance proceeding that eventually 
followed strained the warp and woof of the social and political fabric, 
but the state emerged from the ordeal with institutions intact.
157
158
To attract Industry, North Carolina's leaders had for half a 
century promoted a progressive linage which no doubt contributed to the 
comparative moderation on racial Issues that was displayed once the 
compliance state of desegregation w e b  reached. A viable public school 
system was an integral part of the progressive Image that the state's 
leaders had worked to portray. Dual schools had been the socially 
acceptable mechanism to legally accommodate the problem the conservative 
populace had with racial mixing. The state's white citizenry was 
comfortable with segregated schools as a traditional means of satisfying 
the educational needs of both races. Thus, North Carolinians were 
pulled in at least two directions on the desegregation issue once it 
became the law of the land because North Carolina was a state of laws.
Law and order was as much a part of the peculiar brand of progressive 
conservatism that permeated the social and political Ideology of the 
Carolinians as was the traditional and customary institutional apartheid.
In the implementation of the Brown ruling, the federal government 
gave the state ten years to begin and ten more to reach compliance.
This judicious application of "all deliberate speed" allowed North 
Carolinians an opportunity to adjust to major societal change as progres­
sive sentiment gradually overcame conservative resistance.
When compared to other southern states, North Carolina had an easier 
and more successful transition to unitary schools than most. A generally 
accepted maxim of propensity for racial accommodation was that the ten­
dency for racial moderation varied inversely with the percentage of 
blacks in the population. A state with large numbers of blacks usually 
had great difficulty with Institutional desegregation. While this
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theory helped to explain the stubborn reluctance of North Carolina's 
most resistant black-belt school districts to desegregate, the state 
made better desegregation progress than other southern states which 
had fewer blacks. The strong stand on law and order by North Carolina's 
leaders at critical stages of the desegregation process helped to 
account for the relatively peaceful demise of legal biraciallsm In the 
public schools. Hhile most of the people were pro-segregationlst and 
repeatedly elected leaders who advocated the continuance of segregated 
schools, they ultimately chose to obey the law. State officials, 
despite their pro-segregationist rhetoric, in every case stood firm on 
law and order issues. North Carolina's governors did not imitate the 
racist posturing of Orval Faubua, George C. Wallace,,or Ross Barnett.
No public official stood in the schoolhouse door to turn black children 
away. Unpopular though it was in North Carolina, the Brown decision 
was the law of the land, and that was the decisive factor.
During the two-decade social evolution between the ruling and 
compliance, influential leaders of business and industry worked quietly 
and effectively to encourage the peaceful transition to unitary schools. 
Their concern for maintenance of a progressive image for the state 
translated into strong support for peaceful desegregation. This quiet 
demonstration of power and influence helped change attitudes at the 
country-club and clvic-club level which eventually made an impact on 
social and political attitudes. The role played by these leaders in 
the desegregation effort demonstrated once again that those who control 
the financial resources had considerable influence on the course of 
events that helped shape public opinion.
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The media in their generally even-handed treatment of the desegre­
gation story promoted peaceful compliance with federal mandates. 
Responsible journalism was usually Che common practice; while the 
media reported the news* they avoided making the news. In several 
southern states reporters were too often responsible for fanning the 
flames of racial conflict. In North Carolina, editorials usually 
supported law-and-order measures and contributed to the moderation 
of public opinion.
What was thought of in the 1950s as a regional problem took on 
national dimensions, and, by the 20th anniversary year of the Brown 
decision, North Carolina had some of the best desegregation statistics 
in the nation. The year 1974 was also the 10th anniversary of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the law that actually brought about the 
elimination of dual schools in the state. Under Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act, the powerful influence of federal aid brought North 
Carolina schools into compliance more rapidly than federal officials 
could have expected when viewed in terms of the amount of exlstant 
biracialism ten years after Brown. The compliance decade saw busing 
requirements by the Court added to the impact of federal money to reach 
the highest level of desegregation in the state's history. In 1974, 
the judiciary joined the earlier retreat of the executive and legislative 
branches on the desegregation issue by restricting busing. The direct 
result of the waning enthusiasm for desegregation was a settling-in 
period that Increased stability and social equilibrium in the unitary 
schools with only a minimal amount of resegregation in North Carolina's 
public schools.
The two decades that followed Brown was a period In which occurred 
some of the most profound changes In social and political Institutions 
in the history of the state. This study documents some of those changes. 
It shows Indications of power as a change mechanism, and It provides 
some insight into Interracial relationships as they applied to public 
schools. Latent racism continued to be a problem in North Carolina, as 
did the relative poverty that impeded the economic progress that the 
affected progressive linage had tried to promote. The progressive 
conservatism that marks North Carolina's social and political life has 
most often proved more conservative than progressive. Progress made 
during the period on desegregation demonstrated the state's commitment to 
education and provided optimism and hope for generational change. This 
change over time should Integrate quality education programs with the 
acceptable desegregation quantity already accomplished.
Conclusions
Some of the questions that were considered pertinent to the problem 
turned out to be self-answering in the development of the study. Many 
of the answers Just emerged during the research and presentation of the 
data. Other answers were more elusive and often led to more questions.
The effect of federal aid to education on the rate of desegregation 
in the North Carolina public schools was easily documented. When the 
state's high tax burden and relative poverty were considered in light 
of the strong and continual commitment to education, the obvious 
conclusion was that federal revenue was one of the most important 
determinants of the desegregation rate. The majority of North 
Carolinians were both heavily conservative and strongly segregationist.
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They repeatedly demonstrated their conservative and segregationist 
convictions at the polls. Their traditional commitment to public 
education proved equally strong over time. Federal aid to education 
provided an important Inducement to promote school desegregation. The 
federal money was used judiciously at optimal times to produce the 
desired response to compliance requirements. There was a positive 
correlation between the disbursement amounts and time frames and the 
progress of desegregation compliance. A billion dollars of federal aid 
to the state during the compliance decade unquestionably influenced the 
development of a unitary school system in North Carolina.
The question concerning why North Carolina's desegregation program 
proceeded at a faster rate in a more orderly fashion than did other 
states in the region proved to be too complex to address in a study of 
this nature. Once the research data were collected and organized it 
was readily apparent that comparisons with other states.' desegregation 
progress were outside the parameters of this study. An investigation 
directed toward the question cited as a main thesis would constitute 
a major research project in itself. Therefore, without attempting to 
answer the central question, there are a few identifiable Influences 
that can provide insight Into reasons the desegregation program worked 
well in North Carolina. The fact that the state eliminated dual schools 
in a more orderly fashion Chan most other southern states is easy to 
document. North Carolina had less racial conflict as the schools were 
desegregated than other states in the region. One obvious reason was 
the law-and-order position maintained by the state's leaders and 
accepted by the North Carolina people. More violence accompanied the
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desegregation of public facilities than occurred during the movement to 
eliminate dual schools. In part, this phenomenon was probably a result 
of the importance North Carolinians placed on their schools. It was one 
thing to drag a "freedom rider" off of a bus or a "sit-in protester" 
out of a restaurant, quite another to drag a black child out of a 
school. Even the most racist extremists seemed to respect school property 
when children were present. The Klan repeatedly attempted to break up 
civil rights demonstrations and inarches.^ Yet the physical conflict that 
accompanied their efforts to disperse black protest gatherings was 
generally absent as they stood by while thousands of black .children 
entered formerly all-white schools for the first time.
The question concerning whether the twenty-year period selected was 
a logical time frame for the study is self-evident. After reviewing the 
presentation of data, it is clear that no other period of time would 
work as well. If a ten-year time frame had to be selected, it would be 
the period of compliance between 1964 and 1974. The study would, 
however, be incomplete without linking the two decades. As stated, this 
twenty-year period covered initial reaction, political maneuverings, and 
compliance. In the Brown decision of 1954, the concept of legal 
biraclalism was voided; by 1974, legal biracialism was a dead issue in 
North Carolina. The system of dual schools was completely dismantled in 
the state by 1974, and the high point of desegregation according to the 
statistical data was reached because of the busing effort. North
^ It is important to note that most of the racial conflict involving 
civil rights occurred in North Carolina during the period when blacks 
were agitating for the passage of civil rights legislation. Once the 
Civil Rights Acts were passed, there was an obvious decrease in racial 
discord in the state.
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Carolina's Department of Public Instruction no longer publicises those 
statistics because they have established a unitary- state school system. ■ 
It Is, however, safe to assume that the percentage of black students 
attending racially mixed schools is no greater ten years later than It 
was in 1974.
Coherent patterns of resistance to desegregation strategies did 
emerge during the desegregation proceedings. The research data pointed 
to schools in the Carolina black-belt and city schools with large black 
populations as the most difficult schools to desegregate. The resistance 
patterns were easy to identify and therefore easy to target as areas 
where increased federal aid could make an impact on the reluctance to 
establish unitary schools. Once isolated and treated with an influx of 
federal money, these school systems were desegregated with relative ease 
in a comparatively short period of time.
t/hlle the scope of this study ultimately did not include investi­
gation into the reasons that de lure segregation was eaBier to eradicate 
than de facto segregation, some obvious conclusions can be drawn from 
the research. Examples of de facto segregation in (forth Carolina were 
found in most of the larger cities where racial imbalances resulted from 
housing patterns and demographic distributions. The only real solution 
to the problem of de facto segregation in North Carolina proved to be 
busing to desegregate. Busing was generally unpopular with both races 
because it eroded the neighborhood schools' concept and because of the 
inconvenience and time Involved in transporting students out of their 
attendance area. In de jure segregation where the basis of racial 
separation was deliberate legal action, the situation could usually be
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remedied by abolishing the law and allowing all students to enroll in 
the most convenient schools In their district.
The question of whether the elimination of dual schools provided 
equal opportunity for blacks in the state's public school system could 
only be partially answered based on the research findings. If the 
basic premise of the Brown decision which stated that segregated schools 
were inherently unequal was valid, then it follows that blacks were 
provided more equal opportunity with the establishment of unitary schools. 
In desegregated programs, students were provided opportunities for social 
experiences and academic opportunities that were not generally available 
in the segregated schools. The elimination of dual schools in North 
Carolina provided for more cost-effective use of public school revenues 
that increased educational opportunities for all students. In general 
terms— based on the research data— the question concerning equal 
opportunities for blacks in the unitary schools must be answered 
affirmatively.
Recommendations
The data concerning equal opportunity for blacks in the state's 
unitary school system support the conclusion that generally better 
educational programs were available because the dual schools were 
eliminated. Equal opportunity is a relative term, however, involving 
social and psychological implications that would best be addressed in 
an experimental type research project. The question Is so broad, and 
Includes so many variables, that in itself the problem of equal 
educational opportunity for blacks in desegregated schools would merit
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a major study and would prove to be fertile ground for a number of 
dissertation endeavors.
Another recommendation for follow-up research would be the 
problem concerning the impact of federal aid on a school system or 
systems. The concept of using federal resources to facilitate 
Implementation of national objectives has long been a subject of 
controversy. More careful research into the ramifications of social 
engineering as a legitimate objective of educational programs is 
needed in order to make better.judgments concerning the issue.
Finally, a study that would investigate North Carolina schools 
during the decade from 1974 to 1984 might prove to be a worthwhile 
research project. Cither a sociological or psychological approach 
to the educational experience of black children in desegregated 
schools could contribute to the field of knowledge on the subject.
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One of several cases originating in McDowell County that 
petitioned for the desegregation of the county school system. This 
case was dismissed as premature under the doctrine of "exhaustion of 
remedies."
Carson v. Warlick, 238F ed 724 (1957).
Another case from McDowell County involving a charge by the 
plaintiff Carson that Federal Judge Wilson Warlick was not providing 
a judicial remedy for an existing illegal situation involving 
biracialism in the public schools.
Covington v. Montgomery County School Officials. 139 F. Supp. 161,
163 (H.D.N.C., 1956).
The state's constitutional requirement for separation of races 
in the public schools waB declared invalid in this case.
Drum v. Seawell. 249 F. Supp. 777 (M.D.N.C. 1966).
In this litigation the state's Congressional Districts were 
declared unconstitutional because of unequal representation favoring 
the Democrat Party.
Green v. County School Board of Hew Kent County. Virginia. 391 U.S. 
430, 437 (1960).
This ruling declared that the desegregation plans in the "Freedom 
of Choice" district were Invalid if they did not result in immediate 
desegregation of the schools. The districts operating under "Freedom 
of Choice" were required to present realistic plans that worked.
Hawkins v. North Carolina State Board of Education, C.A. No. 2067, 
W.D.N.C., April 4, 1966.
State tuition grants to attend private schools provided for 
students who objected to attending racially-mixed schools were 
declated unconstitutional in North Carolina.
Joyner v. McDowell County Board of Education, North Carolina.
92 S.E. 2d 795 (1956).
A class action suit petitioning the court to force the school 
board to admit black students to white schools. This action was 
dismissed as being improperly drawn.
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Lowery v. School Trustees. 140 N.C. 33, 52 S.B. 267 (1905).
A court action that required that public school revenue be 
divided fairly under the "separate but equal" doctrine between Negro 
and white students.
Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
The Supreme Court's landmark, decision that legitimatized 
segregation solely on the basis of race under the legal concept of 
"separate but equal."
School District v. Almanace County, 211 N.C. 213 (1937).
Litigation Involving the right of all students to be educated 
through the use of public revenues.
U.S. v. Jefferson County Board of Education, No. 23345, 5th Circuit 
Court of Appeals 5 (1966).
This case voided the state law that allowed state revenues to be 
used for education in private schools that permitted to required 
segregation by race.'
Wheeler v. Durham City Board of Education, 309F 2d 630 (1958).
A decision that upheld the legality of the states Pupil 
Assignment Act which provided for a slow, complicated process of 
desegregation.
i . 
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APPENDIX
CHART 1 EMERGING FINANCIAL SUPPORT PATTERN 
FOR CURRENT OPERATING EXPENSE 
IN NORTH CAROLINA 
(FOUR SELECTED SCHOOL YEARS)1
for 1927-26 1947-48 1965-66 1966-67
:<penditure $47 per pupil $105 per pupil $369 per pupil $421 per pupil
Federal
8.0ft
Federal 
8.0 ftFederal 1.0ft
Table U
COMPARISON OF PER PUPIL EXPENDITURES, 1964-65/1973-74
PER PUPIL EXPENDITURE, BY SOURCE PERCENT OF TOTAL
State Federal Local Total State Federal Local
1964-65 $250.93 $16.14 $54.57 $321.64 78.0 5.0 17.0
1965-66 276.70 29.62 62.47 368.79 75.1 8.0 16.9
1966-67 292.18 65,66 68.45 426-29 68-5 15.4 16.1
1967-68 323.74 65.21 76.44 465.39 69.6 14.0 16.4
1968-69 365.64 75.00 90.85 531.49 68.8 14.1 17.1
1969-70 410.26 75.08 102.95 588.29 69,7 12.8 17.5
1970-71 450.29 97.24 115.28 662.81 67.9 14.7 17.4
1971-72 481.02 109.43 130.05 720.50 66.8 15.2 18.0
1972-73 523.72 111.90 153.20 788.82 66.4 14.2 19.4
1973-74 629.07 115.42 170.66 915.15 68.8 12.6 18.6
Tabte 2.
Total Expenditures fo r Public Schools in 
Hortb Carolina, According to  Source of 
Funds 1927-48
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le a r State* Local Federal Grand Total
1927-28 6,565,644.53 34,160,228.10 139,660.23 40,885,532.
1928-29 4,295,154.94 37,196,562.59 138,633^10 41,630,400.
1929-30 7,215,275.50 32,250,703.57 160,417.29 39,626,396.
1930-31 6,965,342.94 31,320,604.66 182,843.85 38,468,791.
1931-32 17,142,699.43 14,290,386.96 221,032.85 31,654,199.
1932-33 17,585,572.52 11,190,235.28 210,245,85 .28,986,053-
1933-34 15,877,419.79 8,383,677.39 682,034.20 24,948,131.
1934-35 17,029,138.59 10,955,109.26 364,479.82 28,848,727.
1935-36 20,509,697.81 12,284,348.68 1,619,546.20 34,413.592.
1936-37 22,030,916.18 15,301,445.88 1,640,471.28 38,972,833
1937-38 25,852,606.57 15,509,450.20 962,930.89 42,324,987.
1938-39 26,418,699.77 14,306,167.27 1,592,957.33 42,317,824.
1939-40 26,990,595.00 14,613,976.11 1,054,134.40 42,658,705*
1940-11 28,475,170.92 15,256,331^79 1,199,031.90 ' 44,930,534*
1941-42 29,207,637.12 16,487,616.16' 2,267,071.84 47,962,325.
1942-43 31,584,770.13 15,008,610.40 2,453,192.69 49,046,573-
1943-44 38,036,536.01 14,449,632.90 2,426,950.30 54,913,119.
1944-45
•
39,770,672.92 U ,738,240.13 3,356,609.90 57,865,522.
1945-46 45,544,813.14 16,840,813.51 3,700,616.78 66,086,243.
1946-47** 53,638,859.00 20,000,000.00 6,245,668.00 79,934,527.
1947-48** 63,409,000.00 20,500,000.00 |6 ,950,000.00 |  90,659,
—  ■ •* Including occasional g if ts  from philanthropic agencies.
** Amounts estim ated.
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Negro Voter Registration
Table 3* Estimated Percentage of Vaiing-Age Ne­
groes Registered to Vote, k j .j o - m jCo ,  by States
SHU
l '« r
1 W J947 ■ I9S2 1956 1951 I960
MillLuippi • 1 4 5 3 6
Alabama • 1 3 11 '3 •4
South Carolina • ■3 ao 37 ■3 • • •
Loulitana • a *5 3' 3 6 3«
Georgia a ao a3 a? 96 » •
Arkaiuaa 3 31 fl7 3 6 33 3 8
Florida 3 >3 33 3a 3 1 39
Virginia 5 11 16 »9 at 33
Texai 9 *7 3> 37 39 3 0 "
North Carolina 10 *4 18 34 33 38
Tennessee (6 i»3 a? a9 •••
* Leu than 0 .5%.
MAP 3
N E G R O  POTENTIAL VOTERS REGISTERED, I960.
Medium 121.0-50%)
I I Hlflh (30%  + )
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COM PARATIVE FINANCIAL SUPPORT PATTERN, 
CURRENT OPERATING EXPENSE *
North Carolina 
1966-67
Par Pupil Expandlturo $421
Fadaral
15.4%
Local
16.1%
United States 
1966-67
Per Pupil Expenditure $573 
1
Federal:
B.0% !
52.0%
Chart 2 compares the support pattern prevalent In other 
states with the pattern In North Carolina. Nationally, funds 
for public schools are proportioned by source as follows: 52 
per cent local, 8 per cent federal, and 40 per cent state sources. 
Currently, North Carolina utilizes more federal and State 
funding and leas local funding than the national average for 
the support of public schools.
TabU 4
The Supreme Court that handed down the Brown decision: 
Justices Hugo L* Black; Harold H. Burton; Tom C. Clark; 
William 0. Douglas; Felix Frankfurter; Robert H. Jackson; 
Sherman Hinton; Stanley F. Reed; and the 14th Chief 
Justice of the United States, Earl Warren.
VITA
Personal Data:
Education:
Professional
Experience:
Honors and 
Awards:
RANSOME ELLIS HOLCOMBE
Date of Birth: January 1, 1939
Place of Birth: Burnsville, North Carolina
Public Schools, Spruce Pine, North Carolina
University of North Carolina, Asheville,
North Carolina and Western Carolina 
University, Cullowhee, North Carolina; 
history, science, B.S., 1964.
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland and 
East Tennessee State University, Johnson City, 
Tennessee; history, M.A., 1971.
East Tennessee State University, Johnson City,
Tennessee; educational administration, Ed.D. 1985.
Teacher and Head Coach, Oak Hill High School, 
Morganton, North Carolina, 1965-1967.
Teacher, Coach, Principal, Secondary Supervisor,
Assistant Superintendent, Washington County Schools; 
Jonesboro, Tennessee, 1968-1985.
Basketball Scholarship, Student Council, Academic 
Scholarship, Men's House Government; Western 
Carolina University and University of North 
Caro1ina-Ashevllle.
Coach of the Year, Skyline Conference, 1967-68.
Academic Fellowship, Johns Hopkins Universityj.
Doctoral Fellowship, .East Tennessee State University..
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